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Abstract 
 
This thesis contributes to the research literature by reporting the results of an 
investigation that explores whether regulatory governance practices in Nigeria’s 
downstream petroleum sector are fit for purpose. The rationale for the study 
originated from issues relating to the management of Nigeria’s downstream 
petroleum sector that were identified in the extant literature. These issues were of 
such significance that their resolution could impact positively and materially on 
Nigeria’s economy and at the same time the research would fill a gap in the relevant 
literature. The data for this empirical research were collected using questionnaire and 
interview instruments and the findings were analysed against a backdrop of the 
Public Interest Theory of Regulation. The results obtained revealed perceptions of 
major weaknesses in the regulatory governance practices adopted by Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory agencies namely: the regulatory independence of Nigeria’s 
downstream regulators has declined over time; there are flaws in the accountability 
practices of Nigeria’s downstream regulators; and there are other related factors such 
as the absence of openness, poor consultation and a lack of public sensitisation that 
affect the transparency practices of Nigeria’s downstream regulators. Interestingly, 
the results also revealed that although Nigeria’s downstream regulators appear to 
possess the required skills to regulate the sector, their talents are not being fully 
utilised. Recommendations to resolve the weaknesses identified are made which, if 
properly and effectively implemented, should   have a significant positive impact on 
the Nigerian economy. Such recommendations may also be applicable to those 
countries with similar regulatory governance challenges.  
 
Keywords: Nigeria’s Downstream Petroleum Sector, Public Interest Theory, 
Regulatory Governance, Regulatory Agencies 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction  
1.1 Preamble  
Over the years Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector has increasingly become 
unstable (Okpage et al., 2012). For example, Ameh (2005) pointed out that even with 
the existence of regulatory agencies, Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector has 
experienced a number of problems including scarcity, adulteration, bunkering of 
products and corruption. Okpage et al., (2012) further stated that the sector’s 
regulatory agencies appear to have a number of weaknesses. This view was 
substantiated by the results of the government investigation after the 2012 oil subsidy 
crisis (Petroleum Task Force, 2102).  
The unexpected increase in the petroleum pump price in January 2012 resulted in a 
nationwide protest that paralysed the economy (Sunusi, 2012) and resulted in the 
establishment of investigation panels by both the executive and legislative arms of 
the government. The findings of the panels point to a number of regulatory issues 
and challenges in the sector including bribery, forgery and complicity. Specifically, 
the National Assembly reported cases of malpractice, mismanagement and fraud 
among regulated companies.  
In the same vein the Petroleum Product Pricing Regulatory Agency, a regulatory 
agency in the sector, reported a lack of adequate funding to enable them discharge 
their regulatory duties and responsibility effectively (PPPRA, 2012). Furthermore, 
companies lacking the necessary qualifications and prerequisites are now participants 
in the downstream business. Indeed, many companies who had neither depots nor 
throughput agreements were allowed to participate in the scheme despite revised 
eligibility guidelines (Sanusi, 2012). 
Another issue in the sector was the state of infrastructure,
1
 particularly the decaying 
refineries and pipelines. In this regards, Anthony et al. (2012, p. 61) observed that: 
                                       
1 The poor state of the refineries appears to be a deliberate attempt by the regulated companies to 
continue the practice of importing petroleum products in order to received outrageous amounts of 
money in the name of fuel subsidies (Nuhu-Koko, 2008).  
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the low capacity utilization of Nigeria’s state-owned refineries and 
petrochemical plants in Kaduna, Warri and Port Harcourt, the 
sorry state of repair, neglect and repeated vandalisation of the 
state-run petroleum product pipelines and oil movement 
infrastructure nationwide, the collateral damage of institutionalised 
corruption, with the frightening emergence of local nouveau riche, 
oil mafia that controls, and coordinates crude oil, and refined 
petroleum product, pipeline sabotage and theft (illegal bunkering) 
nationwide, the insatiably corrupt task force operatives that assist 
diversions of both crude oil and petroleum products, large–scale 
cross–border smuggling of petroleum products, of all of which are 
the root causes of the protracted and seemingly intractable fuel 
crises that have bedevilled the polity relentlessly for close to a 
decade now, are all predictable outcomes of government 
involvement in the downstream sectors of the Nigeria’s petroleum 
industry.  
With regards to government’s subsidy on petroleum products, Nuhu-Koko (2008) 
noted that the public still pay very high prices, suggesting that they are paying for 
inefficiencies and corruption.
2
 The government’s regulations appear to favour 
regulated companies rather than the general public (Sanusi, 2012; Akpieyi, 2009; 
Khan, 1994). This is consistent with the earlier view that the sector’s regulators seem 
to play more script of the industry.  
Sunusi (2012) argued that the system consists of very incompetent operational 
management throughout the supply chain, ranging from poor product handling to 
distribution to final consumers. Ehinomen and Adeleke (2012) noted that theft of 
petroleum products from pipelines and cross-border smuggling, as well as 
inefficiencies in handling activities in the jetties and storage depots, all result in 
considerable leakages in the supply chain. Indeed, all these problems, implicitly and 
explicitly, generate costs, which are offloaded by regulated companies and then 
indirectly passed onto final consumers. These costs are undeniably significant and 
invariably have a detrimental effect on the system, with the public at the receiving 
end.  
The above state of affairs of Nigeria’s downstream sector oil and gas industry is not 
normal, and might not be unconnected to number of problems in the system, 
including lack of good regulatory governance practice. For example, it might be 
                                       
2
 The findings of the Petroleum Task Force and industry experts indicated that the landing costs for 
the imported petroleum products in Nigeria are the highest within the West African sub-region 
(Petroleum Task Force; 2012). 
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reasonable to say that because of a lack of good regulatory governance practice a 
regulator might identify with the interest of the industry, rather than striking a 
balance between those of industry and public. Further, it might be because of a lack 
of an effective regulator (and related governance) that the sector has issues, for 
instance, relating to pricing, product shortages, and licensing.  
 
This study investigates whether a lack of good governance in the regulation of the 
sector contributes to the issues of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector.  
1.2 Objectives and research questions of the study  
This section discusses the aim and objectives of the study the development of which 
have been influenced by the wider literature on regulatory governance practice. The 
major factors leading to the implementation of successful regulatory governance 
systems are the concepts of accountability, transparency, responsibility and fairness 
(Yakasai, 2001). The International Monitory Fund (IMF) in 2004 and the World 
Bank in 2005 issued frameworks for good regulatory governance principles. The 
IMF framework focused on four characteristics: independence, accountability, 
transparency and expertise. Good regulatory governance practice enables and 
inspires stakeholders to formulate and implement policies that are conducive to all 
the parties involved in order to attain the policy objectives without hindrance 
(Gregory, 2000). Practicing good regulatory governance is the primary aspect of 
economic development in any society (Gregory, 2000). Such practices also help to 
generate and preserve an environment that encourages capital investment (Oman, 
2001).  
A good regulatory governance system can be well-defined by the ability of a 
regulatory agency to effectively and efficiently manage resources, and to design and 
implement regulatory policies in order to meet regulatory objectives (Kaufman, 
2000). There are four dimensions of good regulatory governance practice which have 
been widely considered as the major principles for achieving regulatory best practice 
(Quintyn, 2002). These dimensions are interrelated and underpin each other at 
various levels to ensure good regulatory best practice (Dinar, 2000). Regulatory 
independence, regulatory accountability and regulatory transparency are two sides of 
the same coin. Regulatory expertise supports the three mechanisms (Parker, 2002). 
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Regulatory accountability and regulatory transparency are mechanisms for 
preserving regulatory independence (World Bank, 2003). This could be achieved by 
making regulatory actions and regulatory decisions accountable and transparent but 
this is dependent on the level of regulatory expertise (OECD, 2002).  These four 
dimensions are as follows: 
(a) Regulatory Independence 
Regulatory independence refers to the level of regulators’ autonomy in relation to 
their regulatory decisions and finance (McCabe and Nowak 2008). For any 
regulatory agency to discharge its duties effectively and efficiently it has to have a 
legal mandate that make it autonomous from outside interference (IMF, 2004). 
Further, the possibility of attaining regulatory objectives by regulators relies on the 
adequacy of independence mechanisms that are in place.  Quintyn et al., (2002) 
argued that it is vital for the regulatory agency to be protected from inappropriate 
influence from the political domain and from the regulated firms in order to achieve 
the stated regulatory objectives. They also stated that regulatory agencies’ 
independence raises the opportunity for ensuring credible regulatory policy.  
A good regulatory governance regime should be reinforced by legislative laws 
stating clearly the autonomy requirements (Parker, 2002).  The general public 
through their representatives in parliament might initiate certain objectives for 
regulators to adhere to (Robert et al., 2012). Since regulatory independence is a 
necessary mechanism for good regulatory governance practice, this requires 
instruments, mechanisms and procedures to be put in place to preserve the autonomy 
of the agency from political and regulated entity interference (Pelkmans et al., 2000).  
(b) Regulatory Accountability 
Regulatory independence cannot be realised without effective regulatory 
accountability practice (Dinar, 2000).  Regulatory accountability provides a 
transparent mechanism by which the regulatory agency has to explain and account 
for its actions (IMF, 2004). Thus, regulatory accountability encompasses the 
instruction to embark on certain actions or to desist from such actions and provides 
an account of such activities (OECD, 2000). Quintyn et al., (2002) further stated that 
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regulatory accountability is not only about being accountable, but it is also a 
requirement for validating such reported activities and ensuring the readiness of 
regulators to face any possible consequences for their actions.  
To ensure good regulatory governance practice, regulatory agencies must justify any 
actions they are planning to undertake, how they will go about implementing such 
decisions and the outcome of those decisions (OECD, 2002).  For the effectiveness 
of regulatory governance practice the regulators should disclose all pertinent 
information regarding regulatory rules to the general public, regulated entities, 
government and to the legislature (IMF, 2004). An effective regulatory 
accountability practice is crucial for ensuring efficient regulatory decision-making 
(Parker, 2002). Thus, effective regulatory best practice entails proper accountability 
practice. 
(c) Regulatory transparency  
Regulatory transparency is regarded as the environment within which regulatory 
agency’s goals and objectives are carried out in a transparent manner (McCabe and 
Nowak, 2008).  Dinar, (2000) stated that regulators should consult all stakeholders 
on any regulatory decisions and explain the rationale for embarking on such decision. 
It is vital that information about regulatory policy is easily accessible by regulated 
firms and the general public and that this information is made available in a 
comprehensive and timely manner (IMF 2000). Parker, (2000) pointed out that 
regulatory transparency has been recognised as a good mechanism for ensuring 
regulatory best practice.  He further adds that for regulators to achieve their stated 
objectives a greater degree of transparency practice throughout the regulatory 
process is required. In addition, implementation of regulatory transparency practice 
has become an influential mechanism for preventing poor regulatory governance 
practices (World Bank, 2005). 
(d) Regulatory Expertise 
Good regulatory governance practice requires the regulatory agency’s staff to 
possesses the necessary skills and knowledge about the industry they are regulating 
(OECD, 2002). Regulators should be highly trained in order for them to pursue the 
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regulatory agency’s goals without compromising them due to their lack of 
knowledge or self-interest (Dinar, 2000). Ensuring that regulators have the necessary 
expertise has become a major concern with respect to the need for regulators 
achieving their regulatory objectives. For example, Quintyn et al., (2002) pointed out 
that the appointment of regulatory agency’s heads should be based on expertise and 
proven integrity. The tenure and criteria for removal should be clearly stated (IMF, 
2004). Good regulatory governance practice cannot be achieved without adequate 
skills/ expertise (McCabe and Nowak, 2008). Thus, regulatory expertise will 
undoubtedly ensure and improve the quality of regulation and strengthen the 
credibility of the regulatory institution (Dinar, 2000). Parker, (2002) argued that an 
appropriate level of regulatory agencies’ expertise is a prerequisite to ensure that 
regulatory independence, regulatory accountability and regulatory transparency are 
achieved in a satisfactory manner.  
 
The four dimension discussed above are the pillars for ensuring good regulatory 
governance practice. These four dimensions have been widely being discussed in the 
regulatory governance literature (Dinar, 2000, Parker, 2002, OECD, 2002, Quintyn 
et al., 2002, World Bank, 2003, IMF, 2004 and McCabe & Nowak 2008). Similarly, 
this study reviewed the four dimensions of good regulatory governance practice. The 
aims and objectives of this study were formulated in line with the four dimensions of 
good regulatory governance practice. Therefore, based on the literature reviewed and 
the anecdotal evidence concerning the operations of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum 
sector the following aim and objectives were developed:  
Aim-This study aims to critically investigate the impact of regulatory governance 
practice on Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector. 
 Objectives- 
1. To critically assess the state of regulatory independence of Nigeria’s 
downstream petroleum sector in relation to good regulatory governance 
practice.  
2. To critically examine the level of regulatory accountability of Nigeria’s 
downstream petroleum sector in relation to good regulatory governance 
practice. 
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3. To critically measure the state of regulatory transparency of Nigeria’s 
downstream petroleum sector in relation to good regulatory governance 
practice. 
4. To critically evaluate the level of regulatory expertise of Nigeria’s 
downstream petroleum sector in relation to good regulatory governance 
practice. 
These objectives were set as a means of addressing the following research question: 
To what extent is the regulatory governance practice in Nigeria’s downstream 
petroleum sector fit for purpose?  
1.3 Research hypotheses 
In line with the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, and the above stated objectives, the 
following research hypotheses were developed for testing in this study:  
Main research hypothesis 
HO1 – The regulatory governance practice in Nigeria’s downstream petroleum 
sector is not fit for purpose. 
Sub-hypotheses 
HO1 – There are inadequate independence arrangements in place to enable 
Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies to ensure good regulatory governance 
practice in the sector. 
HO2 – Inadequate accountability mechanisms are in place and these affect the 
regulatory governance practice of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies. 
HO3 – Inadequate transparency mechanisms are in place and these affect the 
regulatory governance practice of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies. 
HO4 – Lack of required expertise affects the regulatory governance practice of 
Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies. 
The originality and expected contribution of the study are discussed below. 
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1.3.1 Originality, significance and expected contributions of the study 
It has been argued that both oil-producing and non-oil-producing countries must 
maintain efficient downstream petroleum sectors to ensure their economic growth 
and development (Ameh, 2005). Therefore, in light of the relevance of Nigeria’s 
downstream petroleum sector to its economy, this research is of importance to the 
socio-political and economic development of Nigeria.  
 
Firstly, the study will be of significant economic consequence for Nigeria and other 
countries that face similar challenges to Nigeria’s downstream sector, taking into 
consideration the significance of the petroleum resources. For example, Nigeria’s 
economy is heavily reliant on the income derived from the sale of oil and gas. As 
Sunusi (2010) emphasised, 95% of foreign exchange earnings, 83% of Government 
revenue and over 80% of Nigeria’s GDP are derived from the sales of petroleum 
resources. Hence, this research, which seeks to explore the regulatory governance 
mechanism in Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector, has the potential to add 
significant value to the Nigeria’s oil and gas sector.  
Secondly, as no previous research has been carried out in relation to the regulatory 
governance of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector, this research can be regarded 
as a pioneering study into the regulatory agencies involved. The study will contribute 
to the existing literature on regulatory governance and will enable other researchers 
to use it as a reference for further investigation. Its findings may also be of benefit 
not only to the Nigeria’s government but also to other countries that face similar 
challenges. 
Thirdly, Glaeser and Shleifer (2003) believe that poor regulatory governance 
practices result in the perceived failings of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector. 
As such, the findings of this study might inspire the government and other regulatory 
agencies to start thinking positively about the future of regulation in the country, not 
only for the sector under current study, but for all other sectors as well.  
Fourthly, the recommendations made by this thesis may offer valuable solutions of 
significant importance to the downstream sector. Hence, this research, which seeks to 
explore the regulatory governance mechanism of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum 
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sector, could considerably enhance the efficiency of operations within the 
downstream petroleum sector.  
The next section introduces the theoretical framework for this study. 
1.3.2 Theoretical framework and research methodology  
This study adopts the Public Interest Theory (PIT) of regulation. The theory is based 
on the premise that government regulations are intended to correct market 
inefficiencies and the inequality in the distribution of scarce resources for the welfare 
of all (Levy and Spiller, 1996). Levy and Spiller (1994) further stated that 
governmental regulations are supposed to benefit the public. Indeed, the regulators 
are regarded as representing the general public rather than private interests. 
In Levy and Spiller (1996), the Public Interest Theory of regulations is considered 
the best mechanism of resource allocation. In advanced economies, demand and 
supply forces determine the distribution of scarce resources (Levy and Spiller, 1996). 
Levy and Spiller (1994) argue that the best method of allocating resources under 
normal conditions is by means of a market mechanism. These circumstances, 
however, are not adhered to in practice because of the difficulty in allocating scarce 
resources. This difficulty, therefore, calls for other mechanisms that can enhance 
resource allocation (Adams and Tower, 1994). Levy and Spiller (1996) and Arrow 
(1970) argue that only mechanisms governed by governmental regulations can 
ensure the successful allocation of scarce resources (see Chapter 4). In the light of 
the above, Nigeria’s downstream regulations were designed for the benefit of the 
general public, hence, the adoption of PIT, which is the most widely used in 
regulatory governance studies. Despite adopting PIT for this study, this thesis also 
acknowledges that the regulatory capture theory and the agency theory could also be 
applicable in the study of regulatory governance of downstream petroleum sector 
(see Chapter 4). 
The literature review in Chapter 5 indicates that the adoption of an appropriate 
research philosophy, methodology, methods and techniques is necessary in any 
social science research (Jonker and Pennink, 2010). With regard to the above, this 
research reviewed various philosophical assumptions and research paradigms 
associated with social science research. There are a number of frameworks 
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developed by scholars in relation to what comprises philosophical paradigms, within 
the perspective of social and organisational theory (see Chapter 5). Several authors 
argue that a researcher should adopt a paradigm for his/her research because it 
influences how knowledge is studied and interpreted (Creswell, 2013, Bogdan and 
Biklen, 1998, Cohen and Manion, 1994).  
In this research, the pragmatic paradigm is adopted because it is the underlying 
philosophical framework for mixed-methods research (Somekh and Lewin, 2005; 
Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003; Creswell and Clark, 2007 – see Chapter 5). Jonker 
and Pennik (2010) argue that the use of a single research approach has many 
weaknesses. Indeed, a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods of data 
collection helps to validate the data (Collis and Hussey, 2003; Sekaran, 2006). In the 
context of this thesis, a questionnaire and interviews were used as data gathering 
methods. Thus, 150 questionnaires were administered to all stakeholders, of which 
68% were completed and returned. In addition, 20 experts were also interviewed.  
1.3.3 Structure of the thesis 
This study is divided into eight chapters (see Figure 1.1). The current chapter 
presents the research problems, aim and objectives, research hypotheses and the 
significance of the study. In addition, the theoretical framework, method and 
methodology employed in the study are stated. 
Chapter Two reviews literature relevant to the study, which includes regulatory 
governance, and explores the general regulatory governance framework. This chapter 
contributes immensely to the content of the questionnaire.  
Chapter Three provides an overview of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector, 
together with its structure. In addition, the chapter highlights the primary regulations 
of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector, as contained in the Petroleum Act 1969 
(amended in 1990 and 1998). Furthermore, it thoroughly discusses the emergence of 
three Nigerian downstream regulatory agencies and their regulatory responsibilities. 
It goes on to give an overview of regulatory governance in the petroleum sector 
around the world. The issue of petroleum subsidies is also reviewed as well as the 
regulatory governance issues confronting Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector in 
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particular. The analysis undertaken in this chapter also helps to guide the format of 
the questionnaire used in this research.  
In Chapter 4, the theoretical framework adopted for this study is thoroughly 
discussed. Comprehensive reviews of the Public Interest Theory of regulations, its 
variables and the debates surrounding the theory are presented. The chapter also 
explores the justifications for applying PIT as a theoretical framework for this study. 
Other regulatory governance theories are discussed, along with the reasons why they 
were not chosen as the theoretical framework for this study.  
The research methodology and methods for this study are highlighted in Chapter 5. 
The chapter begins with a general discussion of the philosophical assumptions and 
the ontological and epistemological debate. It also reviews the research paradigms 
and justifies the reason for adopting a pragmatic paradigm. The research hypotheses 
are also developed here, as is the justification for using the mixed-method research 
technique and research instruments (questionnaire and interview) chosen for the 
study. This is followed by a description of the data analysis methods and the 
statistical package employed in this study.  
Chapter six reviews the findings of the data collected from the questionnaires. The 
opinions of the respondents on each of the variables are analysed and interpreted 
using the descriptive statistics method. Mann-Whitney tests and cross tabulations are 
run to determine whether differences exist between the respondent groups.  
In Chapter 7, the follow up interviews are presented and analysed.  
In Chapter 8, which concludes and summarises the thesis, the limitations encountered 
during the study and recommendations for further research in relation to regulatory 
governance practice of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector are outlined.  
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Figure 1.1: Structure of the thesis   
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CHAPTER TWO 
An overview of regulatory governance 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to review literature on regulatory governance, which will 
provide the theoretical basis for this study. It is divided into six sections. Section 2.2 
reviews the need for economic regulation, Section 2.3 the concept of regulatory 
governance. The framework of good regulatory governance is the subject of Section 
2.4 and the chapter is concluded in Section 2.5.  
2.2 The need for economic regulation  
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD) there are many reasons for government regulations, both social and 
economic (OECD, 1996). Guasch and Hahn (1999) argue that economic regulations 
are concerned with the regulation of market entry by firms, service delivery, prices, 
profits, revenue and output. Regulations are a set of rules (laws or principles) 
intended to control, govern or conduct behaviour (Breyer, 1982). Alternatively, they 
could be said to define the formulation and implementation of an authority to manage 
the conduct of entities, people, companies, organisations or institutions (Stern and 
Cubbin, 2005). They become necessary when a range of behaviours yield a variety of 
consequences, of which only some are desirable (Breyer, 1982); the regulating entity 
determines which consequences are desirable or acceptable (Stern, 2005), and then 
proscribes conduct that leads to undesirable outcomes, or encourages conduct that 
results in the desired consequences (Stern, and Holder, 1999).  
Ever since the first privatisation, the need to separate regulation from policy-making 
has been obvious (Barth et al., 2003). Since what was publicly owned was now 
transferred to private sector, whose interest is to maximise profits, the need for 
regulation cannot be over-emphasised. Thus, the purpose of government regulations 
is to protect public interests (Shleifer, 2005). Various regulations are put in place to 
defend particular interests or sets of special interests; i.e. conduct, which yields 
benefits, is endorsed by the regulating body (Shleifer, 2005).  
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Regulations that are deemed to be in the best interest of the common good, indirectly 
and over time, protect a special interest in the short term (Mitnick, 1980). Mitnick, 
(1980) argues that protection during regulation extends to intangible values such as 
an individual's civil rights, potential yields of natural resources and changed future 
values for both material property and rights of access and conduct. For instance, in 
the US the rights of an individual to profit from legal activities and the rights of 
future generations to benefit from natural resources are both protected through the 
regulated use of publicly owned lands (Mitnick, 1980).  
Over the past decade, economic regulation has become a major concern, as 
ineffective regulation has been associated with weaknesses in the productivity rates 
of many industrialised countries (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003). For instance, Shleifer 
(2005) notes that government regulates the business environment because 
corporations are chartered by states, as such corporate commerce should be 
regulated. The state charter creates a corporation and the government regulates the 
activities of the corporation.  
On the other hand, the proponents of market failure argue that there are some serious 
exceptions. Johnston and Schumacher (2000) assert that free markets often fail to 
attain maximum market efficiency, which results in resources being wasted. A clear 
example of this is the utility services industry. Horvat and Branko (1982) hold the 
view that if there is free market competition between utilities there would be 
duplication as all the various companies would erect telephone and electric poles and 
lay waterlines, etc, which would be unnecessary and result in market failure. Thus 
Jacob et al., (2010) argue that it is vital for the government to regulate competition in 
order to avoid market failure.  
Johnston and Schumacher (2000) identified market failure as the result of a market 
misjudging what is important. Often markets do not respond to real needs, for 
instance safety, medical care, libraries, and fairness in commerce, employment and 
health provisions. Market failures can only be remedied through government 
regulation. Such measures include minimum wage laws, health codes, safety 
standards, architectural standards and regulations that will benefit society at large 
(Johnston and Schumacher, 2000).  
15 
 
Another justification for the introduction of government regulations is the need to 
protect businesses (Bockman, 2011). Bockman (2011) argues that government 
guidelines are established to protect many rights that are not protected by free market 
mechanisms. Many scholars also argue that government protection of businesses is 
necessary to prevent conflict between various interest groups. For example, Kahn 
(1988) is of the opinion that employees deserve fair wages, health and safety 
protection and social security as a matter of right. Consumers, on the other hand, 
should be protected from the possibility of inherent health problems arising from the 
goods and services they purchase or consume (Kahn, 1988). Shleifer (2005) also 
notes that it is the right of all those who have a stake in the market to receive such 
protection or treatment from foreseen possible consequences. Kamar (1998) argues 
that government regulations are of paramount importance to overcome judicial 
inefficiency. For example, chemical waste, such as pollution, may cause harm to 
victims. In this scenario, it may not be possible to bring the culprit to justice, as it 
may be difficult to identify the root cause of the pollution. Thus, regulation is said to 
be appropriate when an activity creating public pollution is deemed sufficiently 
important (Bockman, 2011).  
In direct contrast, the proponents of deregulation, such as Robert and Scapens 
(1985), argue that corporations should not have to be created by governments. 
Bockman (2011) observes that in a community that regards the individual as a 
sovereign being, corporate commerce can and does arise through individual 
initiative. Then corporate entities are merely an extension of the idea of freedom of 
association and exist for making people economically prosperous (Levine and 
Forrence, 1990).  
With respect to market failure or inefficiency, Dunleavy (1994) argue that 
establishing monopolies in public utilities actually secures efficiency in the end. For 
example, a strike is more crippling in the case of a public utility than in the case of a 
firm that does not enjoy a legal monopoly. In preventing inefficiency, strikes must 
also be prohibited (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994). However, that in turn infringes the 
right of workers to withhold their services. Indeed, market failure is remedied at the 
expense of a serious loss of freedom (Levine and Forrence, 1990). It could be argued 
that it would be morally better to accept the inefficiencies, given that in any political 
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system it is unreasonable to expect perfect efficiency (Levine and Forrence, 1990; 
Noll, 1989; Frey, 1983; Robert 1999).  
According to Zhang (2009), another problem concerning market failure arises when 
producing important but not commercially viable goods and services; and 
government remedies contribute to their own share of hazards. Political failures are 
even more dangerous than market failures (Bailey and Pack, 1995). Kaufmann et al. 
(2004) believe that weak laws are widespread and it is difficult to remedy 
undesirable consequences. Similarly, it is easy to establish bureaucracies, but it is 
difficult or even impossible to do away with them, as the regulators cannot be sued; 
thus, their errors are not open to legal correction (Dunleavy, 1994). Government 
regulation involves the coercion of some people for reasons that do not justify such 
coercion. Moreover, this practice is highly inefficient (Frey, 1983). The regulation of 
markets may not result in welfare improvements like the economic outcome under 
imperfect market conditions. Indeed, literature has identified various circumstances 
where the regulation of markets might reduce rather than increase economic welfare. 
Regulation of a firm’s rate of return could lead to incentives to over-invest (Levine 
and Forrence, 1990, Noll, 1989, Frey, 1983, Robert, 1979, Bailey and Pack, 1995). 
Despite these criticisms, government intervention in business is necessary in order to 
effectively distribute scarce resources (Zhang, 2009). 
2.3 The concept of regulatory governance 
Nations the world over have established regulatory institutions responsible for 
economic and social activities (Barth et al., 2006). The primary objective of these 
regulatory agencies is to ensure that regulatory policies serve the interests of the 
public (Ahunwan, 2002). These regulatory agencies also need to ensure that 
regulations and regulatory mechanisms are effectively designed, managed and 
implemented, and ensure that the bodies they regulate provide a quality service. 
Zhang (2010) posited that a credible regulatory agency is an integral part of a good 
regulatory governance system, which assists in shaping the relationship between 
citizens, businesses and the state. Thus an effective regulatory governance system 
supports socioeconomic development and the rule of law and helps regulators to 
make informed decisions about what, whom and how to regulate (Zhang el al. 2005).  
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According to the OECD (2002), regulatory governance covers both the design and 
implementation of instruments and the methods for measuring the impact of 
regulation, as well as principles of good governance. These principles include 
accountability, transparency, efficiency, adaptability and consistency. Of these 
principles, however, it is argued that effective accountability and transparency 
practice are prerequisites for regulatory governance. Ahunwan (2002) posited that 
good regulatory governance is fundamental to the efficient management of natural 
resources. Moreover, Ogunleye (2008) stressed that good regulatory governance 
focuses on the exploitation of a country’s natural resources to attain social and 
economic developments. According to Cariño (2004), good regulatory governance 
practice prevents corruption and rent-seeking behaviour (the manipulation of 
political, social and economic activities for the purpose of creating new wealth). The 
literature suggests that rules and regulations are established to ensure transparency, 
accountability and credibility, and to maintain effective governance systems that 
promote good organisational performance (Oman, 2001). 
Consequently, the adoption and implementation of an effective and efficient 
regulatory governance system can contribute to the mitigation of economic social 
challenges (Zhang, 2010). This involves establishing strong, viable regulatory 
agencies and institutional leadership and oversight, as well as enhancing 
accountability and transparency (Cariño, 2004). Indeed, effective regulation 
emphasises the consultation, communication and engagement of citizens across all 
levels of government, and internationally, and strengthens the capacity for regulatory 
management within the public service (OECD, 2010). 
According to Goodhart and Charles (2001), the promotion and practice of good 
regulatory governance is the shared responsibility of regulatory agencies and market 
participants. Robust regulations enhance the system-wide capacity to act collectively 
in a manner that deters unsound market practices and the occurrence of moral 
hazards, and enhances the effectiveness of the system-wide management of stress 
(Goodhart and Charles, 2001).  
Quintyn et al. (2003) identified the most significant responsibilities of these 
regulatory agencies as follows:  
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(a) the drafting and amending of new regulations in line with the 
regulatory mandate; 
(b) ensuring compliance and enforcement of rules in line with inspection 
bodies, audit offices and judiciary; and  
(c) monitoring and reporting on the operation of regulatory processes, 
institutions and systems.  
Good regulatory governance helps to promote sound practices among market 
participants (Rossi and Marco, 1999). Regulators do not operate in a vacuum, but are 
influenced by both economic and political institutions and the quality of their 
governance (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003). The quality of public sector governance 
and governance practices in the public sector has an impact on the regulatory 
governance sector (Quintyn et al., 2007).  
Regulatory agencies (and their governance) have a significant impact on the 
economic development and stability within industrial sectors (Schinasi and Garry, 
2003). In order to promote stability, regulatory agencies emphasise governance-
related issues, such as: transparency and the disclosure of information on risks; 
strengthening market discipline via the provision of better information and clarity on 
policy positions; the analysis of qualitative dimensions, such as information-sharing 
arrangements; and supervisory cooperation (Sundrarajan et al., 2003). 
Thus regulatory agencies play a significant role in overseeing, promoting and 
implementing sound practices in their areas of jurisdiction (Rodrik, 2002). To 
achieve these objectives, regulatory agencies need to establish and implement sound 
governance practices (Barth et al., 2000). By practicing good governance, the 
credibility of regulatory agencies would be enhanced. However, in the event of the 
failure of effective governance principles, regulatory agencies may lose their 
credibility and moral authority to promote good practices in the institutions they 
oversee (La Porta, 2000). This scenario could create moral hazard problems (e.g. 
unethical behaviour and corruption) and contribute to unsound market practices, 
which in turn, cannot be addressed without good public sector governance (Schwartz, 
1981). One of the main preconditions for good regulatory governance is good public 
sector governance, for which the key components include: 
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 the absence of corruption; 
 the implementation of a robust approach to competition policies;  
 an effective legal and judicial system; and  
 having an ‘arm’s length’ approach to government ownership (Kaufmann, 
2002).  
However, it is recognised that as long as there is nothing to stop politicians 
interfering in the regulatory process, regulatory governance cannot be effective 
(Kaufmann and Kraay, 2003). The regulatory institutions in OECD countries have 
played a key role in promoting a ‘whole-of-government’ approach relating to 
reviewing and reforming the existing regulations (IMF, 2004).  
The key features of successful regulatory governance systems include the adoption of 
a broad alignment of the incentives for institutions, policymakers, regulators, 
business and other stakeholders (La Porta, 2000). These incentives require 
transparency, predictability, role clarity and clear rules and regulations. As a result, 
each party of a regulatory transaction has an understanding of the other parties’ 
objectives, good communication and effective sanctions against improper or 
prohibited conduct (Large and Andrew, 2003). However, if the incentives are not 
aligned, negative outcomes typically arise, such as corruption, the development and 
implementation of regulations for the benefit of a few at the expense of the broader 
community (Johnston et al., 2001). 
In developing countries, a regulatory governance system is frequently used (by 
narrow interests) as a vehicle to strengthen rent seeking and to achieve unnecessary 
and very damaging control over key parts of the economy (Borio, 2006). Therefore, 
one key question for the promotion of reforms in developing countries is how the 
institutionalisation of regulatory governance arrangements helps to safeguard rent 
seeking and minimise corruption (Johnston et al., 2001). 
The adoption of a robust regulatory governance system has become a major issue 
around the world, probably because good governance plays a significant role in the 
growth of every organisation, either public or private. In this regard, Okeahalam and 
Akinboade (2003) observed that the manner in which institutions exercise their 
powers in running their activities is influenced by the availability of good regulatory 
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governance practices. The requirement for a regulatory governance system applies to 
public and private institutions and involves the development of rules, laws and 
recognised business exercises, which jointly direct the bond, in a market economy, 
between all interest groups (Johnston et al., 2001). Rules and regulations can be used 
to reconcile the conflicting interests of all the stakeholders concerned, be it investors, 
corporate entities, suppliers, management, customers, shareholders, or society as a 
whole (Yakasai, 2001). 
According to Reed (2002), the proper implementation of robust regulations may 
prevent some stakeholders from taking advantage of the sector and reduce potential 
unethical practices (e.g. corruption). Indeed, having a good regulatory governance 
mechanism prevents corruption and manipulation (Rafael et al., 2000).  
Good regulatory governance is difficult to define (Dias and Nwete, 2004). For 
example, Kaufman et al. (2009), view it as:  
 the ability and capability to manage resources effectively and efficiently; and 
 the formulation, implementation and enforcement of sound policies and 
regulations in order to achieve designated objectives.  
Good regulatory governance encompasses the respect of the regulatory agency for 
the broader goals and policies of the legislature (Kirkpatrick, and Parker, 2004). In 
support of this theme, Gregory (2000) identified the use of critical supervisory tools 
(such as sanctioning and enforcement, including the revoking of licenses) to ensure 
the stability of the system; this can have a far-reaching impact on stakeholders’ 
property rights. therefore Safeguarding the integrity of the supervisory function is a 
key objective that should be based on high quality governance practices (Ladegaard, 
2005).  
Stern and Holder (1999), however, argued that preserving the integrity of the 
regulatory responsibilities to ensure its effectiveness could be problematic. 
Regulatory functions are typically ‘invisible’ and this invisibility makes it open to 
interference from both politicians and supervisory entities (World Bank, 2003). 
Examples of government interference that take place in many countries include the 
granting of forbearance, by allowing institutions to continually breach regulations 
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without punishment, and the lack of enforcing sanctions (Levy and Spiller, 1994). 
Government interference may artificially extend the life of insolvent institutions and 
therefore lead to unfair competition and higher costs for the taxpayer at a later stage 
(IMF, 2004). In more extreme cases, government interference may also threaten the 
stability of the sector and lead to systemic problems (OECD, 1999). These 
observations underline the high quality governance needed to maximise the potential 
for regulatory agency success.  
To understand whether a system of regulatory governance is good, or is in need of 
reform, it is important to determine the criteria for measuring regulatory quality. 
Regulatory governance quality can be evaluated in terms of the quality of the 
processes and the quality of the outcomes of the regulations (Baldwin et al., 2011). In 
assessing the outcomes of a regulatory regime, effectiveness and efficiency are 
yardsticks (Arrow, 1970). An effective regulation helps to achieve the social welfare 
objectives set down by the government for the regulatory authority (Baron, 1988). In 
developing countries, the social welfare objectives of regulation are likely to be less 
concerned with the pursuit of economic efficiency, but more with wider goals to 
promote sustainable development and the eradication of poverty (Borio, 2006). On 
the other hand, efficient regulation allows social welfare objectives to be achieved 
more economically (Baron, 1988). There are two forms of economic costs of 
regulation: 
(a)  administrative costs incurred directly due to the regulatory system, 
which are reflected in the budget appropriations of the regulatory 
bodies and authorised by the government; and  
(b)  costs of regulatory compliance; this cost is incurred externally by the 
regulatory agency and falls onto the producers and consumers, in 
terms of the economic costs of both adhering to the regulations and 
evading and avoiding them (Guasch and Hahn, 1999).  
The capability, capacity and competence of the state of providing strong and reliable 
regulatory institutions are important determinants of how well markets perform 
(Dinar, 2000). A nation with a developed institutional capacity is more likely to be 
able to formulate and implement effective regulation, which may contribute to 
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improvement in the growth of the economy (World Bank, 2003). Good regulatory 
governance is characterised by predictable, open, progressive and enlightened policy-
making, a bureaucracy built on professionalism, a strong civil society participating in 
public affairs, with an executive arm of the government accountable for its actions, 
and all following the rule of law (Campbell and Bhatia, 1998). The weaknesses in the 
institutional capacity to deliver good governance may adversely affect the economic 
development of the country (World Bank, 2002).  
According to Kirkpatrick et al. (2004), regulatory institutions are relatively new to 
developing countries and therefore evidence showing the quality of regulation may 
be limited. Kirkpatrick et al. (2004) further add that the evidence that is available in 
developing countries reveals that the outcomes of post-privatisation regulation have 
been poor. In areas where research was conducted, a number of regulatory failures 
were exposed (Chong, and De Silanes, 2005). For example, Stern and Hodder (1999) 
carried out a study across Asia; their findings were that that there is a significant 
difference between the practices and a considerable shortfall when compared to 
regulatory best practices undertaken in the USA and the UK. Cook and Kirkpatrick 
(2003) also discovered that creating effective regulation and a competitive 
environment is a difficult and slow process in developing countries.  
Regulation in Africa is being examined as part of individual sector initiatives, but 
these efforts are uncoordinated and implementation is left to follow privatisation 
instead of being put in place at the same time (Campbell-White and Bhatia, 1998). In 
relation to regulatory governance, the structures in these countries are associated 
with institutional failures and a bureaucratic approach that restricts enterprise 
(Laffont and Tirole, 1991). In Africa, regulatory authorities are characterised by a 
lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities and the adoption of policy-making 
roles independent of the government (Schwella, 2002). Knight-John (2002) observes 
that in Africa the policies governing the regulatory governance process have been ad-
hoc and based on short-term political interests, with deficiencies apparent at each 
stage of the process. The transitional economies’ experience also demonstrates much 
inconsistency in the performance of the newly established regulatory institutions 
(Cave and Stern, 1998).  
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Kirkpatrick et al. (2004) showed that limited regulatory governance capacity 
contributed to the instability of the financial sector during the 1997 Asian crisis. 
Kirkpatrick and Parker (2004) found that the liberalisation of the financial sector in 
African economies exposed the weakness of financial regulation and resulted in 
widespread bank failures and systemic weaknesses. The World Bank (2001) 
emphasises the importance of improving regulatory governance regimes and building 
institutions and capacity effectively to supervise the private sector. Similarly, the 
Asian Development Bank (2000) also stressed the need for improving the regulatory 
governance system. Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), Hall and Jones (1999) and Barro 
(2000) identified several fundamental contributing effects of good regulatory 
governance on higher per capita incomes in the long run, using regressions with 
instrumental variables on a cross-section of countries. The World Bank (2003), 
Chenard et al. (2004) and Malyshev (2006) suggested that in order for good 
regulatory governance to improve economic performance, the climate for capital 
creation should be enhanced. According to Kaufmann et al. (2010), differences in the 
effectiveness of public spending can be described by the quality of good regulatory 
governance. Olson et al. (1998) found that productivity growth is higher in countries 
with superior institutions and quality regulation and governance.  
2.4 The dimensions of good regulatory governance system 
Parker (1999) suggests that an effective regulatory governance regime is one that 
balances consistency, transparency and accountability. In this regard, Zhang (2010) 
noted that accountability requires the regulators to be accountable for their actions, to 
observe the rules of due process when arriving at their decisions, and to operate 
within their legal powers. Pelkmans et al. (2000) believe that transparency relates to 
regulatory decisions being reached in a way that is revealed to all interested parties. 
McCabe and Nowak (2008) stated that the process that provides regulatory 
legitimacy is consistency. Estache and Kouassi (2002) and Dinar (2000) argue that 
inconsistency in regulatory decisions undermines public confidence in a regulatory 
regime. Inconsistencies lead to investor uncertainty, which increases the cost of 
capital and thus diminishes the willingness to invest (Dinar, 2000). Political 
interference has the tendency to undermine regulatory reliability and the political 
elite are able to intervene and alter the regulatory policy for their own political 
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advantage (Parker, 2002). Regulatory consistency can easily be accomplished when 
there are independent regulatory arrangements (Dinar, 2000).  
The principles of good regulatory governance such as due process, integrity, 
transparency, accountability and independence are beyond the measures of 
operational performance. These principles should guarantee good policy formulation 
and assist in reducing fraud by offering effective monitoring for fraudulent activities 
within the sector (IMF, 2004). The role of a regulatory agency in any nation is to 
regulate and ensure control within its jurisdiction, as well as ensuring adequate 
protection within its boundary. A number of studies (for example IMF, 2004; World 
Bank, 2003; OECD, 2002; and Quintyn et al., 2002) have identified that the 
following four prerequisites form the basis of good regulatory governance: (i) 
regulatory independence; (ii) regulatory accountability; (iii) regulatory transparency; 
and (iv) regulatory expertise. 
2.4.1 Regulatory independence 
One possible way to reduce the potential for interference in the regulatory process is 
the creation of independent regulatory agencies (OECD, 2002). This can be 
achieved, for example, by: 
(a) insulating the regulatory agency from unnecessary interference from 
politicians and supervisory entities; and 
(b) delegating tasks related to economic and social regulation to 
independent agencies (e.g. a specific ministry, or a local body) as 
opposed to a government agency (Quintyn et al., 2002).  
Agency independence increases the likelihood of being able to make credible policy 
commitments. Parker and Kirkpatrick (2007) stressed that a good regulation 
governance system needs to be supported by parliamentary mandate. The public, 
through legislature, may instruct regulators to achieve certain results (Robert et al., 
2012). Autonomy, as a requisite of agencies’ regulatory governance, involves 
procedures, mechanisms and instruments aimed at guaranteeing the independence of 
the agency from political authorities, the independent management of the agencies 
managerial resources and the regulation of the sector (Pelkmans et al., 2000). 
According to Gilardi (2006), political autonomy signifies the level of the regulatory 
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agencies’ independence from government authorities and is measured by indicators 
that reflect the autonomy of the agencies’ decision-making. Likewise, managerial 
autonomy includes the freedom enjoyed by the regulatory agency to determine the 
management of its resources and is measured by indicators that reflect the powers of 
the agency to determine its organisational structure and the use of its budget 
(Quintyn et al., 2003).  
2.4.2 Regulatory accountability 
As stated earlier, effective independence cannot be achieved without adequate 
accountability. Gray et al. (1996) viewed regulatory accountability as the obligation 
to provide an account (not necessarily in monetary terms) or a reckoning of those 
actions for which one is held answerable. Thus, accountability involves two 
responsibilities: the mandate to embark on particular actions (or refrain from 
undertaking such actions) and the duty to provide an account of those actions (Gray 
et al., 1996). Lawal (2008) posited that accountability is greater than an undertaking 
to account for what has already been completed; rather it also involves the 
prerequisite for the validation of the reported activities and the willingness to face 
any consequences.  
Accountability is essential for a regulatory agency if it is to justify its actions against 
the background of the mandate it has been given. Regulatory institutions should be 
accountable to those who delegated the responsibility (i.e. the government or the 
legislature) and to those who fall under their functional realm and to the public at 
large, the stakeholders (IMF, 2004; OECD, 2002). Regulatory accountability, as an 
aspect of an agency’s governance, involves processes, instruments and mechanisms 
aimed at guaranteeing an adequate level of control over the agency’s budget and 
performance by political authorities, namely the parliament. According to the UK’s 
House of Lord’s committee on constitution (2004, p.7): 
Effective processes for achieving accountability are a key discipline on 
regulators, and are essential to maintaining both an effective regulatory 
framework and effective regulatory decision-making. Accountability is a 
control mechanism that is an integral part of the regulatory framework. 
Effective regulation therefore requires effective accountability. 
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Hüpkes, et al. (2005) observed that providing proof of sound stewardship of public 
money and other actions to discharge accountability indicates that regulators are 
being effective in fulfilling the demands of the roles to which they have been 
appointed. The next section discusses the use of transparency as another beneficial 
attribute of regulatory governance framework. 
2.4.3 Regulatory transparency 
Transparency, in the context of regulatory governance framework, refers to an 
environment in which the agency’s objectives, decisions and their rationale, data and 
other information, as well as terms of accountability are provided to the public in a 
comprehensive, accessible and timely manner (IMF, 2004). Transparency has 
increasingly been recognised as a component of good governance (Quintyn et al., 
2003). Policymakers recognise that globalisation (in general) and the integration of 
financial markets and products (in particular) require a greater degree of transparency 
in monetary and financial policies and in regulatory regimes and processes, as a 
means of containing market uncertainty (OECD, 2000; IMF, 2004). Additionally, 
transparency has become a powerful vehicle for mitigating poor operational practices 
and policies. Transparency of procedures, mechanisms and instruments is intended to 
guarantee the disclosure and publication of relevant regulatory and institutional 
information, the participation of stakeholders in the agency’s regulatory decisions 
and decision-making and the application of rules aimed at governing integrity, as 
well as the behaviour of agency officials (IMF, 2004; OECD, 2002). Regulatory 
transparency involves the use of indicators related to the involvement of non-
institutional actors in an agency’s policy-making, including their access to the 
agency’s information. Institutional transparency is composed of indicators associated 
with the transparent management of the agency however; these indicators are not 
directly linked to stakeholder involvement. they include issues such as the 
publication of the agency’s annual report, the use of norms of ethics, and the 
existence of public examinations for hiring employees (IMF 2004; OECD 2002). 
To improve regulatory transparency in regulatory governance, consultation and 
communication are essential. Rodrigo et al. (2009, p.28) stresses that:  
Transparency refers to the organisation of the way the state projects its 
regulatory powers to the society and the market, and it is fundamental in 
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the regulatory process, from the initiation of the regulation, its 
formulation and drafting, to its implementation and review.  
To attain good regulatory governance practice, the regulators at all levels of 
government should ensure that the public participates in the regulatory process and 
that regulators communicate the costs and benefits of the policy reform for the 
smooth functioning of the regulatory system as a whole (Haufler, 2010). Quintyn 
(2002) believes that transparency is able to tackle several causes of regulatory 
failures, such as rigidity, inadequate information, market uncertainty, bias toward 
concentrated benefits, regulatory capture, lack of accountability and the inability to 
understand policy risk. Regulatory agencies need to increase the level of information 
accessibility to the public. Moreover, they also need to pay attention to a wider range 
of interests, as well as becoming more responsive to what is heard. Regulatory 
transparency can therefore advance the way in which regulators choose the most 
appropriate regulatory policy and helps to avoid arbitrary decisions during the 
implementation of regulations (IMF, 2004; OECD, 2002; Quintyn, 2002). 
Nevertheless, a regulatory policy necessitates the involvement of various actors 
whose points of view and positions should be considered (Holland and Boon Foo, 
2003). Indeed, the regulators cannot achieve consultation if the aims of transparency 
and openness in the process are not adhered to (Stern, 2000). The legitimacy of any 
regulation does not only depend on the actions of the regulatory agency, but also on 
the degree of public input (Rotimi and Abdul-Azeez, 2013). Decentralisation 
undeniably improves the credibility of the regulatory process if the principles of 
transparency and consultation with legitimate stakeholders are reinforced. Quintyn 
(2002) stated that public input into the regulatory process is capable of maximising 
the number of positive consequences; this can also ensure that the regulators are 
aware of public preferences. Similarly, regulatory transparency emphasises the role 
of clarity, which helps both regulated entities and the public to understand the 
particular regulation to which they need to adhere (Rodrigo et al., 2007).  
2.4.4 Regulatory expertise 
Regulators need to have the necessary skills to formulate sound policies for the 
benefit of society in general. A lack of capability and essential skills prevent many 
regulatory agencies from achieving good regulatory governance practices (OECD, 
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2005). In order to attain good regulatory governance it is essential that the regulators 
are highly trained in the field of regulation (IMF, 2004) and have the required 
expertise to make good regulatory decisions (World Bank, 2003). According to 
Kirkpatrick et al. (2002), it is fundamental that those working for regulatory bodies 
should have sufficient knowledge and have undergone thorough training to 
accumulate the skills required to administer a good regulatory governance system. 
Regulatory expertise cannot be achieved without integrity, which is the mechanism 
that ensures that agency staff is able to pursue institutional goals without 
compromising them because of their own self-interest (OECD, 2002; IMF, 2004). 
Integrity affects regulatory agency staff at various levels. The procedures for the 
appointment of agency heads, their terms of office and criteria for removal should be 
such that the integrity of the board’s policy-making body is safeguarded (World 
Bank, 2000). The integrity of the regulatory agencies’ daily activities is ensured 
through internal audit arrangements, to ensure that the agency’s objectives are clearly 
set out and monitored and accountability is maintained (Quintyn, 2002). Thus, by 
ensuring the quality of the agency’s operations, the integrity of the institution is 
maintained and its credibility appears strengthened to the outside world (IMF, 2000). 
Integrity also implies that certain standards are expected regarding the personal 
affairs of officials and staff, to prevent the exploitation of conflicts of interest. 
Assuring integrity also implies that the regulatory agency staff enjoys legal 
protection while undertaking their official duties. Without legal protection, the 
objectivity of the staff would be contested and staff would be left open to bribery or 
threats, resulting in the overall effectiveness and credibility of the institution 
suffering (OECD, 2002; IMF, 2004).  
2.5 Conclusion 
The chapter reviewed the reasons for government regulation and discussed the 
concept of regulatory governance and the framework for good regulatory governance 
system. Accordingly, regulatory independence, regulatory accountability, regulatory 
transparency and regulatory expertise as principles of good regulatory governance 
were reviewed in the chapter. The review concludes that for regulatory agencies to 
achieve their mandate, they have to be free from external interference. In addition, 
adequate independence arrangements, accountability and transparency mechanisms 
should be in place. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector: an overview 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter studied the concept of regulatory governance. The aim of this 
chapter is to provide an overview of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector and 
identify the challenges facing it. Section 3.2 reviews the development of Nigeria’s 
downstream petroleum sector. The structure of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum 
sector is presented in Section 3.3 and Section 3.4 identifies and reviews the 
regulatory functions of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies. Section 3.5 
examines the regulatory governance issues in the petroleum industry in general and 
Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector in particular. The chapter is concluded in 
Section 3.6  
3.2 Historical development of the downstream petroleum sector in Nigeria 
Prior to the discovery of oil within the country in 1956, Nigeria’s downstream 
petroleum began as a market structure where the prices of petroleum products were 
determined by the forces of supply and demand (Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC), 2012). Multinational oil companies largely controlled 
marketing of petroleum products. This continued until 1973 when the government 
initiated uniform pricing of petroleum products to ensure equal distribution of 
products nationwide (Badmus, 2013; Azaiki, 2007; Ayoade, 2002). The downstream 
petroleum sector includes all activities following the delivery of crude oil to 
processing plants for refining, conversion and value addition into gasoline, diesel, 
kerosene and petrochemicals, including transportation, storage, marketing of the 
finished products and associated services (Ayoade, 2002). The value chain entails the 
supply of crude oil to the refineries, primary distribution from refineries to terminals, 
secondary distribution to depots and distribution to retail outlets for marketing 
(Badmus, 2013). In a country where nearly 80% of urban family incomes are spent 
on food, rent and transportation costs, the price of cooking gas, kerosene and 
gasoline constitute a significant share of the cost of living (Ayoade, 2002). 
The downstream petroleum operation in Nigeria is dominated and controlled by 
state-owned enterprises (Ehinomen and Adeleke, 2011). The government is 
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responsible for regulating and controlling the petroleum price through its regulatory 
agencies (Baghebo and Atima, 2013; Coady et al., 2007; Ehighelua, and Ekpu, 
2004). Before 1966, Nigeria’s economy was supplied with petroleum products 
through private sector imports by multinationals such as Shell, Esso, BP and Total. 
The first refinery in Nigeria was commissioned in 1966 and had a capacity of 35,000 
barrels per day (bpd). This domestic production, supplemented by imports, served 
the nation until the early 1970s when demand exceeded supply and nationwide 
shortages developed (Baghebo and Atima, 2013). 
In 1975, the Federal Military Government appointed a committee of inquiry to 
examine the root causes for the shortages of petroleum products. The panel 
determined that: (1) national demand had outstripped domestic refining capability; 
(2) local marketing companies lacked the financial resources to undertake the 
importation of substantial quantities of petroleum products required to augment 
domestic production; (3) oil marketers lacked the resources and ability to construct 
infrastructure and facilities to receive and distribute products to all consumption 
centres in the country; and (4) oil marketers lacked the technology and capability to 
construct large capacity refineries to satisfy Nigeria’s demand (Ehinomen and 
Adeleke, 2012; Azaiki, 2007). 
Based on these findings, the government took control over the importation of 
petroleum products from oil marketing companies, expanded the domestic refining 
capacity, product importation and reception facilities as part of a nationwide system 
of pipelines to facilitate the distribution of petroleum products in the long run 
(Gboyega and Soreide, 2011). The government formulated and implemented the 
following policies including the Petroleum Control Decree legislation that was 
passed, and gave the Minister of Petroleum Resources the powers to import and fix 
the price of petroleum products. Secondly, the Petroleum Equalisation Fund Decree 
was also enacted to ensure that prices of petroleum products remained the same all 
over the country. In addition, the government had majority ownership of the major 
petroleum marketing companies (Shell, BP, Esso, Mobil and Total) during the 
implementation of the 1970s Indigenization program (NNPC, 2012). finally, the 
government, through the NNPC, expanded the domestic refining capacity by 
contracting the building of refineries in Warri, Kaduna and Port Harcourt which were 
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completed in 1978, 1980, and 1989 respectively, with a total refining capacity of 
445,000 bpd (Badmus, 2013; Ezeagba, 2005).  
The Nigerian downstream petroleum sector is not as developed as the upstream, as 
most of the operations, apart from the NLNG and a few other projects, are operated 
by the government as a monopoly (Adenikinju, 2009). A proposed Downstream Gas 
Act, intended to regulate the downstream gas sector, was developed with the 
assistance of the World Bank and is currently before the National Assembly. 
3.3 Structure of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector 
The government is the major actor in the Nigerian downstream petroleum sector. The 
following subsidiaries of NNPC are the key players in the sector: (1) The Department 
of Petroleum Resources (DPR); (2) the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory 
Authority (PPPRA); (3) the Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF); and (4) the 
Pipelines and Products Marketing Company (PPMC). Private firms include 
indigenous and overseas private companies. 
Independent oil marketing was introduced in 1979 with the aim of bringing 
indigenous participation in the downstream petroleum sector (Ehinomen and 
Adeleke, 2012). In 1979, when the policy was first introduced, there were no more 
than twenty independent oil marketers participating in the scheme (Eme and 
Onwuka, 2011; Ezeagba, 2005). Fourteen years later the number of indigenous 
independent oil marketers had increased from 20 to about 550. In 1981, the 
indigenous oil marketers contributed less than 0.5% in terms of volume of petroleum 
products marketed in Nigeria (Ehinomen and Adeleke, 2012). Presently, the 
indigenous marketers account for about 40% of the volume of products marketed in 
the country (Ezeagba; 2005). There are nearly 10,200 retail outlets across the country 
owned by major oil marketers and independent oil marketers (PPPRA, 2012). The 
NNPC owns eighteen mega-stations in the country. According to Ehinomen and 
Adeleke (2012), independent oil marketers are competing with the six major oil 
companies that control about 60% of the downstream markets: 
 
1. African Petroleum plc 
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2. Oando Nigeria plc  
3. Con Oil plc 
4. Total Nigeria plc 
5. MRS Nigeria plc 
6. Mobil Oil Nigeria plc. 
Downstream activities include gas treatment, crude oil and gas conversion into 
refined and petrol chemical products and the transportation and distribution of 
refined products (Gboyega et al., 2011). These activities are increasingly moving 
within the control of private entrepreneurs, especially indigenous independent 
marketers (Akpieyi, 2009). It is a policy of the federal government that petroleum 
products are distributed by private companies (NNPC, 2012). On this note, the 
government established agencies to regulate activities in the sector. Due to the 
strategic importance of the downstream sector to Nigeria’s economy, the federal 
government formulated the following objectives in 1999 to ensure the effectiveness 
of the sector (Iwayemi, 2008): 
(a) maintaining self-sufficiency in refining 
(b) ensuring regular and uninterrupted domestic supply of petroleum 
products at reasonable prices 
(c) establishing facilities and infrastructure for the production of refined 
products targeted at the export market and supporting domestic 
petrochemicals; and 
(d) providing gainful employment and enabling Nigeria’s people to 
acquire technical expertise in the refining and distribution business. 
The PPMC is an entity responsible for the transportation of NNPC’s crude oil to 
refineries in Nigeria (PPMC, 2012). It also imports, distributes and markets refined 
products through its pipelines. The following petroleum and its by-products are 
expected to be distributed by the PPMC: 
 Household Kerosene (HHK) 
 Premium motor spirit (PMS OR PERTOL) 
 Industry Fuel 
 Automotive Gas Oil (AGO or Diesel) 
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 Bitumen 
 Aviation Turbine Kerosene (ATK or jet-Al) 
 High pour Fuel Oil (HPFO) 
 Low pour Fuel Oil (LPFO) 
 Liquefied petroleum Gas (LPG) 
 Base oil (BO). 
The government has established over 5,000 kilometres of crude oil and refined 
products pipeline transmission and distribution network across the country and 
twenty-one depots were also constructed nationwide (Oyekunle, 2011; Ogri, 2001). 
The NNPC also owns nine LPG depots, which have been largely underutilised since 
their inception in 1995 due to the shortage of LPG from the refineries and logistic 
problems in the supply of imported LPG to mostly upcountry depots (DPR, 2012). At 
present, there are four major refineries under the control of the NNPC. Table 3.1 
shows the refining capacity of each of the refineries.  
Table 3.1: Refining capacity of the four refineries under the control of the 
NNPC  
S/N Refinery Location Commissioned 
year 
Installed refining 
capacity (bpd) 
Upgraded bpd 
1 Port Harcourt Refinery 1965 35,000 60,000 
2 Warri Refinery 1978 100,000 125,000 in 1986 
3 Kaduna Refinery 1980 100,000 110,000 in 1986 
4 Eleme Port Harcourt Refinery 1989 150,000  
Source: NNPC, 2012. 
By 1989, the installed capacity of these four refineries was equal to about 140% of 
domestic demand. The reason for constructing the Eleme Port Harcourt Refinery was 
primarily to export its output, though this was achieved only over a short period 
(Nwokeji, 2007). Apart from the pipelines and the depots, the government owns 
twenty marine tankers to transport the petroleum products from the coastal refineries 
to other locations in country (PPMC, 2012). Indeed, the petroleum products are 
sourced either from local refineries, or in the event of a supply shortfall, from 
offshore refineries by importation (Ehinomen and Adeleke, 2012). The transportation 
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of the petroleum products from the depots is the responsibility of the six major oil-
marketing companies and other independent oil marketers (PPMC, 2012). The 
imported refined products are usually received at the NNPC-PPMC depots at Atlas 
Cove. The petroleum products are then moved to nearby depots at Mosimi in 
Shagamu, from where they are pumped into different depots through the pipelines 
(Nwokeji, 2007). Booster pump stations are provided along the route and between 
adjoining depots, an arrangement necessary to boost the flow of products in the 
pipelines along the route (Akande, 1982.). Figure 3.1 provides a summary of the 
downstream structure.  
 
Source: NNPC, 2012. 
Figure 3.1: A summary of the downstream structure. 
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3.3.1 The regulation of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector 
Nigeria’s downstream petroleum regulations were first set out in the Petroleum Act, 
1969 and amended in 1990 and 1998. The Act is the primary petroleum regulatory 
structure of the country, as well as being the principal regulations of the downstream 
sector (Nwachukwu and Edikpa, 2009; Ayoade, 2002). This implies that all the 
activities in downstream sector are subject to the Petroleum Act and the regulations 
thereafter, or any which may come into force. The Act vested the Minister of 
Petroleum Resources with the power to regulate the activities of the downstream 
sector through the regulatory bodies (Petroleum Act, 1998). The principal regulation, 
the Petroleum Act 1969, includes a number of general provisions for downstream 
regulation. Section 9 (sub-sections 1 and 2) provide that the Minister may: 
a) regulate the construction, maintenance and operation of installations used in 
pursuance of this Act;  
b) regulate refineries and refining operations and where two or more refineries 
are in operation, specify:  
i. the proportion or quantity of crude oil to be supplied to each refinery;  
ii. the share of each refinery in the total market; and 
iii. dictate the prices of refinery products; 
c) regulate the importation, handling, storage and distribution of petroleum, 
petroleum products and other flammable oils and liquids, and in particular 
(without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing): 
i. prohibit the importation or exportation of petroleum or petroleum 
products, except at specified ports or places; 
ii. prescribe the notice to be given (and the person by whom the same 
shall be given) on the arrival at a port of a ship carrying petroleum or 
petroleum products as cargo; 
iii. define dangerous petroleum and dangerous petroleum products, 
prescribe anchorages for ships carrying dangerous petroleum or 
dangerous petroleum products as cargo and require those ships to 
proceed to and remain at those anchorages; 
iv. regulate the loading, unloading, transport within a port, landing, trans-
shipment and shipment of petroleum and petroleum products; 
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v. provide for the licensing of lighters and other craft to carry petroleum 
and petroleum products within a port; 
vi. prescribe the conditions and restrictions to be imposed upon vessels 
arriving at a port after transporting petroleum, petroleum products, 
dangerous petroleum or dangerous petroleum products; 
vii. provide for the examination and testing of petroleum and petroleum 
products, and decide on which tests to be applied to ascertain its flash-
point and the method of applying those tests; and 
viii. subject to subsection (2) of this section, may regulate the transport of 
petroleum and petroleum products, prescribe the amount of petroleum 
and petroleum products which may be carried in any vessel, cart, 
truck, railway wagon or other vehicle, the manner in which they shall 
be stored when being so carried, the receptacles in which they shall be 
contained when being so carried and the quantities to be contained in 
those receptacles, and provide for the search and inspection of any 
such vessel, cart, truck, railway wagon or other vehicle; 
f) confer or impose on public officers, for the purposes of this Act, powers and 
duties additional to those conferred or imposed by section 8 of this Act  
g) where paragraph (a) of this subsection does not apply, it may determine the: 
i. forms to be used for the purposes of this Act; and 
ii. the fees to be charged in connection with the operation of this Act 
(including, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, fees 
arising from the Minister granting permission and for the supply of 
any document or other material, the execution of any examination and 
of any other action by him); and 
h) provide for such other matters as, which according to him, may be necessary 
or desirable in order to give proper effect to this Act. 
(2) Regulations made under subsection (1) (e) (viii) of this section shall apply only 
where petroleum or petroleum products are being transported: 
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a)  on the waters mentioned in item 36 (a) and (b) of Part I of the Second 
Schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999; or 
b)  by railway or transport ancillary thereto; or 
c)  on trunk roads within the meaning of item 62 of that Part of that Schedule. 
Section 10 of the act provides an obligation to pay any fees, rent, royalty, premium 
or other sum imposed by, or under this Act, shall be discharged if and only if, the 
payment is made within the time provided by or under this Act (or, where no time is 
so provided, within a reasonable time) to the Minister or his duly authorised 
representative. 
Section 13 (sub sections 2, 3 and 4) of the Act also provide that: 
(2) Any person who: 
a) constructs or operates a refinery in Nigeria without a licence granted under 
section 3 of this Act; or 
b) in any land to which section 1 of this Act applies: 
iv. undertakes, without the appropriate licence, any act for which a 
licence is required under any regulations made under this Act, shall be 
guilty of an offence and on conviction, shall pay a fine not exceeding 
N2,000 (about £8). 
(3) Any person who contravenes any provision of an order made under section 
6 of this Act shall be found guilty of an offence and on conviction shall be 
liable to a fine not exceeding N2, 000. 
(4) Where a person is convicted of an offence under subsection (2) or (3) of this 
section, in respect of any petroleum or petroleum products, then, in addition 
to any penalty imposed under the subsection in question, the convicting 
court may— 
a) order the petroleum or petroleum products to be forfeited; or 
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b) order that person to pay to the Minister the value of the petroleum or 
petroleum products. 
(Source: Petroleum Act 1969, amended in 1990 and 1998) 
Thus, it is based on the primary legislations above that the regulatory responsibilities 
of the downstream regulatory agencies were set out to enable an effective and 
efficient formulation and the implementation of the regulatory policies in the sector. 
The section below discusses the regulatory agencies in the Nigeria’s downstream 
sector.  
3.4 The downstream regulatory agencies 
According to the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN), all 
minerals, mineral oils and natural gas in Nigeria are vested in the Government of the 
Federation for the benefit of all Nigerians (CFRN, 1999). Petroleum operations and 
activities are regulated primarily by federal agencies, although some state 
governments and local governments also have regulations and bylaws that affect 
activities in the oil and gas industry (CFRN, 1999). 
The government agencies predominantly granted power to regulate all matters 
relating to downstream activities include the DPR, the PPPRA and the PEF. These 
agencies are under the control and supervision of the Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources (Hossain, 2003). The Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR) has overall 
responsibility for the regulation and supervision of the petroleum industry (CFRN, 
1999). The Ministry is also responsible for the formulation, implementation and 
coordination of government policy for the sector through its regulatory agencies. The 
agencies are headed by executive secretaries who enjoy a special status and wide 
powers under the petroleum laws and regulations. These agencies are given the 
power under the petroleum legislations to make subsidiary legislation for the 
regulation of petroleum activities through the Minister of Petroleum Resources 
(CFRN, 1999). 
The Petroleum Act of 1969 formed the legal basis for activity in both the upstream 
and downstream petroleum sector. Other legislation that regulated the petroleum 
39 
 
sector included the Oil Pipelines Act of 1956 and amendments, the Hydrocarbon Oil 
Refineries Act of 1965, the petroleum (drilling and production) regulations of 1969 
and the 1990 amendment, the petroleum (refining) regulations of 1974 and 1977, the 
Associated Gas Re-Injection Act of 1979 and amendments, the Federal 
Environmental Protection Agency Act of 1988, the Nigeria LNG Decree of 1990, 
and the Petroleum Profits Tax Act of 2004 (Department of Petroleum Resources 
(DPR), 2012). 
3.4.1 Department of Petroleum Resources 
The DPR began as the Hydrocarbon Section of the Ministry of Lagos Affairs in the 
early 1950s (DPR, 2010). It was the first statutory agency set up to supervise and 
regulate the petroleum industry in the country. At the time, it reported to the 
Governor-General. Later, the section was upgraded to the Petroleum Division within 
the then Ministry of Mines and Power (Jaidah, 1978). In 1970, the Division became 
the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR). In 1971, a new body called the 
Nigeria’s National Oil Corporation (NNOC) was created to engage in commercial 
activities in the petroleum industry, with the Department continuing to perform 
statutory supervision and control duties in the oil industry (Jaidah, 1978). In 1975, 
the Department was incorporated into the Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR) 
after energy matters were excised and transferred to another arm of the government. 
Through the proclamation of Decree 33 in 1977, the MPR and the NNOC were 
merged to form NNPC. This was a bid to optimise the utilisation of the then scarce 
local manpower resources in the industry’s public sector (Odulari, 2008). The Decree 
also established the Petroleum Inspectorate as an integral part of the Corporation and 
granted it a semi-autonomous status, with its Head reporting to the Minister of 
Petroleum Resources, who also doubled as Chairman of the NNPC (Petroleum Act, 
1969). The industry was continually regulated by the Petroleum Inspectorate but was 
barred by the Decree from engaging in any commercial transactions, or being 
involved in the commercial decisions of the Corporations. In 1985 a new Ministry of 
Petroleum Resources (MPR) was again formed, while the Petroleum Inspectorate 
remained in the Corporation and retained its regulatory functions. In 1988, with the 
commercialisation of the NNPC, the Petroleum Inspectorate was excised from the 
Corporation, due to the non-commercial nature of its functions, and was merged with 
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the new MPR to form its technical arm. The Department has continued to oversee all 
the activities of companies licensed to engage in any petroleum activity in the 
country, with the objective of ensuring that national goals and aspirations are 
fulfilled and that oil companies carry out their operations according to international 
oil industry standards and practices (DPR, 2012). It maintains records and other data 
regarding the oil industry's operations and informs the government about all 
activities and occurrences in the petroleum industry. The DPR discharges a number 
of duties, including representing the government at domestic and international level 
and at OPEC meetings (particularly during quota negotiations).  
3.4.1.1 The DPR’s downstream regulatory functions  
The Petroleum Inspectorate, which was responsible for regulation, was removed 
from the NNPC structure in 1986 and recreated as the DPR. The DPR is headed by a 
Director General who is responsible for setting the standards for the effective control 
of the petroleum industry (Mmadu and Akan, 2013). 
According to the Decree 1969, the DPR’s general responsibilities and objectives are 
to ensure: compliance with petroleum laws and regulations through the monitoring of 
the operations of the upstream and downstream companies; the full development of 
Nigeria’s petroleum resources; and the protection of all oil and gas investments 
(foreign, local, public and private) (DPR, 2012). However, section 7 (1) of the 
Decree 1969 and Regulation 25 of the mineral oils (safety) Regulation 1963 confer 
the power of arrest and a magistrate on officers of the department of petroleum 
resources in certain circumstances (DPR Act, 2012). 
The Department of Petroleum Resources has been vested with the necessary powers 
by various legal provisions to discharge its regulatory functions and responsibilities. 
Table 3.2 identifies the relevant legislations.  
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Table 3.2: DPR legislation  
NO LEGISLATIONS/DECREES/GUIDELINES YEAR 
1 Government Notice No. 596  1990 
2 Petroleum (Drilling and Production (Amendment) Regulations  1990 
3 Nigeria LNG (Fiscal Incentives Guarantees and Assurances (amendment) 
Decree 
1993,18th 
Nov. 1993 
4 Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contracts (Amendment)  1999 
5 Petroleum (Amendment) Decree  1996 
6 Petroleum (Amendment) Decree No.23,  1998 
7 Petroleum refining (Amendment) regulation  1996 
8 Petroleum (Drilling and Production) (Amendment) Regulation  1996 
9 Customs Excise, Tariff, Etc (Consolidation) Amendment  1996 
10 Customs Excise, Tariff, Etc (Consolidation) Amendment  1997 
11 Customs Excise, Tariff, Etc (Consolidation) (Amendment) Decree  1999 
12 Territorial Waters (Amendment) Decree 1998 
13 Customs Excise, Tariff, Etc (Consolidation) (Amendment) Decree  1998 
14 Minerals oil (Amendment) Decree  1998 
15 Nigeria Mining Corporation (Amendment) Decree  1998 
Source: DPR website, 2012. 
The following DPR regulatory mandates were drawn from the above legislations.  
1) Supervising all petroleum industry operations being carried out under 
licences and leases in the country, in order to ensure compliance with the 
applicable laws and regulations in line with good oil producing practices. 
2) Enforcing safety and environmental regulations and ensuring that those 
operations conform to national and international industry practices and 
standards. 
3) Keeping and updating records on petroleum industry operations, particularly 
on matters relating to petroleum reserves, production and exports of crude oil, 
gas and condensate, licenses and leases, as well as producing regular reports 
on the above for the government. 
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4) Advising the government and relevant agencies on technical matters and 
policies that may have impact on the administration and control of petroleum. 
5) Processing all applications for licenses to ensure compliance with established 
guidelines before making recommendations to the Honourable Minister of 
Petroleum Resources. 
6) Ensuring timely and adequate payments of all rents and royalties when due.  
7) Monitoring the Government Indigenisation policy to ensure that local content 
policy is achievable.  
These functions cover all petroleum operation activities, upstream and downstream, 
as well as petrochemical. The DPR attempted, with limited success, to adopt 
remedial enforcement tools. These included compliance monitoring within the 
context of the Petroleum Act and model clauses incorporated into the licence 
pursuant to the Petroleum Regulations. Equally, environmental issues were not given 
sufficient prominence until after the dumping of toxic wastes of Italian origin in 
Koko Port, Bendel State (now Delta State), in May 1988 under a purported private 
arrangement with the local inhabitants of Koko. This was the catalyst for 
environmental enforcement and reacting to widespread public condemnation of the 
event, the government immediately promulgated the Harmful Waste (Special 
Criminal Provisions) Act 1988 No. 42 (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990, 
Cap.165), which came into force on 25 November 1988. 
3.4.2 Petroleum Product Pricing Regulatory Agency  
In August 2000, the government set up a special committee, consisting of thirty-four 
members drawn from various stakeholders and other interest groups, to review the 
supply and distribution of petroleum products, with the aim of looking into the 
problems associated with Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector (PPPRA, 2012; 
Makwe; 2006). Prior to setting up the Committee, the downstream sector was 
characterised by the following problems: 
1) Scarcity of petroleum products leading to long queues at service stations.  
2) Low capacity utilisation and refining activities at the nation’s refineries (poor 
state of the refineries).  
3) Frequent fire accidents due to mishandling products – product adulteration.  
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4) Pipeline vandalisation.  
5) Large-scale smuggling, due to unfavourable economic products prices at the 
borders with neighbouring countries.  
6) Low investment opportunities in the sector.  
In October 2000, the Committee submitted its reports and the government 
meticulously studied the recommendations and published its findings in a 
government White Paper. Some of the far-reaching recommendations of the 
committee accepted by the government in its White Paper are as follows: 
1. Operational facilities at the depots and the pipelines should be repaired 
immediately.  
2. To prevent further malpractice, all coastal supplies of AGO transported 
through nominated company vessels should be stopped, as subsidies to the 
target group (National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), rig operators) were 
not justified.  
3. Restructuring of the NNPC and its subsidiaries should be commenced, by 
establishing a committee in the first quarter of 2001.  
4. All roads leading to the refineries and depots should be dualised to allow easy 
access and improve efficiency of operations.  
5. Current efforts to resuscitate the Nigeria Railway system by the government 
should be sustained.  
6. The government should deregulate and liberalise the import of petroleum 
products by other parties and the prices of products should be based on 
import parity to enhance and encourage the participation of other players, 
other than the NNPC.  
7. All four government refineries should be privatised and the establishment 
private refineries should be encouraged. 
8. Loading capability of all marine-fed depots should be expanded.  
9. A pipeline management authority for the management of pipelines and depots 
should be established, which will charge both private and public users a tariff 
per throughput litre of products.  
10. A downward review of the National Ports Authority (NPA) ports charges to a 
comparable level with other ports in the world should be carried out.  
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11. A Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency, with sufficient autonomy 
to superintend the various phases of the proposal embodied in the report 
Special Committee on the Review of Petroleum Products Supply and 
Distribution (SCRPPSD), especially the liberalisation of the downstream 
sector of the petroleum industry, should be established immediately (PPPRA, 
2012; Makwe; 2006). 
With the majority of the recommendations in the SCRPPSD report as set out in the 
White Paper being accepted, a Presidential Technical Campaign Committee for the 
liberalisation of the downstream sector of the petroleum industry, headed by the then 
Special Assistant to the President on Petroleum and Energy matters, took steps to 
sensitise the Nigerian public to the need for deregulation and liberalisation of the 
downstream sector (Ogwumike and Ogunleye; 2008; PPPRA Act, 2003). The result 
of that campaign, which saw the Committee visiting State Governors, traditional 
rulers and various interest groups, was that deregulation and liberalisation were the 
only viable options the government could adopt to attract investments into the sector 
and to remove the recurrent and endemic problem plaguing the sector (Makwe, 
2006).  
Overwhelmed with the success of the campaign for the liberalisation of the 
downstream sector, on March 8th 2001 the government set up the Petroleum 
Products Pricing Regulatory Committee (PPPRC) as an interim measure to carry out 
the functions of the PPPRA, as recommended by the SCRPPSD, while waiting for 
the enactment of the Act of the National Assembly for the setting-up of the PPPRA, 
as required in a democratic government (Okafor, 2007a, 2007b). The PPPRC was 
inaugurated by the Secretary to the government. After a series of meetings with 
stakeholders and interest groups, the PPPRC accepted that pricing was a condition 
precedent for deregulation and liberalisation. Therefore, on January 1st 2001, it 
commenced the phased liberalisation of the downstream sector by announcing the 
selling prices for PMS, AGO and HHK at N26, N26 and N24 per litre respectively 
(Okolo and Etekpe, 2010; Okafor, 2007). The consumption tax of N3.00 per litre of 
product was abolished while an import duty of N1.50 per litre was introduced. The 
sale of crude to NNPC at $9.50 per barrel was raised to $18.00 per barrel. In order to 
encourage importation and to stabilise the prices of petroleum products, the 
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government announced the removal of import tax of N1.50 per litre on 2nd July 
2003. 
The Senate and the House of Representative finally passed the bill for the 
establishment of the PPPRA, submitted on March 2001 to the National Assembly, on 
5th February 2003 and 22nd May 2003 respectively. The President assented to the 
bill in May 2003 and inaugurated the Agency’s board on 19th June 2003. With the 
establishment of the PPPRA, the opportunity for full deregulation and liberalisation 
of the downstream sector opened the way for all stakeholders in the sector to play 
their part, according to the rules and guidelines set out by the PPPRA based on its 
functions (PPPRA, 2012; Makwe, 2006). The PPPRA was established by the 
Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (Establishment) Act 2003 as an 
autonomous agency to determine the pricing of petroleum products and to regulate 
their supply and distribution. The PPPRA, by its mandate, also has the responsibility 
to manage the Federal Government’s deregulation policy in the downstream sector 
(Okolo and Etekpe; 2010; Okafor, 2007). 
3.4.2.1 The regulatory functions of the PPPRA as set out in the 2003 Act  
The 2003 Act establishing the PPPRA mandated the Agency to: 
1. determine the pricing policy of petroleum products; 
2. regulate the supply and distribution of petroleum products; 
3. establish an information and data bank through liaison with all relevant 
agencies to facilitate the making of informed and realistic decisions on 
pricing policies; 
4. moderate volatility in petroleum products prices, while ensuring reasonable 
returns to operators; 
5. oversee the implementation of the relevant recommendations and 
programmes of the federal Government, as contained in the White Paper on 
the Report of the SCRPPSD, as specified in the second schedule to the Act 
which relate to its functions, taking cognisance of the phasing of special 
proposals; 
6. establish parameters and codes of conduct for all operators in the downstream 
petroleum sector; 
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7. maintain constant surveillance over all key indices relevant to the pricing 
policy and periodically approve benchmark prices for all petroleum products; 
8. identify macro-economic factors with relationship to the prices of petroleum 
products and advise the federal Government on appropriate strategies for 
dealing with them; 
9. establish firm linkage with key segments of Nigeria’s society, and ensure that 
its decisions enjoy the widest possible understanding and support; 
10. prevent collusion and any restrictive trade practices harmful to the sector; 
11. exercise a mediatory role as necessary for all the stakeholders in the sector; 
12. carry out any other functions which the national Assembly may confer on the 
Agency from time to time; and 
13. carry out other such activities as appears necessary or expedient for the full 
and efficient discharge of its functions under the Act. 
(PPPRA, 2012) 
Various analysts criticised the creation of the PPPRA. According to Nuhu-Koko 
(2008), the establishment of the PPPRA is nothing but an additional bureaucratic 
burden on top of those already in existence. Industry experts are of the opinion that 
the regulatory agencies have inter-related regulatory responsibilities, which create 
confusion and results in the improper execution of government policies (Okafor, 
2007). For example, the establishment of the PPPRA clearly duplicates some of the 
functions of the existing DPR.
3
 Over the years, policy inconsistencies and regulatory 
overload, brought on by competing regulatory agencies, have made it impossible to 
implement an integrated regulatory framework that caters to the needs of operators in 
the energy sector (Nuhu-Koko, 2008; Okafor, 2007). 
3.4.3 Petroleum Equalisation Fund 
The PEF is a regulatory agency under the MPR established by Decree No.9 in 1975 
(as amended by the 1989 Decree No. 32), mainly to administer uniform prices of 
                                       
3
 For example, while the DPR is saddled with the responsibility of inspecting and monitoring the 
operations in upstream and downstream sectors of the oil and gas industry, agencies like the PPPRA 
also find themselves involved in a similar role of monitoring the supply and distribution of petroleum 
products in the domestic market (Nuhu-Koko, 2008).  
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petroleum products throughout the country. This is achieved by reimbursing the 
marketer’s transportation differentials for petroleum products movement from the 
depots to their sales outlets (filling station), in order to ensure that products are sold 
at a uniform pump price throughout the country (PEF, 2012; Onuoha, 2008). The 
source of the Fund comes from the net surplus revenue recovered from oil marketing 
companies. The PEF has an operational office in Lagos, 5 zonal offices and twenty-
two depot offices located at the twenty-one NNPC depots and marketers’ storage 
facilities at Apapa and Ibafon. The agency is headed by the Executive Secretary, who 
is the Chief Administrative Officer, responsible for the day to day operations of the 
Fund (PEF, 2012). 
Notwithstanding these arrangements, in 1979 the government was concerned that 
petroleum products supplies were not reaching other parts of the country, particularly 
remote areas, and so a bridging scheme was introduced to encourage major oil 
marketers to build filling stations in those areas (Okafor, 2007a; 2007b). The 
bridging scheme was initially established as a short-term solution during turn-around 
maintenance (TAM) of the refineries to support marketers in transporting petroleum 
products nationwide. Even though bridging was supposed to be a temporary measure 
until the refineries resumed production at full capacity, the status of the refineries has 
deteriorated over the years (NNPC, 2012). Indeed, vandalisation of the pipeline by 
militants and economic saboteurs has been on the increase, to the extent that trucks 
have become the principal means of distributing petroleum products in recent times 
(PPMC, 2012). 
Initially the government projected that only 10% of total petroleum products would 
be transported by trucks (bridged), with the remaining 90% being distributed through 
the pipelines (PEF, 2012). According to the PEF, at present approximately 40% of 
the petroleum products are bridged annually (PEF, 2012; Onuoha, 2008).  
Indeed, at the inception of the National Transportation Allowance (NTA) the 
equalisation scheme was restricted to just eight major marketing companies. 
However, today, like the bridging and inter-district schemes, it has been extended to 
6 major marketing companies, Depot and Petroleum Product Marketers Association 
(DAPPMA) operators and over 9,000 independent members of the Petroleum 
Marketers Association of Nigeria (IPMAN) (PEF, 2012; Onuoha, 2008). 
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According to the PEF, in order to ensure the effective implementation of the 
equalisation function and the uniform pricing of petroleum products, the country 
needed to be divided into depot districts, which were then further sub-divided into 
zones. A depot district is the part of the country served by particular depot. There are 
presently twenty-one depot districts, which are further, sub-divided into 50 km areas 
known as zones. These zones are progressive bands having a 50 km radius, with the 
depots being the centre point of a maximum of nine zones; that is, a total of 450 km. 
Each outlet is allocated to a depot and the distance between them determines the 
transport cost of moving the product, which is the only variable factor in uniform 
pricing. This arrangement was undertaken using the Transportation Differential Zone 
(TDZ) map. To ensure equalisation, all marketers are required to submit returns to 
the PEF detailing the products lifted from each depot and transported to the 
respective zones within the district. The net effect of the returns culminates in either 
a claim from, or a contribution to the fund. 
For every litre of petroleum product transported within zones 1 and 2, the marketer 
has a transport allowance built into the price of the products, which the marketer 
holds in trust on behalf of the consumer and is required to submit to the Board. 
Furthermore, for every litre of product transported from zone 3 to zone 9, additional 
claims are submitted to the PEF for the additional transportation average. Thus, the 
Board reimburses the marketer for the losses incurred, solely and exclusively, for 
transporting the products for sale at a uniform price in those zones. 
Bridging has been defined as the movement of petroleum products outside a depot 
district (of a distance exceeding 450 km). The importance of bridging is underscored 
by the need to ensure equitable product distribution to all parts of the country and 
consequently prevent shortages. The bridging transportation rates are determined by 
the distance between the product loading depot and the receiving depot, as bridging 
trucks report to the nearest depot in the area of discharge for a product audit before a 
point of discharge is allocated (PEF, 2012). Bridging volumes and costs have risen 
tremendously over the years as pipeline, depot facilities have deteriorated, and truck 
operating costs have increased due to continued depreciation in the value of the 
Nigerian Naira and other macro-economic factors. 
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A bridging allowance is the payment made on every litre of petroleum product (white 
product) lifted from any depot, regardless of whether the product is bridged or not. 
The marketers pay the bridging allowance upfront when buying the products from 
PPMC. The amount is determined by the PPPRA when setting the pump price. In 
turn, the PPMC remits the accrued monies to the PEF to be used for the 
reimbursement of marketers participating in the road haulage of petroleum products. 
3.4.3.1 The regulatory functions of the Petroleum Equalisation Fund 
The legislative mandates of the PEF, as provided by Decree No. 9 of 1975 and as 
amended by Decree No. 32 of 1989 (now Chapter 352 of the Laws of the federation 
1990) are as follows: 
1. To apply the laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as they affect the 
uniform pricing system, in ensuring that each marketing company complies 
with the laws regarding the management of the transportation equalisation 
process, and  
2. To equalise the transportation differentials in white product marketing. 
In broad terms, the Board performs two basic functions: 
1. The administration of the price equalisation scheme to ensure the authority of 
the government policy of uniform pump prices for petroleum products 
nationwide; 
2. The administration of the bridging payment scheme to complement the 
NNPC’s pipeline distribution network of petroleum products to all the depot 
areas nationwide, during the breakdown/maintenance of local refineries 
and/or pipeline breaks/vandalism. 
3.5 Regulatory governance in the petroleum industry sector 
The petroleum industry is probably the largest of all the industries, not just in terms 
of size, but also in terms of its impact on the industrial economies of the world and 
the political interest that it arouses (Norton and Rowe, 1978). According to Steven 
(2008), countries around the world have established a number of regulations, which 
serve as the main instrument for, and guiding principles of, the distribution of natural 
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resources for the benefit of all. Nevertheless, it is evident that, over the years, the 
regulatory governance of the sector (oil and gas) has become problematic, 
particularly in emerging economies (Steven, 2008; McPherson, 2003). Hossain, 
(2003) and Khan (1994) argue that there are many challenges affecting the 
governance of the sector, including poor regulations, poor accountability and 
transparency as well as a lack of expertise among the regulators in relation to good 
regulatory governance practice.  
The downstream petroleum sector is usually under the control of regulatory agencies. 
This sector is faced with numerous challenges, especially in developing countries, 
ranging from inadequate refining capacity and lack of price stability to poor 
distribution and transportation systems (McPherson, 2003). Political interference is 
one of the major challenges hindering the governance of the oil sector (Lahn, 2007; 
Ross, 2003). In many countries, government officials have used petroleum resources 
as a tool to gain political and financial control. McPherson (2003) argues that, if a 
government moves its control to the downstream petroleum sector, the public, 
elections and other elements of public interest definitely become the subject of 
control, using petroleum pricing regulations as mechanisms. In this regard, petroleum 
pricing and subsidies could be used to gain political advantage.
4
  
Regulatory governance issues also arise in the downstream petroleum sector because 
of operational management challenges (Rotimi and Abdul-Azeez, 2013). To manage 
the sector effectively and efficiently, the operational management system has to be in 
place and in harmony with the good regulatory governance practice (McPherson, 
2003). When ineffectiveness and inefficiency persist, poor regulatory governance 
practice is the result and hence regulatory failure (Soreide, 2011). Indeed, 
inefficiency in the downstream petroleum sector has become an issue of concern, 
especially in developing and emerging economies (Clarke and Monk, 2010). These 
inadequacies could also be due to interference in managerial and technical issues, as 
well as the result of weak regulations (Jaidah, 1980). Al-Mazeedi (1992) observes 
that inappropriateness in the recruitment of regulatory agency employees has a 
                                       
4
 Petroleum wealth can be used to secure financial, political, or military support and direct state 
control over the oil and gas sector to enhance the government’s standing and bargaining position 
(Tordo et al., 2011:23).  
 
51 
 
negative effect on the governance of the sector. Recruitment within the sector is 
usually based on tribalism, or religious or family affiliation, rather than on 
competency and proven performance (Al-Mazeedi, 1992). As a consequence of 
inefficiencies in recruitment, the sector becomes ineffective and this results in badly 
managed regulations (Stevens, 2004). Developing countries are believed to have very 
poor accountability and transparency mechanisms, which contribute to the poor 
management of public resources (Reed, 2002). As a result, many nations have been 
subsidising petroleum products in order to stabilise the price of petroleum products 
(World Bank, 2000). However, it would appear that petroleum subsidies are 
politically motivated (Sunusi, 2012). Hanson et al. (1993) argue that the management 
process of petroleum subsidies consists of irregularities, ineffectiveness and 
inefficiencies and this has allowed the government to squander public treasure.  
The pricing of petroleum products has become a major issue in developing counties.
5
 
A survey conducted by Baig et al. (2007: p. 8) discovered that: 
Domestic petroleum product prices can be set by the market or by 
the government, on either an ad hoc basis or according to a 
formula. In the countries surveyed, there is evidence that ad hoc 
regimes, especially where automatic price formulas were 
suspended, are prone to prices that imply subsidization. Prices 
were found to be liberalized in 15 out of 44 countries for which 
information was available. However, while there were no explicit 
regulations affecting prices in these countries, governments may, 
nonetheless, have been able to influence them through moral 
suasion, particularly in countries where there was a large state 
enterprise (e.g., Bolivia and the Republic of Congo). 
According to Okafor (2006), when the price of petroleum products is not regulated 
by the government it reacts in the longer term to supply and demand, like other 
products, and in the shorter term to the perceptions of supply and demand. The main 
petroleum products derived from crude oil refining are co-produced and their prices 
may, and do, fluctuate widely relative to each other
6
 (Makwe, 2006). However, there 
                                       
5
 The large increase in international fuel prices during the period 2003–06 proved to be particularly 
challenging for developing and emerging market economies, where governments have significant 
influence over domestic fuel prices and social safety nets tend to be poorly developed. See Domestic 
Petroleum Product Prices and Subsidies: Recent Developments and Reform Strategies, Taimur Baig, 
Amine Mati, David Coady and Joseph Ntamatungiro (2007). 
 
6
 A Critique of the Nigeria’s Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA) Pricing 
Template and Cost Recovery Analysis by I.E. Makwe (2006) This fluctuation can also be explained 
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are no enforced rules and regulations to prevent such price fluctuations (Makwe, 
2006). Price fluctuation could be caused by variations in price between the lighter 
products, (which usually attract higher prices) and the heavier products (attracting a 
lower premium). Similarly, the prices of petroleum products can be affected by taxes, 
especially in most European countries (Manby, 1999). 
With regard to the products’ specifications, the sellers and buyers have to agree on 
the quality of the products (Baig et al., 2007). Therefore, each particular product has 
to meet a specific use, climate, environmental regulation, price or a combination of 
these factors. The products have to possess the qualities according to the customer 
needs and the regulatory authority within the country of its use (Makwe, 2006). The 
products must be tested, usually through methods recognised by independent bodies 
such as the Institute of Petroleum (IP) or the American Society for Testing Methods 
(ASTM) (DPR, 2005). However, the buyers or sellers can use their own methods to 
test the products; this may be of little importance as long as it is accepted by the 
other party and it meets the required regulatory standard of the countries (Makwe, 
2006). Knowledge of the different specifications and properties of petroleum 
products are required, particularly for a net importer.  
3.5.1 Regulatory governance issues in Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector 
Although Nigeria’s downstream oil sector plays a significant role in the country's 
economy, it is confronted with major regulatory governance challenges. As 
mentioned above, Nigeria has an installed refining capacity of 445,000 bpd, but only 
a maximum of about 240,000 bpd has been processed for domestic consumption 
since 1990 (NNPC, 2011). The responsibility for the pricing of petroleum products 
moved from the market to the minister’s office. In 1992, a litre of petrol (PMS) cost 
just 70 kobo and the price continued to increase. In 1994, the price of PMS rose to 
N11 per litre (PPPRA, 2012 and Okafor, 2006).). This increased to N20 in 1999, N22 
in 2000, N26 in 2002, N39.50 in 2003, and N49 in 2004 and N65 in 2007. Currently, 
                                                                                                            
by the volatility in crude oil prices on the international market because refineries will not continue to 
operate long on negative margins, and competition will set ceiling to high margins. In the relationship 
between crude oil and products prices, it is perhaps worth noting that crude oil prices reflect product 
prices as supply and demand act in the first instance on products.  
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the price of PMS per litre is N97, as determined by the regulatory agencies (PPPRA, 
2012).  
Despite huge investment, the domestic refineries failed to produce at their expected 
capacities within Nigeria (Sunusi, 2012). As demand increased due to the rapid 
increase in the population, the government has been unable to build any new 
refineries, depots or pipeline networks for over twenty-five years now. Consequently 
Nigeria is importing the refined product at an import parity rate determined by the 
international oil market (Rotimi and Abdul-Azeez, 2013; Sunusi, 2012; Nuhu, 2008; 
Okafor, 2006). Hundreds of millions of dollars were spent on TAM between 1998 
and 2006 and yet there have been no sustainable improvements in the output of the 
refineries (Mmadu and Akan, 2013; Adenikinju, 1996). To be productive, the 
refineries now require about $400 million of investment for modernisation and 
refitting (Daily Trust, 2012). Olusegun (2008: 9) observed that: 
The contradiction is more glaring now with the recent rise in crude 
oil prices at the global markets, which meant more external 
earnings for Nigeria, but also increased the expense burden on 
imported refined petroleum products! It is such contradictions that 
make the Nigeria’s economy appear strange at times, as policies 
seem to ignore what appears obvious to do. As such, policies 
designed to address the deficiencies and defects in the structure end 
up being poorly articulated and/or implemented because of 
regional, political or rent-seeking selfish interests. Obviously, it is 
the same rent-seekers that continually sabotage the reinvigoration 
of the domestic refineries, making Nigeria to depend on importation 
of refined products to meet the domestic need.  
However, there are a number of reasons why the refineries are left to under-perform. 
Firstly, it creates an opportunity to sell the allocated, but unprocessed crude to the 
NNPC and, secondly, it provides an opening to import refined products to make up 
the shortfall in domestic production (Olusegun, 2008; Nuhu-Koko, 2008; Okafor, 
2006). This situation presents multi-million dollar arbitrage, patronage and pay-off 
opportunities for those in power (Sunusi, 2012). For instance in 2010, the refineries 
received a total of 33,633,907 barrels of dry crude oil and condensate and processed 
a little more into various petroleum products (Rotimi and Abdul-Azeez; 2013; 
Olusegun, 2008). The combined average refining capacity in 2010 was less than 
22%, with Warri having the highest capacity utilisation at 43%, Kaduna 20% and 
54 
 
Port Harcourt 9% (Vangard, 2012). The highest capacity utilisation ever achieved 
was 64% in 1990, compared with 80–95% globally (Okafor, 2006). 
Therefore, out of the 445,000 bpd allocated to the NNPC for domestic refining, 
around 162 million barrels in 2010, about 128 million were allocated to privileged 
parties to sell on the open market (Sunusi, 2012). In 2000, the World Bank 
discovered that privileged parties pocketed about $75 million as middlemen, 
marketing the worldwide most needed, light, sweet crude oil (El-Rufai, 2011; 
Iwayemi; 2008; Makwe, 2006). Another regulatory governance challenge is the 
paperwork required to be completed by the oil marketers and the NNPC and remitted 
to the PPPRA and the government to claim ‘the fuel subsidy’, or the price differential 
between the imported product prices and the approved selling prices for PMS and 
kerosene (Sunusi, 2012; El-Rufai, 2011; Iwayemi; 2008). Likewise, there is also an 
issue with the paperwork required for the reimbursement of bridging costs, the cost 
payable to transporters to freight fuel from Atlas Cove, Mosimi and the various 
depots to every part of the country to ensure that elusive price equalisation (PEF, 
2012). The Nigerian citizen directly, or indirectly, bears the burden of all these 
inconsequential inefficiencies and a number of ‘fat cats’ are paid for doing nothing, 
despite the paperwork and audits showing otherwise (Makwe; 2006). 
In 2010, the total production by the refineries was 4,404,360 tons of various 
petroleum products (NNPC, 2012). The PPMC distributed 6,353,517,990,000 litres 
of PMS, 668,548,000 of kerosene (HHK), 205,546,720 of aviation fuel 
(ATK), 879,367,550 of diesel (AGO), and 272,699,100 litres of fuel oil (PPPRA, 
2012). In 2010, Nigeria imported 5,031,288 tons of PMS, compared with the 
insignificant combined 747,776 tons produced by the four refineries. In effect, 
almost 87% of gasoline was imported in 2011 (El-Rufai, 2011). 
The NNPC, through its PPMC subsidiary, produced 4,508,434 tons of petroleum 
products from the refineries and received 6,639,752 tons of imported PMS and HHK 
for distribution (NNPC, 2012). The total quantity of PMS sold in 2010 by the PPMC 
was 9,090,469,690. It has been estimated that the NNPC spent $5.5 billion in 2010 to 
import refined products (Sunusi, 2012). PPMC also sold a total of 13.75 billion litres 
of various grades of petroleum products through depots, bunkers and the coastal 
lifting of about 38 million litres of various products daily (This day, 2012). If the 
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four refineries could operate at or slightly above the template capacity, then the 
PPMC would not need to import more than the modest shortfall and strategic reserve 
that most countries keep (Makwe, 2006).  
With the continuous depreciation of the national currency, the rising market price of 
crude oil and the consequential escalation of refined product prices from ports 
Nigeria uses for imports, the shifting levels of imported fuel pricing has led to the 
contentious issue of fuel subsidies (Sunusi, 2012; El-Rufai, 2011). The unpopular 
policy of the regulatory agencies of withdrawing the fuel subsidy by deregulating the 
pricing of PMS resulted in a serious problem, whereby the country was shut down 
for almost a week as a consequence of a nationwide strike and street protests all over 
the country (Iwayemi, 2008). According to the Petroleum Task Force (2012) there is 
a significant amount of waste and corruption surrounding the current subsidy system 
and the government lacks the political will and legitimacy to confront the major oil 
marketers taking advantage of the subsidy. The Petroleum Task Force committee 
further alleged that some oil marketers financed the election of the incumbent 
president; thus it is easier to eliminate the inefficiencies through deregulation. 
Another major regulatory governance challenge is cross-border smuggling, an 
ongoing problem, and there are frequent reports of large-scale corruption in the 
distribution and marketing chain (El-Rufai, 2012).  
Furthermore, a committee led by Nuhu Ribadu (2012) asserts that it is ironic that 
Nigeria, the largest producer of oil in West Africa and one of the biggest exporters of 
crude oil and now the largest importer of refined petroleum products, currently 
depends on smaller countries for its survival.  
3.5.2 The petroleum subsidy debate in Nigeria 
The petroleum subsidy is the difference that exists between the pump price a 
consumer pays for petroleum products and the actual total cost of producing or 
importing the products. For example, in Nigeria in 2010, the pump price of 
petroleum products was pegged at N65 per litre, although the actual cost of 
supplying it was about N138 per litre at a crude oil price of $110 per barrel (PPPRA, 
2012; Okpanachi; 2011). According to Okafor (2007) a fuel subsidy is a mechanism 
employed by nations to stabilise the effect of local crude prices on its citizens. 
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Annually, around $300bn is spent on energy subsidies worldwide (Okonjo-Iweala 
and Osafo-Kwaako, 2007; Okafor, 2007). Governments set aside money to protect 
their citizens from the price volatility of the international energy market.  
In Nigeria, the amount of money set aside for the payment of fuel subsidies are 
usually included in the annual budget in order to shield the general public from 
paying the true price of petroleum products in the international oil market (Onyishi, 
et al., 2012; PPPRA, 2012). In 2006, the government introduced the Petroleum 
Support Fund (PSF) and made a decision to include it in the budget. According to the 
policy, the PSF is a pool of funds derived from the national budget, to be used for the 
stabilisation of the domestic prices of petroleum products so that any volatility in 
international crude and products prices does not altogether translate into wild 
variation of prices at the pump (PPPRA, 2012). 
According to the policy, the PSF shall be financed from two sources, namely:  
1. All tiers of government – federal, states and local. 
2. Accruals realised during the period of over-recovery (over-recovery here 
refers to the period when the PPPRA’s recommended price is higher than the 
market determined price). 
The policy also provides the following guidelines: 
1. An importer should be an oil marketing company registered with the 
Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC). 
2. A claimant/beneficiary is expected to possess the following: 
a. proof of ownership of storage facilities, with a minimum storage 
capacity of 5,000 metric tonnes for the particular product, as well as 
dispensing facilities (retail outlet network) 
b. a DPR import permit 
c. the ability to finance a minimum cargo size of 5000 mt of products 
under the Fund. 
3. The claimant/beneficiary should notify the PPPRA within a minimum of 45 
days ahead of the cargo’s arrival in the country and furnish the Agency with 
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the relevant documents, including copies of invoices, bills of lading, sources 
of funding and the expected date of arrival of documentation/verification. 
4. The products are expected to arrive into the country on schedule and should 
conform to the products’ specification based on the requirements set out by 
the DPR / Standards Organization of Nigeria (SON). 
5. All approvals for importation are valid for a minimum of three months based 
on the current DPR guidelines. 
6. Deliveries should be made to the invoiced location(s) and approved facilities 
by the DPR. 
In 2006, the government appropriated N150 billion to finance the fuel subsidy 
(Okafor, 2006; Oseni; 2013). However, the import parity principle of deregulation 
will be upheld in the pricing of products so that the spirit of deregulation is not 
totally expunged from the scheme of things (PPPRA, 2006).  
Despite the PSF policy and the guidelines established by the government, the 
downstream sector continues to face challenges and now the government is doing 
everything possible to fully deregulate the sector (PPPRA, 2012). This is due to the 
fact that demands for fuel and other petroleum products have increased, which has 
caused huge budget deficits as Nigeria’s governments are forced to import refined oil 
products at high prices before selling them on at a loss to consumers in order to 
protect the poor (Ross, 2003; Tanko; 2011). According to the Nigerian government, 
the fuel subsidy is unnecessary and undermines expenditure in other areas, notably 
education, health and other infrastructures (Mmadu and Akan, 2013; Adenikinju, 
1996). Oyovbaire (2007) further observes that regulated markets with subsidised 
prices provide an opportunity for dishonest oil marketers to take advantage of the 
price discrepancy between countries. The IMF and Nigeria’s government further 
argue that it is the rich people who benefit primarily from the fuel subsidy, whereas 
poor citizens hardly benefit (Sunusi, 2012). For these reasons there have been many 
attempts made by various administrations to deregulate the downstream petroleum 
sector (Rotimi and Abdul-Azeez, 2013).  
The deregulation of the downstream petroleum sector involves not only the removal 
of government control over petroleum products prices, but also the removal of 
restrictions on the establishment and operations including refining, jetties and depots, 
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while at the same time allowing private sector players to become engaged in the 
importation and exportation of petroleum products and allowing market forces to 
prevail (Nwachukwu and Edikpa, 2009; Okafor, 2006). The attempt by the 
subsequent government to remove the fuel subsidy attracted much criticism from the 
general public and caused civil unrest. The citizens regard fuel subsidies as one of 
the few benefits they are able to enjoy since consecutive corrupt and incompetent 
governments have failed to provide basic social amenities, for example, health care, 
roads, schools, potable drinking water (Sunusi, 2012; Nuhu-Koko, 2008). In spite of 
the huge inflow of oil revenues into the government treasury over the past forty 
years, no meaningful development is evident (Nuhu-Koko, 2008; Okafor, 2006). 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the development and structure of Nigeria’s downstream 
petroleum sector. Similarly, Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies were 
identified; their regulatory functions reviewed and regulatory governance in the 
petroleum industry and the debate surrounding the fuel subsidy was examined. 
Finally, the chapter discussed the regulatory governance issues of Nigeria’s 
downstream petroleum sector. It is the conclusion of this chapter that the issues 
raised in the literature regarding the regulatory governance practice in Nigeria’s 
downstream petroleum sector are associated with poor regulatory expertise, poor 
accountability and transparency practice, the main prerequisites of good regulatory 
governance practice.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Public Interest Theory as a theoretical framework 
4.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter reviewed the literature relating to Nigeria’s downstream 
petroleum sector and its regulations. Abdel-Khalik and Ajinkya (1979) argue that a 
relevant theoretical structure needs to be developed in every piece of empirical 
research. Thus, the main aim of this chapter is to discuss the theoretical framework 
that underpins the current study.  
The rest of the chapter is set out as follows: Section 4.2 reviews the concept of the 
Public Interest Theory of regulation. Section 4.3 examines the Public Interest Theory 
within the context of the public’s perception of good regulatory governance. Section 
4.3 justifies the reasons for the application of the Public Interest Theory in this 
research. Finally, Section 4.4 discusses other regulatory governance theories that 
could have been applied in this study. 
4.2 The concept of the Public Interest Theory 
Public interest theory was first developed by Arthur Cecil Pigou in 1932 (Barr, 
1999). According to this theory, regulations are designed in response to the public 
demand for the corrections of inefficiencies or inequitable market practices (Barr, 
1999). Aranson (1990) argued that initially regulations were assumed to benefit the 
whole society rather than particular vested interests. The Public Interest Theory 
proposal is that government regulations only exist to promote and protect the welfare 
and the interests of the general public, rather than the interests of powerful minority 
or private entities (Becker, 1986). Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies were 
regarded as public authorities and established to design regulations for the best 
interest of the country and the general public. Therefore, the Public Interest Theory is 
adopted in this study, which seeks to investigate whether the regulations formulated 
by Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies adequately benefit the public at large 
and are fit for purpose.  
Aranson (1993) pointed out that government interference and economic controls are 
as old as the existence of humans. Similarly, the theory of public interest is as old as 
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the political beliefs of government intervention and control (Becker, 1986). Indeed, 
the concept of public interest appears in the works of political philosophers such as 
Rousseau, Plato, Aristotle and Hobbes among others (Held, 1970). Consequently, 
government interference and public interest co-exist in political, philosophical, legal 
and management areas (Aranson, 1990).  
According to Baron (1988), the Public Interest Theory can be regarded as the best 
way of allocating scarce resources to individuals and for collective goods. In 
developed nations the distribution of scarce resources is determined by market forces 
– demand and supply mechanisms (Bator, 1958). It is believed that under certain 
circumstances the allocation of resource by means of the market mechanism is the 
most efficient (Arrow 1985). However, as these conditions are frequently in practice 
not adhered to, the allocation of resources is not optimised and this results in an 
increased demand for methods to improve allocation (Bator, 1958). According to 
Arrow (1970), the only method that can achieve the effective distribution of scarce 
resources is government regulation. The Public Interest Theory argues that 
government regulations are mechanisms used to overcome the difficulty of imperfect 
competition, unbalanced market operations, the absence of markets and unattractive 
market results (Baumol, 1977). 
Good regulatory governance improves the allocation of limited resources by 
maintaining, facilitating and imitating market operations (Braeutigam et al., 1989). 
Thus, regulations strive to maintain market operations through monitoring (Baumol, 
1977). Moreover, imperfect competition can result from specific characteristics of 
the production process in relation to the magnitude of the market demand 
(Braeutigam et al., 1989). At a given level of demand, average total costs could be 
minimised if production were to be confined to one company (Baumol, 2003). In this 
regard, a monopoly may exist naturally. According to Barro (1991), if several 
companies produce the same total quantity of goods, the unit costs of production rise. 
For instance, a situation may arise when the production process requires a great deal 
of capital investment (Bator, 1958). Similarly, fixed costs can continue to decline as 
production increases. This is particularly true in the case where modest marginal 
costs hardly rise, but average total costs may persistently fall (Baumol, 1985). 
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Regulation can overcome market problems. Government intervention enhances the 
exchange of goods and factors of production in markets assume the definition, 
allocation and assertion of individual property rights and freedom to contract 
(Quintyn and Taylor, 2003). Peltzman et al., (1989) observed that regulations can 
guarantee property rights and any necessary enforcement of contract compliance can 
be more efficiently organised collectively than individually. Furthermore, market 
transactions costs can be reduced by property and contract law (Bachmann and 
Afrika, 2011). Similarly, the freedom of contract can also be applied to achieve 
cooperation among parties opposed to market operation. A lack of, or poor 
regulations can give rise to prices deviating from the marginal costs and an 
inefficient quantity of goods supplied to the market (Barro, 1991). Therefore the 
essence of anti-monopoly legislations (regulations) is to maintain market operation 
by monitoring the creation of positions of economic power, prohibiting unnecessary 
competition and limiting agreements or punishing the misuse thereof (Bachmann and 
Afrika, 2011).  
Nevertheless, imperfect competition can also arise from the special characteristics of 
the production process, in relation to the magnitude of the demand in the market 
(Hantke-Domas, 2003). A monopolist striving for a maximisation of profits will set a 
price that deviates from the marginal costs (Jones, 1988). The natural monopolies are 
then either put under the control of the state, as happens in many European countries, 
or are highly regulated, as for example in the United States (Jones, 1988). Regulation 
consists of barring entry to the market and the enforcement of price rules that 
promote efficient allocation (Braeutigam, 1989). In this way, the market results of 
perfect competition are simulated. Examples of companies assumed to have the 
characteristics of a natural monopoly are railways, electricity distribution, gas and oil 
pipelines, telecommunication networks and drinking water distributors (Braeutigam, 
1989).  
According to Held (1970), regulatory bodies are considered to represent the interest 
of the society in which it operates, rather than the private interests of the regulators. 
Stigler (1971) argues that the Public Interest Theory assumes that economic markets 
are extremely fragile and apt to operate very inefficiently (or inequitably) if left 
alone. Therefore, government agencies are presumed to be a neutral arbiter. The 
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public interest view holds that governments regulate the private sector to facilitate 
the efficient functioning of firms by ameliorating market failures, for the benefit of 
the broader civil society (Braeutigam, 1989; Stigler, 1971; Held, 1970).  
According to Baron (1988), the assumption behind government regulations is that 
they exist to protect the public interest against private interests. However, this 
responsibility is sometimes unattainable, as private interests use governmental 
regulations for rent seeking to protect their business against market competition 
(Stigler, 1971). One possibility is that regulations have been designed to effectively 
protect the public interest in the form of third party interests against the adverse 
consequences of private activity; on the other hand, the regulators may have given in 
to private interests and made regulatory policy a shield, protecting them from 
competition and consumers (Schwert, 1981). Stiglitz (1998) observed that regulatory 
neutrality is difficult to achieve because the regulatory agency could be captured by 
regulated interests. The consequences are that the agency operates in a way that is 
systematically unfair to the advantage of private interests; again the presumption is 
that they represent private business. Similarly, there is a possibility that regulatory 
governance is transformed into the guardian of the public interest. In this regard, 
legislators have mandated the agencies to ensure that private interests do not 
overtake public interest (Spiller, 1990). 
The problem of market failure, together with the common need for principles of 
public disclosure by business, make regulation critical if the public interest is to be 
protected (Stiglitz, 1998). In this regard, regulation results from the need to protect 
the public from the negative impacts of such market failures and other harmful 
business behaviours. 
4.3 The assumption of the Public Interest Theory within the context of public 
perception of regulatory governance 
The Public Interest Theory of regulation is based on two perceptions: The 
Unbalanced Market Operation and the Information Problem. 
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4.3.1. The unbalanced market operation  
According to the Public Interest Theory, effective regulations are capable of creating 
market stability and attaining market equilibrium (Ogus, 1994). The imbalance in 
market operations occurs separately at both market level and on a macro level 
(Christensen and Lægreid, 2007). When the market is not regulated it is assumed that 
destructive or unnecessary competition might arise, often as a result of long-term 
overcapacity (Ogus, 1994). This situation could negatively affect the market 
equilibrium and it would be difficult to re-establish because the participants are in a 
dilemma (Kaufmann, 2002). Market congestion (overcapacity) may also arise if the 
production capacity is adjusted to the demand during peak moments or periods 
(Kahn, 1988). Unnecessary market competition also affects the price level, which 
sinks below the average total costs, and leads the price level to fluctuate more widely 
(Kahn, 1988). This contributes to inefficiency and insecurity in decision-making on 
the part of both producers and consumers (Ogus, 1994). In addition, excessive 
competition can be detrimental to safety and reliability when consumers are not in a 
position to assess the quality of goods (Kahn, 1988). Therefore, government 
intervention is necessary in order to protect public interest (Christensen and Lægreid, 
2007).  
4.3.2 The information problem 
The Public Interest Theory argues that competitive and/or perfect markets may not 
exist for a number of reasons, most particularly for some goods for which the 
willingness to pay exceeds the production costs, for example utilities (Hirshleifer and 
Riley, 1979; Bergara et el., 1998). Many markets, particularly those linked to 
external effects and public goods, could not exist in the face of information problems 
and high transaction costs (Bergara at el., 1998). Thus, regulations may encourage 
more efficient resource allocation that would benefit the general public at large 
(Huntington, 1952). The Public Interest Theory further argues that consumers lack 
the capacity and ability to monitor qualities and quantities and to determine the 
actual price of goods and services, as a result of hidden information, or because of an 
asymmetric distribution of information (Hirshleifer and Riley, 1979). When it 
becomes impossible to ascertain the quality of goods or services in advance, buyers 
may be prepared to pay an average price, equivalent with the expected quality of the 
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products. On the other hand, suppliers of high quality goods may not be ready to 
offer the products at that asking price and might pull out from the market (Den 
Hertog, 2010).  
Asymmetric distribution of information can also give rise to moral hazards in the 
enforcement of contracts, whereby parties misuse their information advantage (Bergh 
and Faure, 1991). Due to the nature of the goods’ credibility, it is sometimes difficult 
to precisely set minimum quality standards where the risks of moral hazard are high 
(Den Hertog, 2012). In such cases, regulation can combat the problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard (Bergh and Faure, 1991; Den Hertog, 2010).  
 Market failure may also occur as a consequence of investigation costs incurred by 
consumers when appropriate information is not inaccessible (Barzel, 1982). Finally, 
under certain circumstances, transaction costs can be kept to a minimum by the rules 
relating to misleading information (Beales et al., 1981; Shaxson, 2009). Indeed, in 
many nations, social legislation is established as a response to the information 
problems, and rules are introduced to strike a balance in the market system (Swaroop 
and Rajkumar, 2002).Therefore, it is imperative for regulatory agencies to act in the 
interest of the general public. 
4.3.3 Criticisms of the Public Interest Theory of regulation 
The Public Interest Theory of regulation, regarded as a possible solution to market 
failures, has been criticised by various parties in the literature. The free market 
theory argues that regulation is unnecessary because it hinders efficient market 
operation (Ribstein, 2002). Zerbe and Urban (1988) postulate that an optimal level of 
information is disclosed to the buyers or suppliers (general public) through the 
interplay of the price mechanisms and that, consequently, government intervention is 
unnecessary. Zerbe and McCurdy (2010) opine that if the transaction costs, such as 
the inability of the monopolist to price discriminate or avoid arbitrage, or the 
inability of the consumers to organise and effectively bargain, are taken into 
consideration there will be an efficient market result. Therefore, the conclusion of the 
Public Interest Theory that externalities, monopoly power and the so-called market 
failure give rise to inefficiency in the allocation of resources can only be understood 
if the transaction costs involved are missing (Cowhey and Aronson, 1993). Indeed, 
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the allocation of resources can appear to be very efficient when transaction costs are 
included (Toumanoff, 1984). Dahlman (1979) believes that the market mechanism 
itself is often able to encourage stronger institutions to compensate for any 
inefficiency in the market. Thus the argument of market failure as advocated by the 
Public Interest Theory of regulation is unnecessary and inconsistent (Clark and 
Monk, 2009; Dunne and Wheeler, 2004).  
Another criticism is that the Public Interest Theory fails to adequately provide a 
detailed explanation on how and why regulation is reasonably the best transaction 
cost minimising institution in the efficient allocation of resources for particular goods 
and services (Zerbe, 2010). Indeed, the very concept of market failures does not 
contribute to that task (Demsetz, 1976). Baumol (2003), states that a more general 
criticism of the theory of market failure is its limited explanatory power. An 
economist generally requires only ten minutes to rationalise government intervention 
by constructing some form of market failure (Peltzman, 1989).  
Furthermore, the Public Interest Theory assumes that government regulation is 
effective and can be implemented without great cost (Posner, 1971). Indeed, the 
theory assumes that transaction and information costs, which bring about market 
failure, are absent in the case of government regulation (Bergh and Faure, 1991). Ng 
(1985) criticised the assumption that partial allocation does not make the economy as 
a whole more efficient if inevitable inefficiencies persist elsewhere in the economy. 
The inevitable inefficiencies, such as domination in product markets or taxation, 
result in an inequitable allocation in the economy (Ng, 1985). These distortions also 
mean that the allocation in factor markets is sub-optimal. Moreover, regulatory 
agencies can easily be subjected to regulatory capture; this is because of the 
inequality in the distribution of the agency benefits (Wittman, 1995). Posner (1971) 
points out that government regulation sets an inefficient price structure in which, on 
the whole, only certain producer groups receive cross-subsidies. A further criticism is 
that many consumers are deprived of market benefits because of government 
regulation (Baumol and Ordover, 1985; Winston, 1998; Majone, 1997).  
According to Stingler (1971) and Posner (1974), government regulation serves 
private interest and not public interest. The neutrality of regulators frequently breaks 
down, to the detriment of public interest (Posner, 1974). According to Meier (1991), 
66 
 
regulators cannot protect public interest, due to their bureaucratic ineptitude, lack of 
skills and resources and the inevitable complexity of technical issues. Regulatory 
agencies may become victims of incompetence through the inactivity and disinterest 
of regulators (Majone, 1991).  
Despite these criticisms it has been agreed that is impossible to refute the public 
interest theories of regulation, especially in regulatory governance studies (OECD, 
2000). Further, Wilson (1974) states that whatever the reason, political or economic, 
regulation is not an inevitable event.  
4.4 The application of Public Interest Theory to Nigeria’s downstream 
petroleum sector 
The Public Interest Theory of Regulation is one of a number of general theories that 
can be applied to the study of regulatory governance. In this section, the rationale for 
adopting Public Interest Theory as a theoretical framework for regulatory governance 
in Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector is discussed.  
Firstly, as a democratic nation, Nigeria is expected to promote and practice good 
governance in all aspects; by ensuring the rule of law, improving efficiency and 
accountability, and tackling corruption. These requirements are essential elements of 
regulatory governance; with these in place, a country should be able to prosper for 
the benefit of the general public (World Bank, 2007). Thus the application of Public 
Interest Theory within this study will contribute to ascertaining whether good 
regulatory governance is being practiced in the downstream petroleum sector for the 
interest of the general public. 
Secondly, Public Interest Theory argues that the regulatory authorities were 
established to safeguard citizens’ welfare through the efficient allocation of resources 
(Majone, 1991). Indeed, the downstream regulatory agencies of Nigeria (DPR, the 
PPPRA and the PEF) were established for the purpose of ensuring the availability of 
petroleum products at affordable prices around the country (NNPC, 2012). Thus it is 
logical to apply the Public Interest Theory of Regulation in order to ascertain 
whether the agencies are carrying out their duties in the interests of the public.  
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Thirdly, Public Interest Theory is adopted because individuals in Nigeria are unable 
to monitor the quality or quantity of certain products (e.g. petroleum products) 
because of the cost and the lack of knowledge required to do so. Therefore, 
regulators should have the capacity to monitor companies in order to protect the 
general public, or consumers, from the possible problems stemming from this lack of 
information. Similarly, Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies are expected to 
protect the interests of the Nigerian people from unexpected harmful business 
behaviours.  
Fourthly, Public Interest Theory assumes that regulators are neutral arbitrators 
(Posner, 1974). Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies are created to guarantee 
an environment that enables business participation and strikes a balance between the 
regulated entities and consumers, for the benefit of broader society. This assumption 
also informed the adoption of the Public Interest Theory of regulation for this study. 
Fifthly, the government and the regulatory agencies of Nigeria’s downstream 
petroleum sector usually argue that all regulatory decisions in the sector are in the 
public interest. Hence, the adoption of this theory is appropriate for this study. 
Sixthly, Public Interest Theory argues that for regulatory agencies to protect and 
secure the welfare of the general public, the regulators must be independent from 
external interference (Masciandaro et al., 2008). The agencies should have adequate 
financial autonomy and the necessary skills in the area of regulatory governance 
(Maxwell et al., 2000). Therefore, Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies are 
expected to have the autonomy and the expertise to be able to provide welfare and 
protect the public interest. Finally, another reason for the adoption of the Public 
Interest Theory in this study is that the concept argues that to ensure that regulations 
are in the public’s interest, the regulatory agencies should provide accountability and 
transparency for their actions and inactions (Wilson, 1974). On this note, Nigeria’s 
downstream petroleum regulators are expected to ensure proper accountability and 
transparency in practice as the main pre-requisites of good regulatory governance. 
Furthermore, the Nigerian government sees the downstream petroleum sector as a 
means of generating economic activity across all sectors, and it was on this basis that 
the cost of petroleum products has been subsidised for the benefit of the broader 
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society. The fact that the Nigerian downstream sector is important to the general 
public is consistent with application of public interest theory.  
The reasons enumerated above justify the rationale for adopting Public Interest 
Theory of Regulation to underpin this study. Figure 4.1 illustrates the relationship 
between Public Interest Theory and regulatory governance in Nigeria’s downstream 
petroleum sector.  
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Figure 4.1: Public Interest Theory and regulatory governance relationship in 
Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector  
Figure 4.1 shows that the general public (NA, CS, TU and NEITI) expect the 
regulators (the DPR, PPPRA and PEF) to have the required expertise and autonomy 
(independence). Similarly, the general public expect the regulators to provide 
accountability and transparency for their actions. On the other hand, regulators 
should design regulations and monitor the activities of regulated companies (the 
MOMC, IOMC and PPMC) and the regulated companies need to comply with 
regulations and pay revenue to the regulators. The general public expects to receive 
quality products or services from the regulated companies. Moreover, the general 
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public (consumers) have to pay for the services they obtain from the regulated 
companies; therefore, the adoption of the Public Interest Theory perfectly underpins 
the aim of this study, which is to investigate whether the regulatory governance 
practice of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector is fit for purpose.  
4.5 Other theories that could have been applied to the study.  
Two other theories that could be applied in a study of regulatory governance are 
Regulatory Capture Theory and the Agency Theory. 
1- Capture Theory of regulation  
McMahon (2002, p. 1) defines regulatory Capture Theory as ‘meant behaviours, 
active and passive, by responsible authorities, which behaviour acts to protect the 
same illegal, unethical, immoral or anti-public interest practices that those authorities 
are charged of policing’. Leading industry players are granted unjustifiable special 
consideration from the state (McChesney and Shughart, 1995).  
The regulatory Capture Theory applies when the regulatory agencies, established to 
act in the public’s interest, instead move away from the commercial or special 
concerns of interest groups that dominate the industry or sector it is charged with 
regulating (Huntington, 1952). According to Levine and Forrence (1990), regulatory 
capture happens as a result of government or regulatory agency failure, which 
encourages regulated firms to create harmful externalities. Laffont and Tirole (1991) 
add that regulatory capture occurs because groups or individuals with significant 
interest, influence the outcome of regulatory decisions or policies. It is possible that 
these powerful interests focus on their resources and energies in order to achieve the 
policy outcome they desire (Levi-Faur and Jordana, 2006).  
In the context of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector, the regulatory agencies 
could be captured by regulated companies or powerful interests. Instead of the 
regulatory agencies discharging their responsibilities in the interest of the general 
public, they may end up serving the interests of regulated companies. Thus, the 
regulatory Capture Theory might have been appropriately employed in the study of 
regulatory governance. However, the main reason for not adopting this theory here is 
because the aim of this study is wider than investigatingwhether Nigeria’s 
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downstream regulatory agencies serves a special interest group and the focus is on 
determiningif the regulatory governance practice in the sector is fit for purpose.  
2- Agency Theory  
The concept of Agency Theory is concerned with the issues surrounding the 
delegation of responsibility between agent and principal. This is one of the major 
theories used in social science research (Dunne, 2003). Agency Theory is 
concerned with offering a solution to the problems that arise in the principal–
agency relationship (Dunne, 2003). Eisenhardt (1989) believes that these 
problems occur as a result of (a) a conflict of interest between the principal and 
the agent, and (b) the difficulty, or cost implication, for the principal to monitor 
the activities of the agent. Indeed, the problem here is for the principal to 
somehow have reassurance that the agent is acting in the principal’s interest rather 
than for personal gain. The main features of an Agency Theory model are 
presented in table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Main features of Agency Theory  
Key idea Principal-agent relationship should reflect efficient 
organisation of information and risk bearing costs 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent 
Human assumptions Self-interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion  
Organisational assumptions  Partial goal conflict among participants, efficiency as the 
effectiveness criteria, information asymmetry between 
principal and agent 
Information assumption Information as a purchasable commodity  
Contracting problems Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
Problem domain  Relationship in which the principal and agent have partly 
differing goals and risk preferences (e.g. compensation, 
regulation, leadership, impression, management, whistle-
blowing, vertical integration, transfer pricing) 
Source: Kyari, 2013, p. 120.  
In the context of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies, the legislature is the 
principal and the regulatory agencies are the agents. The legislature represents the 
general public and delegates the responsibility to the regulatory agencies to regulate 
the downstream activities. However, the regulatory agencies could possibly pursue 
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their own interests instead of the interests of the principal. When the regulatory 
agencies start acting in their own interest, the legislature may find it difficult to 
monitor their activities and adverse consequences might occur.  
Although, Agency Theory is suitable for application to the downstream petroleum 
sector, it was not adopted in this research because the aim of this empirical study is 
not to investigate the relationship between the legislature (principal) and regulatory 
agencies (agent). This thesis is concerned with general regulatory governance 
practice in downstream petroleum sector and as such places less emphasis on the 
relationship that exists between the legislature and the regulatory agencies. As stated 
in Chapter 1, the aim of this study is to empirically investigate the state of the 
regulatory governance practice of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies to 
assess whether it is fit for purpose. Consequently, the scope of this thesis is broader 
than the arguments associated with the Agency Theory model, as this study explores 
the entire regulatory governance practice in Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed literature on the concept of the Public Interest Theory of 
regulation, discussed the assumptions and public perceptions of the theory, and 
examined its applicability of the theory in the study of regulatory governance of 
Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector. Likewise, two other potential theories 
(Regulatory Capture and the Agency theories) that could be applied in this regulatory 
governance study and the reasons for not adopting them were also reviewed. The 
chapter concludes that the Public Interest Theory clearly supports this study, which 
aims to investigate whether the regulatory governance practice in Nigeria’s 
downstream petroleum sector is fit for purpose. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Research methodology and methods 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to discuss the research methodology and methods used in this 
study and also to specify the steps involved in achieving the research objectives. 
Section 5.2 examines the research philosophy and the assumptions employed in this 
study. Section 5.3 discusses the formulations of the research hypotheses and Section 
5.4 explains and justifies the methods of data collection adopted. The methods of 
data analysis are discussed in Section 5.5 and the chapter is concluded in Section 5.6.  
5.2 Research philosophy 
This section examines the fundamental subject of research philosophy and strategy, 
so as to provide a basis for further discussion and analyses of the research. The topic 
is very broad, attracting many different opinions and debates, and could not possibly 
be covered in a single chapter of a thesis. However, the two key philosophical 
assumptions relevant to this study are discussed. These assumptions are referred to as 
ontology and epistemology.  
According to Blaikie (2007), ontology is regarded as the science or study of being. It 
expresses the researchers’ view on the claims or assumptions on the nature of reality, 
and specifically whether this is an objective reality that really exists, or just a 
subjective reality created in the minds of the researchers (Blaikie, 2007; Bogdan and 
Biklen, 1998; Barker, 1993). Hatch and Cunliffe (2006) describe ontological 
assumptions as how researchers perceive the world through asking questions about 
what exists, what it looks like, what units it consists of and how these units interact 
with one other. Bryman (2012) and Bryman and Cramer (2001) highlight the 
difficulty that arises when taking into consideration phenomena such as power or 
control and culture and whether they really exist or are simply illusions. This further 
widens the debate as to how individuals or groups determine these realities. The 
question is: does reality exist only through its practice (subjectivism), or does it exist 
separately to those who live it (objectivism)? For further discussion on this question 
see Grix (2002) and Bailey (1983). The proponents of subjectivism (constructivism) 
argue that social phenomena in the universe exist only through experience and 
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practice (Bell and Bryman, 2007). On the other hand, the proponents of objectivism 
believe that the world’s social structures exist independently. 
Closely related to the ontological assumptions and its consideration of what 
constitutes reality are the epistemological assumptions which seek the best ways of 
enquiring into the nature of the world, including the questions of what is knowledge 
and what are the sources and limits of that knowledge (Temple and Johnson,1998). 
Epistemology questions the research method and how knowledge can be produced 
and validated (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008). According to Blaikie (1993) 
epistemology as a theory or grounds of knowledge is a set of claims or assumptions 
about the ways in which it is possible to gain knowledge of reality, how what exists 
may be known, what can be known, and what criteria must be satisfied in order for it 
to be described as knowledge. Thorpe and Jackson (2008) view epistemology as 
how, and what, it is likely to be recognised and the need to reflect on the process and 
principles through which reliable and certifiable knowledge is produced. For Bryman 
(2012) and Hassard (1991) epistemology is simply described as how you can know 
something, how knowledge is created and what methods distinguish good quality 
knowledge from poor knowledge, as well as how reality should be described. 
Epistemology is the process and procedure for gathering knowledge to develop a 
theory or a model. It is evident that there are various perceptions and levels of 
understanding among scholars in relation to the social world and methods of 
gathering knowledge. It is obvious that a researcher should consider this link and the 
need to understand his/her position with regards to the philosophical assumption. 
When a researcher holds certain ontological views these could influence the 
epistemological choices, or the conclusions drawn. With regards to the ontological 
position, both subjective and objective epistemological opinions exist. According to 
Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008), an objective epistemological view presumes that a 
world exists externally, whereas subjective epistemology believes there is no 
possible access to the external world further than the researchers’ observations and 
interpretations. Saunders et al. (2009) observed that some researchers argue that data 
collected from existing objects is less open to bias and hence more objective. 
Moreover, when studying social phenomena the results, to hold any authority, must 
be presented in a statistical rather than a narrative manner. However, this is a 
position that many researchers would challenge. Lindorff (2007) argued that in view 
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of the fact that social science research involves so many choices, the opportunity for 
a researcher’s values and preferences to influence the process makes it difficult to 
ultimately achieve true objectivity. It is in view of these debates that research 
paradigms have emerged.  
According to Denzin and Lincoln (2003), a research paradigm is an interpretive 
framework and a basic set of beliefs that guide an action. Collectively, these 
assumptions are referred to as a ‘paradigm’ (Lawal, 2008). According to Harmon 
(1970, p. 5), a paradigm is defined as ‘the basic way of perceiving, thinking, valuing 
and doing, associated with a particular vision of reality’. A paradigm is also 
described as a set of rules and regulations, written or unwritten, which establishes or 
defines boundaries and dictates how the researcher behaves inside the boundaries 
(Baker, 1993; Hassard, 1991). Indeed, a paradigm is like a mental window through 
which the researcher views the social world, based on his or her paradigm of 
concepts, categories, assumptions and biases (Bailey, 2008). There are three main 
research paradigms in social science research. These paradigms are chosen not only 
for their popularity in management research but also because they effectively form 
the basis from which other paradigms are developed. 
The first is the positivist view which believes that the most appropriate way to study 
social reality is to apply the methods of natural sciences. This is closely related to the 
ontological opinion of the objectivists. Their position originated from natural science 
and is characterised by testing research hypotheses adopted from existing theory 
(hence deductive or theory testing) by measuring social realities (Creswell, 2009; 
Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006). The positivist view presumes that the social world only 
exists objectively and externally. Furthermore, it is believed that knowledge is valid 
only if it is based on observations of this external reality; that universal or general 
laws exist; or that theoretical models can be developed that are generalisable and can 
explain cause and effect relationships which lend themselves to predicting outcomes. 
Positivism is based upon values of reason, truth and validity and there is a focus 
purely on facts, gathered through direct observation and experience and measured 
empirically using quantitative methods – surveys and experiments – and statistical 
analysis (Blaikie, 1993; Saunders et al., 2009; Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008; 
Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). Hart (2001) relates this to the organisational context, 
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stating that positivists assume that what truly happens in organisations can only be 
discovered through categorisation and scientific measurement of the behaviour of 
people and systems and that language is truly representative of the reality. 
The second research paradigm is interpretivism, which disagrees with the view that 
natural science methods cannot be used in the study of social reality because of the 
dynamic nature of the social world (Bryman, 2001). The advocates of interpretivism 
are closely linked to the views of constructivists/subjectivists. Hart (2001) describes 
an interpretivist as an anti-positivist. Blaikie (1993) argues that there is a 
fundamental difference between the subject matters of natural and social sciences. In 
the social world it is argued that individuals and groups make sense of situations 
based upon their individual experience, memories and expectations. Meaning is 
therefore constructed and (over time) constantly re-constructed through experience, 
resulting in many differing interpretations. It is these numerous thoughts and 
interpretations that create a social reality in which society progresses. Advocates of 
this paradigm, therefore, believe that it is significant to ascertain and understand the 
meanings and the appropriate factors that determine, influence and affect the 
interpretations among different people. Interpretivists strive to describe meaning and 
create their realities in order to understand their points of view and to interpret these 
experiences in the context of the researchers’ academic experience to build an 
(inductive) theory (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). The focal point of the 
researchers, to understand the meanings and interpretations of ‘social actors’ and to 
understand their world from their point of view, is extremely contextual, and hence it 
is not widely generalisable (Saunders et al., 2007).  
The third school of thought is pragmatism, which believes that the most appropriate 
means of knowledge gathering are to mix both positivism and interpretivsm views 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). Many scholars have been involved in the debate 
over mixed methods and mixed models research and this has led to the emergence of 
pragmatic paradigms (Tashakkori and Creswell, 2007). For example, Morse (1991) 
used a pragmatic paradigm in his review of nursing studies and Meekers (1994) 
applied a pragmatic approach in the study of marriage patterns in Zimbabwe among 
Shona-speaking people. The application of a pragmatic approach in mixed-methods 
has become more prominent in social science research. Tashakkori and Teddlie 
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(1998), however, acknowledge that this has left behind the legacy of discussion 
regarding the importance of paradigms in research and a lack of clarity associated 
with terminology. Pragmatism is ‘a position that argues that the most important 
determinant of the research philosophy adopted is the research question, arguing that 
it is possible to work within both positivist (quantitative) and interpretivist 
(qualitative) positions. It applies a practical approach, integrating different 
perspectives to help to collect and interpret data’ (Saunders et al., 2009, p.598). 
Combining the two methods can complement each other (Creswell 2003); the use of 
both positivism (quantitative) and interpretivism (qualitative) can therefore be 
advantageous (Patton, 1990). The pragmatic approach directly links the adoption of 
the paradigm to the rationale and the nature of the research hypotheses (Creswell, 
2003). A research is frequently versatile and so are the methods or tactics that assist 
the researcher to deal with research questions that sit comfortably within a wholly 
qualitative or quantitative method to design and methodology (Armitage, 2007). 
Tashakkori and Teddlie,(1998) and Creswell, (2003) argue that a pragmatic 
paradigm is a perceptive application to study areas that are of significance, accepting 
methods that are suitable and using the findings in a positive way and in harmony 
with the value system held by the researcher.  
A number of models have been developed in an attempt to form other paradigms in a 
social and organisational theory. Among these models, the one developed by Burrell 
and Morgan (1979) has attracted substantial attention (White, 1983). The Burrell and 
Morgan model is constructed on two independent dimensions, based on assumptions 
concerning the nature of social science and the nature of society. In this model, the 
latter dimension is subdivided into four different, but related, assumptions about the 
very essence of the phenomena (ontology), the grounds of knowledge 
(epistemology), the relation between human beings (human nature) and the way in 
which one attempts to investigate and obtain knowledge about the real world 
(methodology) (Hassard, 1991). By interconnecting the subjective–objective debates 
in the theory of social science, with the consensus–conflict debates in the theory of 
society, Burrell and Morgan (1979) produced four paradigms, known as: 
functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist and radical structuralist.  
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For the purpose of this study, the pragmatic paradigm is adopted. The pragmatism 
approach is particularly suitable for a mixed-method research which combines both 
quantitative and qualitative methods, and is therefore considered to be the most 
appropriate approach for this study. Another reason for the adoption of the pragmatic 
paradigm is that this approach provides the fundamental theoretical and empirical 
framework for mixed-methods research (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003; Sarantakos, 
1998). Arguably the adoption of the pragmatist assumption is justifiable, because the 
existence of the knowledge of regulatory governance system is independent of our 
experiences, and they can also be determined by human interaction. Similarly, the 
researcher is seeking ways to explain whether Nigeria’s downstream regulatory 
governance practice is fit for purpose, based on the circumstances, needs and 
objectives of the country. Thus, in the context of this research, the behaviours of 
individuals are defined and influenced by the situation or environment within which 
the regulatory governance framework is designed and implemented.  
5.3 Development of the hypotheses 
As guided by literature and the regulatory governance framework identified by the 
IMF 2004, World Bank 2003, OECD 2002 and Quintyn 2002, the following research 
hypotheses were developed and are to be tested in this study: 
(i) Main research hypothesis 
HO1 – The regulatory governance practice in Nigeria’s downstream petroleum 
sector is not fit for purpose 
(ii) Sub-hypotheses 
HO1 – There are inadequate independence arrangements in place to enable 
Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies to ensure good regulatory governance 
practice in the sector 
Regulatory agencies should have a clear legal mandate that allows them to be free 
from any form of interference. The main role of regulatory agencies is to make new 
regulations, review existing regulations and improve the quality of regulatory 
governance, and as such it should be highly autonomous (Baton, 1958). The central 
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pillar of a good regulatory governance system is the independence and legislative 
mandate, which protects regulatory agencies from the influence of external bodies. 
Independence is the most important mechanism for achieving good regulatory 
governance practice (OECD, 2000).  
According to the law established by the Petroleum Act 1969, and amended in 1998, 
Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies are required to be autonomous from any 
external interference, such as other regulatory agencies around the world. Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory agencies should have a clear definition of their roles and 
responsibilities, should independently monitor regulatory quality in the downstream 
petroleum sector and should have the power to punish any regulated companies that 
do not adhere to the regulations. Moreover, they should be given the necessary 
financial resources required to exercise their powers effectively. However, from the 
literature reviewed above there are certain concerns that Nigeria’s downstream 
petroleum sector is lacking the independence to carry out its duties. This hypothesis 
is developed on this assertion and will test whether Nigeria’s downstream regulatory 
agencies are independent and autonomous in exercising their regulatory mandate. 
HO2 – Inadequate accountability mechanisms are in place and this affects the 
regulatory governance practice of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies 
The compliance of regulatory agencies to appropriate accounting mechanisms is the 
main prerequisite for attainting good regulatory governance (OECD, 2002). To be 
credible and to be recognised by regulated companies, regulatory agencies should be 
highly accountable in discharging their regulatory functions (OECD, 2004). 
Furthermore, regulatory agencies must stress the importance of accountability when 
making regulations. Kirkpatrick and Zhang (2004) argue that it is vital for the agency 
to be able to justify (to be accountable for) its actions according to the mandate given 
to it by the legislature. Similarly, for any regulatory agency to achieve good 
regulatory governance it must be accountable to those who delegated the 
responsibility, not only the government, or the legislature, but also to those who fall 
under their functional jurisdiction and to the public at large (stakeholders) (OECD, 
2002; IMF, 2004). 
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Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies, like the majority of other regulatory 
agencies around the world, are required by law (the Petroleum Act 1969 as amended 
in 1998) to be accountable. They are required to publish their financial reports and 
justify any expenditure incurred when fulfilling their duties. Their accounts need to 
be submitted for external auditing. But despite what is stated by the law, there are 
many accountability issues with Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies. This 
hypothesis is developed to test whether or not this accountability actually exists in 
practice.  
HO3 – Inadequate transparency mechanisms are in place and this affects the 
regulatory governance practice of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies 
Transparency, in relation to a good regulatory governance system, ranges from a 
simple public notification that regulatory decisions have been taken, to stringent 
controls concerning administrative discretion and corruption (IMF, 2004). According 
to Kirkpatrick (2006), transparency is an important mechanism that contributes to 
good regulatory governance. When drafting regulations, it is of paramount 
importance to consult all stakeholders for the purpose of transparency (OECD, 
2001).When drafting regulations, consultation and the use of clear language are two 
essential components which support the decision-making process and ensure 
transparency (OECD, 2002). Information disclosure is vital to the promotion of 
transparency. Consistent and transparent processes in formulating, implementing and 
reviewing regulations are necessary in order to maintain public confidence and to 
guarantee opportunities for the public to participate in a good regulatory governance 
system (OECD, 2005).  
Just like other regulatory agencies around the globe, Nigeria’s downstream 
regulatory agencies are required by law (the Petroleum Act 1969, as amended in 
1998) to be transparent in discharging their assigned roles and responsibilities. For 
example, they are expected to follow predetermined processes in the issuance of 
import permit licenses and involve stakeholders in all major decisions. Moreover, the 
stakeholders should be made aware of the actual imported petroleum products being 
imported. Openness is also required in work being undertaken in ports, terminals, 
depots and filling stations. Moreover, they are not expected to discriminate by 
sanctioning regulated companies that do not conform to, or violate, regulations. 
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Contrary to the requirements of the law, there are concerns that Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory agencies are not doing enough in terms of ensuring openness 
when discharging their regulatory duties. Therefore, hypothesis HO3 was developed 
in order to test whether or not such transparency practice is obtainable.  
HO4 – Lack of expertise affects the regulatory governance practice of Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory agencies 
A lack of expertise and necessary skills prevent many regulatory agencies from 
achieving good regulatory agency practices (OECD, 2005). To achieve good 
regulatory governance it is imperative that the regulators are highly trained in the 
field of regulation (IMF, 2004) and have the expertise to formulate and implement a 
good regulatory governance system (World Bank, 2003). In support of this aim, 
regulatory agencies should develop manuals and other guidelines, important 
requirements for the training of regulators (OECD, 2005). Kirkpatrick and Zhang 
(2004) state that it is vital for regulatory authorities to have experience and to have 
undergone rigorous training, so as to accumulate knowledge of a good regulatory 
governance system. Poor skills and a lack of expertise among regulators may have a 
detrimental effect on the quality of a regulatory governance system (OECD, 2005).  
Similar to their counterparts around the world, Nigeria’s downstream regulatory 
agency personnel must possess the necessary skills, integrity, knowledge and 
expertise in regulatory governance principles, as required by national legislation (the 
Petroleum Act 1969, as amended in 1998). Additionally, they should have the 
capability to formulate good policies in the sector, as well as knowledge of the 
mechanisms required to foster awareness of good regulatory governance. 
Furthermore, staff are expected to pursue regulatory goals without compromising 
them. However, Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector is faced with the problem of 
instability, which could possibly be related to the lack of required expertise and 
resources to formulate and implement sound policies in the sector. This assertion is 
the basis on which this hypothesis has been developed, in order to test whether 
Nigeria’s downstream regulators have adequate skills/expertise in regulatory 
governance. 
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5.4 Research methods 
The research method refers to the data collection techniques and the type of analysis 
employed in the study. There are two main research approaches, referred to as 
qualitative and quantitative methods (Bell and Bryman, 2007). The mixed-method 
approach, regarded as a third option, is a combination of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods (Saunders et al., 2009).  
Devine (2002) and Teddlie and Tashakkori (2006) argue that the qualitative method 
is the process of understanding the experiences, perceptions and history of the people 
in their natural setting. The main concern of qualitative research is to understand the 
meaning of a phenomenon and the reasons why individuals and groups think or 
behave in a particular way about certain issues (Creswell, 2013; Eriksson and 
Kovalainen, 2008; Busha and Harter; 1980). Bell and Bryman (2007) examined the 
qualitative method as a broader concept when a particular culture and environment is 
being studied, and when ethnography is the most appropriate as method. On the other 
hand, when attention is placed on an in-depth examination of a particular experience, 
then phenomenology would be suitable (Saunders et al., 2011; Resnik, 2010; Morse, 
1991; Patton, 2002). Also, when dialogue or conversation is under investigation, then 
discourse analysis is indicated. Qualitative research views the situation from the 
researhers’ real world setting (Saunders el al., 2009; Patton, 2001).  
Sheila (2009) stated that the following were the key features of qualitative research: 
1. The qualitative method usually involves careful sampling of the research 
participants, who should be as representative as possible of the population as 
a whole. 
2. The qualitative method enables informal interaction between the researcher 
and research participants, rather like a normal conversation; it is fluid, open-
ended, dynamic and (to a degree) spontaneous and creative. 
3. The qualitative method aims to understand people holistically, by recognising 
what they think or feel, as well as their emotion and intuitive knowledge. This 
method also encourages the research participants to respond to ideas that are 
presented to them and to generate their own ideas. 
82 
 
4. The qualitative method involves a high level of interpretation and synthesis of 
data by the researcher throughout the research process, both in the interaction 
with research participants and in the analysis and presentation of the research 
outcomes.  
5. The qualitative method starts with an attempt to understand the world of the 
individuals being researched, to gain some thoughtful insight into what is 
important to them, how they view the world, and the context within which 
they evaluate the idea, product or service that may be presented to them. The 
emphasis is on the depth of understanding and relationship that the individual 
has.  
On the other hand, the quantitative method is generally regarded as a scientific 
method of conducting research. Sheila (2009) posited that the major feature of the 
quantitative method is that it has the ability to measure the proportion of a population 
that think or behave in a particular way. Thus it appears objective in nature. A 
quantitative method is more suitable when a research aims to ‘discover how many 
and what kind of people in the general, or parent population, have a particular 
characteristic which has been found to exist in the sample population’ (Brannen, 
1992, p. 5). Quantitative methods place more emphasis on numerical, measurement, 
sampling and designing issues and analysis of the informal relationships between the 
variables (Sekaran, 2006; Trochim, 2006; Somekh and Lewin, 2005; Devine, 2002). 
According to Sheila (2009), the quantitative method is said to have following 
attributes:  
1. It involves statistical and numerical measurement of the raw data captured in 
questionnaires. 
2. The results can be used as a benchmark; the survey can be repeated in the 
future using the same questions, and the results can be compared. 
3. It generally involves large numbers of people, including specific subgroups, 
grouped for example by age, social class, marital status or brand usage. 
Mixed-method research involves a combination of both quantitative and qualitative 
research approaches in a particular study (Armitage and Keeble-allen, 2007; 
Ivankova et al., 2006; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Ryan et al., 2002; Brannen, 
1992). In the context of this current study, the mixed-method approach is adopted in 
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order to allow the research to benefit from the attributes of both qualitative and 
quantitative methods. Many reasons informed the adoption of this method.  
First, combining these approaches will enhance an appropriate investigation into 
Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector. Second, this method will help to facilitate 
and obtain an in-depth knowledge of regulatory governance issues in Nigeria’s 
downstream petroleum sector. Third, employing mixed-method research will enable 
a better understanding of individual perceptions in relation to Nigeria’s downstream 
regulatory governance practice. Fourth, mixed-method research has the capability to 
facilitate complementary outcomes, by using the strength of one method to overcome 
the weaknesses of the other. Fifth, the use of mixed-method research will help the 
researcher examine and acquire more information relating to the research hypotheses.  
Sixth, the reason for combining both qualitative and quantitative methods is because 
the study intends to use both the questionnaire and interview method of data 
collection. Thus, the mixed-method approach perfectly matches this research’s aim 
of gaining the perceptions of different stakeholders. Moreover, the participants’ 
knowledge, views and records relative to regulatory governance and Nigeria’s 
downstream sector are essential for this study.  
5.4.1 The population of the study 
The term ‘population’ is defined as an entire group of people, events, or things of 
interest that the researcher wishes to investigate (Sekaran, 2006). Knowledge of the 
population at the outset of a study is crucial when it comes to identifying appropriate 
sources from which data for the study can be collected (Sekaran, 2006). In this study 
ten legitimate stakeholder groups were appropriately selected.  
1- The Department of Petroleum Resources. The DPR formed part of the study 
population because the general responsibilities and objectives of the DPR are to 
ensure compliance with petroleum laws and regulations through the monitoring of 
the operations of the upstream and downstream companies. A total of 18 experts 
were identified to be the population of this stakeholder group.  
2- The Petroleum Product Pricing Regulatory Agency. The PPPRA was 
established to determine the pricing of petroleum products and regulate the supply 
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and distribution and, by its mandate, it also has the responsibility to ensure the 
availability of petroleum products at a reasonable price; this made it a suitable 
participant in this study. The operations department is responsible for regulating the 
price of petroleum products. The department is headed by the General Manager of 
Operations and other 16 staff.  
3- The Petroleum Equalisation Fund. The PEF was selected to partake in this 
research because it is an agency established primarily to administer uniform prices of 
petroleum products throughout the country. This is achieved by reimbursing the 
marketer’s transportation differentials for the movement of petroleum products from 
the depots to their sales outlets (filling stations), in order to ensure that products are 
sold at a uniform pump price throughout the country. A total of 16 experts were 
identified from the technical department; the department is responsible for ensuring 
regulations in relation to price equalisation are adhered to.  
4- The Pipelines and Product Marketing Company. The PPMC was 
established to ensure the security of the supply of petroleum products to the 
domestic market at low operating costs, to market special products competitively in 
the domestic and international markets, and to provide excellent customer service by 
effectively and efficiently transporting crude oil to the refineries and moving 
petroleum products to the market. It was therefore considered relevant to this 
research The PPMC has five area offices across the country: Port-Harcourt, Warri, 
Mosimi, Kaduna and Gombe. The area offices are each headed by an Area Manager. 
Since the five area offices have uniform responsibility, only the KADUNA area 
office was selected and 17 experts were identified as the population of this study.  
5- The Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative. NEITI was selected 
because it was mandated by law to promote transparency and accountability in the 
management of Nigeria’s oil, gas and mining revenues. A major component of the 
on-going anti-corruption reform in Nigeria that ensures good governance, NEITI 
consists of four departments: the Executive Secretary’s Department, the Technical 
Department, Communications Department and the Finance & Administrations 
Department. Only executive secretaries and the Technical department were asked to 
participate, as they are believed to be better informed than the other departmental 
staff: 16 experts were identified and formed part of the study population.  
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6- The National Assembly. The NA was included as part of the study population 
because it is the body responsible for making laws in Nigeria and it is actively 
engaged, through its oil and gas committee, in ensuring that the laws relating to the 
oil petroleum industry are up to date. There is a House of Representatives committee 
on downstream petroleum (with 8 members) and a senate committee of petroleum 
downstream (with 5 members). In total 13 experts were identified to form part of the 
study population. When legislatures perceive there are inefficiencies within a certain 
sector of the economy they usually take drastic measures to resolve the problem. 7-  
7- Major oil marketing companies. MOMC were selected due to the fact that they 
are regulated companies which are expected to adhere to the regulations stipulated by 
the regulatory agencies when selling refined products to the final consumer. There 
are six MOMCs in the country. These six companies have the same business 
characteristics; they are all engaged in marketing refined petroleum products and 
lubricants through their retail outlets nationwide. A total of 14 experts were 
identified from four companies; these experts are the main contact of regulatory 
agencies in each of the companies, and as such they are in a better position to be well 
informed on the phenomenon under investigation.  
8- The independent oil marketing companies. The IOMC formed part of the study 
because they are also regulated companies that market petroleum products in the 
country. They are usually one-man businesses, only companies that have more than 
40 retail outlets and have been in the downstream business for twenty years were 
selected. It is likely that companies fitting these parameters will have adequate 
knowledge of downstream regulations in Nigeria. In all, 12 independent marketers 
were identified to constitute part of the study population.  
9- The civil society. The CS was selected because its members represent the opinion 
of the general public. For any regulation to be successful, it should be designed to 
provide opportunities and sustainable growth and development in line with public 
interest. There are a number of civil societies in Nigeria, but the Save Nigeria Group 
(SNG) and the Civil Rights Congress (CRC) were selected because they are the most 
prominent and are always committed to issues regarding the downstream petroleum 
sector. In total, 13 experts were identified and formed part of the study population.  
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10- The trade unions. The TU were included because they represent the voice of the 
general public and that of the Nigerian labour force. The Petroleum and Natural Gas 
Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN) and National Union of 
Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) were also selected since they are 
representative of Nigeria’s oil and gas workers, including the downstream petroleum 
sector. The management of the unions was targeted and 14 members were identified 
as participants in this research.  
Table 5.1: Summary of the respondents’ groups population estimation  
Respondent Groups Respondents 
Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), 18 
Product Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA) 17 
Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), 16 
Pipelines and Product Marketing Company (PPMC), 17 
Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), 16 
National Assembly (NA) 13 
Major oil marketing companies (MOMC) 14 
Independent oil marketing (IOMC) 12 
Civil society (CS) 13 
Trade unions (TU) 14 
Total 150 
Source: Based on pilot study  
Table 5.1 shows a total of 150 respondents from the ten stakeholder groups, which 
constitute the population of the study. These experts were selected based on the 
expertise and knowledge they possessed as well as their relevance to Nigeria’s 
downstream petroleum sector.  
With the exception of the civil society and trade unions, each of the other eight 
groups maintains a downstream petroleum unit. To ensure that the identified 
stakeholders had appropriate knowledge of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory 
governance practice, every effort was made to seek assurances and advice from a 
range of informed individuals in Nigeria‘s downstream petroleum sector. Based on 
the input they provided and subsequent analysis of the available information from the 
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groups selected, these 150 experts were identified as possessing the required 
knowledge in the field under investigation. 
5.4.2 Sample and sampling techniques 
According to Patton (2002), certain factors need to be carefully considered when 
sampling from a population, including: what the researcher wants; the purpose of the 
research; what is at stake; what will be useful; what will affect the credibility of the 
research; and what can be done with the available time and resources. A researcher, 
after considering the above factors, may use judgement to decide on a suitable 
number of respondents for the study (Marshall, 1996).  
The environment under investigation leads to the careful consideration of the sample 
size of this research. The economic, political and business structure, as well as the 
environment within which Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector operates, was 
carefully considered to allow these major stakeholders to be recognised. The total 
population of 150 respondents were sampled across the stakeholder groups.  
5.4.3 Data collection techniques 
There are various methods of data collection. According to Fontana and Frey (2005), 
the data collection method adopted by researchers varies, depending on the type of 
phenomenon under investigation. A researcher can use either primary (questionnaire 
and interviews) or secondary (documentary sources) data, or a combination of both.  
According to Bush (2002), a questionnaire is a document including questions and 
other types of statements which is designed to seek appropriate information and 
allow analysis of it accordingly. The questionnaire technique is regarded as one of 
the most generally acceptable methods of data collection (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 
2006; Saunders et al., 2003; Van Teijlingen and Hundley, 2001). Saunders et al. 
(2003) identified a number of guidelines to ensure the effectiveness of a 
questionnaire, which include specifying: the information needed, what is to be 
incorporated in each question, what types of query are to be asked, how many 
question are to be included, the capability of the participants to answer the query, the 
enthusiasm of participants to answer questions, and the structure of the questions. 
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A questionnaire can be structured, semi-structured, or unstructured. A structured 
questionnaire consists of pre-coded questions, with good clear outlines of the 
questions (Saunders et al., 2003). Among the advantages of structured questionnaires 
are uniformity in answering, simplicity of data management and ease of 
administration. An unstructured questionnaire involves the use of open-ended 
questions. According to Van Teijlingen and Hundley (2001), an unstructured 
questionnaire is mainly suited to focus group research. A questionnaire with a 
combination of both closed and open questions is considered to be a semi-structured 
or quasi-structured questionnaire. Therefore the semi-structured questionnaire assists 
the researcher in collecting both quantitative and qualitative data. 
Like the questionnaire, interviews are generally used in social science research as a 
data collection instrument (Trochim, 2006). Cohen and Manion (1994) argue that 
interviews are incredibly important, mainly for obtaining the story behind 
respondents’ knowledge. Interviewers have the opportunity to ask further 
information around the subject matter in order to attain in-depth knowledge about the 
phenomenon under investigation (Wahyuni, 2012). In this regard, the research 
objectives direct the questions asked in the interviews, the content, sequence, and 
wording of questions are completely at the discretion of the interviewer (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). There are three types of interview: structured, semi-structured 
and unstructured (Fontana and Frey, 2005). 
In structured interviews, the set questions could be asked in the same order to all the 
interviewees. A semi-structured interview is moderately more flexible than a 
structured interview and it involves the use of closed-ended and open-ended 
questions. An unstructured interview relies on social interaction between the 
interviewer and the interviewee (John, 2009). The central objective of an 
unstructured interview is to expose the researchers to unexpected ideas which will 
help him/her to gain a better understanding of the respondents’ social reality from 
their point of view. 
This research adopts the questionnaire and interview method to collect data from 
diverse participants. A combination of these methods will help to overcome the 
weaknesses of one method when employing the other. The reason for adopting the 
questionnaire and interview is to obtain a reasonable respondent sample across all 
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stakeholder groups concerned with downstream regulatory governance in Nigeria. 
This will guarantee a fair representation of the population. Analysis of the 
perceptions held by the different groups will shed light on the regulatory governance 
of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector from different perspectives and will enrich 
and enhance the literature. These techniques are adopted because of the descriptive 
nature of the research and the fact that it is concerned with the opinions and attitudes 
of the informed. 
Secondary data was obtained from available literature such as journals, books, 
government reports, magazines, newspapers and extra-governmental agencies’ 
reports (e.g. NGOs, OPEC, UNDP World bank). 
5.4.3.1 Questionnaire design 
The main sources of data in this research will be the opinions of the respondents 
obtained from carefully worded questionnaires. The reason for this is that the 
respondents – the main stakeholders in Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector – 
possess relevant information on the regulatory governance in this sector. The 
questionnaires are a typical form of information gathering which simplifies the 
gathering of evidence on the public’s beliefs (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). After more 
than two months of drafting and rewording, the questionnaire was simplified in such 
a way that all the respondents could understand and respond to the questions easily. 
It is evident that this helped the respondents to answer the questions easily, given that 
none of the respondents complained or asked for an explanation regarding their 
wording.  
To simplify and ensure the effectiveness of the questionnaire, both close-ended and 
open-ended questions were designed. To maximise the validity, minimise the 
respondent burden and reduce the financial costs of data collection, a five point 
Likert scale was employed (1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, and 
5=strongly agree). This enabled respondents to indicate their opinion by ticking the 
appropriate boxes, except for the first section which asked for their demographic 
characteristics. 
The questionnaire was divided into four sections (see Appendix 1). Section one 
requested information relating to the respondents place of employment. Sections two, 
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three and four asked the respondents about the independence, accountability, 
transparency and expertise of the regulatory governance practice in Nigeria’s 
downstream petroleum sector of the DPR, PPPRA and PEF, respectively.  
5.4.3.2 Interview  
An interview is ‘a verbal interaction between one or more researchers and one or 
more respondents for the purpose of collecting valid and reliable data to answer 
particular research questions’ (Parahoo, 2006). The use of interviews in a research is 
a valuable tool because they are flexible enough to allow for several circumstances, 
are easily administered and achieve a good response rate (Sarantakos, 1998).  
Although an interview may be structured, semi-structured or unstructured (Patton, 
2002; Sekaran, 1992), this study chose to adopt the semi-structured interview as it is 
the perfect choice for an in-depth research and is a broadly acceptable method in 
literature. It also increases the rationality of the tool since participants will be 
assisted in understanding the queries and at the same time the interviewer may ask 
for further explanation (Creswell, 2009; Fontana and Frey, 2005). Twenty experts 
were selected to participate in a follow-up interview. The selection of these 
interviewees was based on the level of their skills and their experience in the 
downstream petroleum sector and certain criteria were used in selecting them: (a) 
only two respondents from each of the ten stakeholders groups; (b) only staff in 
managerial positions; and (c) only those officials that have spent seven years or more 
working in the downstream petroleum sector. The researcher identified these experts 
with the help of the research assistants in each of the ten stakeholder organisations. 
In addition, the pilot study and the initial data collected further guided the selection 
of these experts. The sampling technique used in the interview is appropriate because 
the abovementioned participants are believed to be more knowledgeable in the area 
under investigation.  
5.4.3.3 Pilot study 
The main objectives of a pilot study are to provide information that could enhance 
the reliability and validity of the research. A pilot study is ‘a specific pre-testing of 
research instruments, including questionnaire or interview schedules’ (Van 
Teijlingen and Hundley, 2001, p. 1). The pilot testing helps to save time, money and 
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effort which cannot be recovered if a study fails due to unforeseen circumstances. 
Similarly, a pilot test allows researchers to change or amend the questions so as to be 
very clear and to guarantee the success of the data collection process (Abdel-Khalik, 
and Ajinkya, 1979; Saunders et al., 2003). 
Two pilot tests were carried out in this study. The initial test was performed at the 
Robert Gordon University Aberdeen Business School (ABS) with six research 
students and two academic staff. All their observations, suggestions, comments and 
recommendations relating to the wording and the arrangement of the questionnaire 
were incorporated. The second pilot test was conducted in Nigeria on the stakeholder 
groups, with the help of a friend who is in a position of authority in one of the major 
oil marketing companies in Nigeria connected to all the respondent groups in the 
downstream sector. The respondents were selected from appropriate departments 
believed to be highly experienced in Nigeria’s downstream sector. Very useful 
observations and submission were made. There were no complaints in relation to the 
wording or the clarity of the questions. However, many participants observed that 
since there are three regulatory agencies mandated to regulate the downstream sector 
in Nigeria, the questions should be separated according to the agencies’ 
responsibility. The questionnaire was carefully amended and the adjustments were 
made in line with the respondents’ observations.  
5.4.3.4 Reliability and validity 
Reliability and validity are essential in evaluating the quality of a research 
(Golafshani, 2003). Many researchers argue that the concepts of reliability and 
validity can be used in all research because the central idea is to ensure the credibility 
of the findings (Kuzel and Engel, 2001). 
In relation to this study, the participants were given four weeks to complete the 
questionnaire. This ensured that the respondents were not under duress and as such 
their responses were believed to be correct. As participant bias can occur when 
participants are identified individually in order to generate desirable answers, the 
respondents in this study remained anonymous. It is, therefore, guaranteed that the 
reliability of the questionnaire was not in any way affected by participant bias. 
Similarly, observer errors were avoided by minimising, standardising and 
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interpreting the questionnaire so that the respondents found the questions easy and 
interesting. The researcher was very objective during the data collection and data 
analysis, which significantly minimised observer bias.  
Validity refers to the appropriateness, meaningfulness and usefulness that determine 
precise research objectives. Validity is usually seen as an essential component that 
evaluates and measures a particular purpose (Jensen, 2003; Bush, 2002). According 
to Saunders et al. (2003), validity is the ability to measure what was proposed to be 
evaluated and to assess how reliable and acceptable the research finding will be. In 
order to ensure the validity of this research about 97% of the questions were 
standardised to ensure that the respondents interpreted the questions in a similar way. 
5.4.3.5 Questionnaire administration 
The researcher personally administered all the questionnaires to the respondents. 
Almost all the major stakeholders groups that participated in this study were located 
in Abuja, Lagos and Kaduna. The researcher visited these organisations and met with 
the officials responsible for handling research related matters. The questionnaires 
were given to the officials, who in turn identified and distributed them to appropriate 
personnel. With regards to the NEITI, the researcher was unable to personally meet 
the individual in charge of the research, despite several unsuccessful visits to the 
office in an attempt to contact the right officer. Thus, the researcher decided to seek 
the help of a family friend who happened to know the Executive Secretary (ES). 
Upon contacting the executive secretary, an appointment was made the following 
day to meet in her office. The ES was impressed with the aim of the research, and 
directed her secretary to call the officer in charge of handling research matters. She 
then requested that the officer identified and distributed the questionnaire to the 
appropriate respondents.  
Although some questionnaires were returned within two weeks, others took up to 
four or five weeks. Several telephone calls and personal visits were made to the 
organisations in order to maximise the response rate. 
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5.5 The method of data analysis 
According to Bogden and Bilken (1982, p. 145) data analysis involves: ‘The process 
of systematically searching and arranging the interview transcripts, field-notes, and 
other materials that you accumulate to increase your understanding of them and to 
enable you to present what you have discovered to others’. According to Miles and 
Huberman (1994) data analysis consists of three activities: (i) data reduction; (ii) data 
display, referring to organising information to enable conclusions; and (iii) drawing 
conclusions and verification. The three activities are interrelated during and after 
data collection. These processes can be attained by using parametric or non-
parametric statistic tests.  
Geisser and Johnson (2006) argue that parametric statistics is a branch of statistics 
that assumes data can be represented by a probability distribution and inferences are 
made about the parameters of the distribution. Dallal (2001) identified a number of 
parametric statistical tests including: (i) the t test which compares two independent 
samples; (ii) the paired t test which examines a set of differences; (iii) the Pearson 
correlation coefficient, which assesses the linear association between two variables; 
(vi) the one way analysis of variance (F test) which compares three or more groups; 
and (v) the two way analysis of variance which compares groups classified by two 
different factors. 
Non-parametric statistics are a branch of statistics that do not depend on the type of 
probability distribution which describes the data. The following are regarded as the 
most commonly used non-parametric statistical tests: (i) the Mann-Whitney U test; 
the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, which compares two independent samples; (ii) the 
Wilcoxon matched pairs signed-rank test, which examines a set of differences; (iii) 
the Spearman rank correlation coefficient which assesses the linear association 
between two variables; (vi) the Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance by ranks, used to 
compare three or more groups; and (v) the Friedman two way analysis of variance, 
used when comparing groups classified by two different factors (Bryman and 
Cramer, 2001; Dallal 2001). 
This study adopts descriptive statistics and a non-parametric statistical test to enable 
analysis of the data. Descriptive statistical methods, such as calculating the mean and 
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median, cross-tabulation and frequencies were used in the data analysis. This helped 
to analyse the differences and characteristics among the respondent groups. Where 
significant differences existed between respondent groups, a Mann-Whitney test was 
conducted. The main reason for the adoption of a Mann-Whitney test is that it is 
believed to be the most widely used statistical tools and generates excellent results. 
According to Landers (1981), the Mann-Whitney test is one of the most powerful 
non-parametric tests and, like other non-parametric tests, does not depend on 
assumptions on the distribution of the population. This study analysed the data in line 
with the objectives of the research by considering the following stages: 
(a) Reduction of the data: The data was reduced by focusing on Public 
Interest Theory of regulation as a framework; this process was also 
beneficial in helping to determine the most appropriate respondents. 
The careful manner in which the survey questions were constructed 
also contributed, as did the tables and figures used to present the data.  
(b) Codification of the data: Data coding is the process of translating 
questionnaire data into a
 
significant category to enable easy analysis 
(Williams, 2003). In this study, the questionnaire responses were 
coded separately into a coding sheet before entering into a database. 
The coding of the questionnaire was successful, largely as a result of 
the assistance given by the supervisory team and other research 
students, which helped to prevent any mistakes arising during coding. 
(c) Statistical tools adopted: SPSS statistical software was used in order to 
enable the coded data to be input. Even though there are other 
statistical tools
7
 that could be applied, the adoption of the SPSS was 
necessary because the package is regarded as the most powerful data 
analysis software and can handle very complex statistical procedures 
(Pallant, 2010). It is also one of the most commonly used software 
programs in social science research.  
(d) The missing value analysis: Missing values can occur when 
respondents do not reply to a question because they refuse to, or they 
                                       
7 These include AtlasTi, Hyperreserch, Nud*ist, Nud*ist Nvivo, Decision Explorer, and Minitab. 
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fail to understand the query, or lack the time to answer the question, or 
they lose interest (Raymond, 1986). Missing data usually causes 
problems during data analysis. According to Croninger and Douglas 
(2005), missing data affects the validity of a research. The missing 
data in this study were discovered as MCAR
8
. A mean estimation 
technique was applied and the missing values were computed. The 
reason for using a mean estimation technique is that the software 
employed (SPSS) in this study has characteristics that are capable of 
automatically computing the mean estimation. Additionally, the mean 
estimation technique is one of the most commonly used techniques 
(Raymond, 1986). 
(e) The statistical tests and discussion of results: Descriptive and non-
parametric statistical tests were adopted, which helped the analysis of 
the data. The descriptive statistics of frequencies, mean, median and 
cross-tabulation were used to analyse the demographic characteristics 
of the respondents and to explain the overall perceptions of the 
respondents in relation to each of the tested variables. The Mann-
Whitney test was used as it is one of the most powerful tools in non-
parametric statistics. The differences between the respondent groups 
were identified and discussed using Mann-Whitney tests.  
(f) Summary of the main results: Based on the findings and the possible 
practical implications of each of the outcomes, a summary was made. 
The summary provides the basis for this study’s conclusion as 
presented in the last chapter.  
                                       
8 Generally, literature identifies three types of missing data (Nakai and Ke, 2011): i) Missing completely at 
random (MCAR), which means the probability that responses are missing is unrelated to both the specific 
values that should have been obtained and the set of observed responses; ii) Missing at random (MAR), 
referring to the probability that responses are missing depends on the set of observed responses, but is 
unrelated to the specific missing values that should have been obtained; and iii) Not missing at random 
(NMAR), in which the probability that responses are missing depends on both the specific values that 
should have been obtained and the set of observed responses. The determination of the data as MCAR was 
through Little’s MCAR test. The test is based on the assumption that the calculated mean of the observed 
data in each assessment under MCAR is always the same, regardless of the pattern of missing information 
(Little, 1988).   
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5.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has reviewed literature on research methodology and methods. This 
enabled the study to adopt the most appropriate methodology and methods. As a 
result, the pragmatic paradigm method was adopted for this research. This paradigm 
involves the adoption of the mixed-method approach. Both the interview and 
questionnaire techniques were employed as appropriate methods of data collection 
and the data for the study were analysed using the SPSS statistical tools. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Data analysis and presentation 
6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present and analyse the data collected through the 
questionnaire-based survey. In order to achieve this, the chapter is divided into four 
sections. The response rate of the questionnaire is analysed in Section 6.2. Section 
6.3 presents the demographic characteristic of the respondents using descriptive 
statistics. In Section 6.4 the analysis of the main findings from the questionnaire-
based survey is discussed and Section 6.5 concludes.  
6.2 Questionnaire response 
According to Williams (2003) questionnaire response rates differ from one 
questionnaire to another and usually falls between the ranges of 10% to 90%. 
Walonick (2004) further believes that a well-designed questionnaire contributes to a 
high response rate. Although 150 questionnaires were administered in this study to 
all the ten groups of respondents, only 104 questionnaires were returned (see Table 
6.1).  
Table 6.1: Questionnaires issued and returned based on the respondent groups 
Respondent groups Issued Returned Excluded Used 
Department of Petroleum Resources 18 13 0 13 
Petroleum Product Pricing Regulatory Agency 17 11 0 11 
Petroleum Equalisation Fund 16 11 0 11 
Pipeline and Product Marketing Company  17 13 0 13 
Nigeria’s Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 16 10 0 10 
National Assembly 13 9 0 9 
Major Oil Marketing Companies 14 10 0 10 
Independent Oil Marketing Companies 12 8 0 8 
Civil Society 13 9 2 7 
Trade Unions 14 10 0 10 
Total 150 104 2 102 
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Out of the 104 questionnaires, 2 were excluded because they were not completed in 
accordance with the instructions given. The remaining 102 questionnaires constituted 
68% of the total questionnaire administered. In line with Walonick’s (2004) 
assertion, this is a very good response rate. Thus the analysis and presentation is 
based on 102 returned questionnaires. 
There are many factors that contribute to the achievement of the high response rate in 
this study:  
(1) The questionnaires were distributed with the help of officers selected from each 
of the ten stakeholders, and the officers assisted by identifying the right respondents 
with relevant experience in each of the ten agencies. Moreover, the full cooperation 
of these officers also contributed to the high response rate.  
(2) After administering the questionnaires, sufficient time was given to the 
respondents to reply. Constant follow-up via telephone and personal visits to the 
agencies over a period of four weeks also motivated the respondents to complete the 
questionnaires. After completing the questionnaire, some respondents were able to 
call the researcher to come and collect it.  
(3) The way in which the questionnaires were designed contributes to the high 
response rate (see Appendix 1). A covering letter was attached to the questionnaire 
which stipulated that the identity of the respondents would not be disclosed at any 
time. Also, the procedures for completing the questionnaire and the objectives of the 
research were clearly stated in the letter.  
(4) An introductory letter produced by the supervisory team, stating the importance 
of this study, also led to the achievement of such a high response rate (see Appendix 
1). 
6.2.1 Data check 
The first step described in this chapter is to ensure that the data is accurate by 
crosschecking the coding and the value entered into the SPSS programme file. This 
was achieved by individually checking all the questionnaires entered to authenticate 
the integrity of the data. The data check discovered that in four instances the data 
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were wrongly entered. For example, the value of 33 was erroneously entered into a 
cell instead of 3; a value was skipped and entered into another variable cell. After 
discovering these errors, it was decided to crosscheck the SPSS data file, referring 
back to each of the returned questionnaires over and over again. All errors were 
corrected accordingly. 
 6.2.2 Missing values 
After analysing the responses carefully, it was discovered that a total of 20 cases 
were missing, ranging from 1 to 5 (see Table 6.2). The missing value constitutes less 
than 1% of the total number of responses. To address this issue, a Little’s MCAR test 
was carried out to determine the actual missing value The test revealed a Chi-Square 
= 936.764, DF = 903, sig. =.212; since the significance value is greater than alpha 
value (0.05), the data is referred to as MCAR in this study (no identification pattern 
exists for the missing data). Consequently, a mean estimation technique was used to 
complete the missing data. 
Table 6.2: Pattern of cases with missing value  
S/N Cases Missing value Missing value 
percentage 
1 7 1 1.4 
2 8 1 1.4 
3 16 1 1.4 
4 20 2 2.8 
5 26 1 1.4 
6 27 2 2.8 
7 28 1 1.4 
8 33 1 1.4 
9 46 1 1.4 
10 49 1 1.4 
11 50 1 1.4 
12 52 5 6.9 
13 58 2 2.8 
6.3 Demographic characteristics of respondents 
In this study the only demographic characteristic included was the respondents’ place 
of work. This is because all the respondents working for the ten stakeholders are 
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believed to have a basic knowledge of the downstream petroleum sector in Nigeria. 
Table 6.3 shows the response frequencies from the place of work of the respondents. 
Table 6.3: Frequency of respondents’ demographic characteristics  
Place of work Frequency Percentage 
Department of Petroleum Resources 13 12.70 
Petroleum Product Pricing Regulatory Agency 11 10.80 
Petroleum Equalisation Fund 11 10.80 
Pipeline and Product Marketing Company  13 12.70 
Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 10 9.80 
National Assembly 9 8.82 
Major Oil Marketing Companies 10 9.80 
Independent Oil Marketing Companies 8 7.80 
Civil Society 7 6.90 
Trade Union 10 9.80 
Total 102 100.0 
 
6.4 Main findings of the study 
The four hypotheses developed in this research are tested in this section. Lean-
Guerrero and Franfort-Nachmias (2011, p. 166) stated that testing hypotheses 
involves a number of stages: (a) state the hypotheses; (b) set criteria for decision; (c) 
computes the test statistics; (d) make a decision. While developing the hypotheses 
the measurement of variable, population distribution, sampling techniques and 
sample size should also be considered (Lean-Guerrero and Franfort-Nachmias, 
2011). In Chapter five the hypotheses were developed and thoroughly discussed, 
considering all the aspects mentioned in this study.  
In relation to criteria for accepting or rejecting the four sub-hypotheses developed in 
section 5.3, the questions asked under each hypothesis were regarded as the major 
yardstick for measuring such particular hypothesis. Therefore, on each of the 
hypotheses a number of questions were asked. These questions are regarded as the 
main indicators for acceptance or rejection of each of the research hypotheses in this 
study. For example, if ten questions were asked under a particular sub-hypothesis 
and six were rejected by the respondents the hypothesis would be accepted (and vice 
versa). 
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Further, as stated earlier in section 5.4.3.1 a five-point Likert scale was employed in 
the questionnaire, three point (i.e 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = neutral and 3 = strongly 
agree) was used for the purpose of this analysis. This is necessary in order to reduce 
the volume of the data and to ensure the clarity of presentation and analysis. 
Descriptive analyses of the frequency distribution of the responses of the 
respondents’ are presented in the subsequent sections below. The aim is to determine 
the perceptions of the respondents in relation to each of the 71 variables adopted in 
this research. Mann-Whitney tests were run at 5% level of significance to determine 
whether differences exist between the respondent groups. Wherever differences exist, 
cross-tabulation tests were run to analyse the actual percentage of the agreement or 
disagreement among the respondent groups.  
6.4.1 Regulatory independence 
This section discusses and analyses the first hypothesis relating to the independence 
of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies. The research hypothesis was 
developed and the respondents’ opinion regarding the independence of the regulatory 
agencies in the downstream petroleum sector was sought. 
HO1 – There are inadequate independence arrangements in place to enable 
Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies to ensure good regulatory governance 
practice in the sector 
An independent and legislative mandate is one of the basic mechanisms of a good 
regulatory governance regime, as it protects regulatory agencies from external 
interference (OECD, 2000). This first hypothesis was developed in order to carefully 
formulate questions relating to the independence of the three regulatory agencies 
(DPR, PPPRA and PEF) that are responsible for regulating Nigeria’s downstream 
petroleum sector.  
6.4.1.1 Perceptions relating to the Department of Petroleum Resources regulatory 
independence in regulatory governance practice; 
As noted in Section 3.4.1, the DPR is among the three regulatory agencies mandated 
to regulate Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector. Its mandate includes protecting 
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the interests of the public and that of the government from the interests of regulated 
companies. These reasons informed the adoption of the Public Interest Theory of 
regulation in order to ascertain whether the DPR has the autonomy to design 
regulations that protect the interests of the general public. In view of the Public 
Interest Theory of regulation and the good regulatory governance framework adopted 
in this study, five statements were put forward to seek the views of the respondents 
on the independence of the Department of Petroleum Resources in conducting its 
regulatory functions. 
The frequencies and percentages of the respondent views relating to the DPR 
independence are shown in Table 6.4: 102 responses were recorded for each of the 
five statements. 
Table 6.4: Descriptive frequencies relating to the Department of Petroleum 
Resources’ regulatory independence  
Statements M Md SD D N A SA TR 
a.  The Department of Petroleum Resources 
has financial autonomy to determine its 
own budgets. 
 
2.63 
 
2.0 
 
24 
(23.5) 
 
30 
(29.4) 
 
18 
(17.6) 
 
20 
(19.6) 
 
10 
(9.3) 
 
102 
(100) 
b.  The Department of Petroleum Resources 
is free to make independent decisions 
relating to the regulations of the 
downstream petroleum sector. 
 
2.96 
 
3.00 
 
10 
(9.8) 
 
35 
(34.3) 
 
17 
(16.7) 
 
29 
(28.4) 
 
11 
(10.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
c.  The Department of Petroleum Resources 
effectively reprimands regulated 
companies that do not adhere to 
regulations. 
 
3.11 
 
3.00 
 
7 
(6.9) 
 
39 
(38.2) 
 
12 
(11.8) 
 
24 
(23.5) 
 
20 
(19.6) 
 
102 
(100) 
d.  The Department of Petroleum Resources 
regulatory decisions are only overruled 
by a court of jurisdiction or a pre-
established appellate panel. 
 
3.00 
 
3.00 
 
8 
(7.8) 
 
28 
(27.5) 
 
32 
(31.4) 
 
24 
(23.5) 
 
10 
(9.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
e. The Department of Petroleum Resources 
independently recruits, deploys, 
promotes and disciplines its own 
personnel 
 
3.26 
 
4.00 
 
14 
(13.7) 
 
28 
(27.5) 
 
1 
(1.0) 
 
35 
(34.3) 
 
24 
(23.5) 
 
102 
(100) 
Note: (a) M=Mean, Md=Median, SD=Strongly Disagree, D=Disagree, N=Neutral, A=Agree, SA=Strongly Agree, TR=Total 
Responses (b) Figures in brackets are percentages.  
 
6.4.1.1.1 Department of Petroleum Resources has the financial autonomy to 
determine its own budgets 
This section analyses respondent views on the extent of the DPR’s financial 
autonomy. The reason for asking this question is to determine whether the DPR has 
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the power to regulate its budgets. OECD (1997) posited that financial autonomy is 
one of the fundamental aspects that give agencies the power to conduct their 
designated responsibilities without interruption. The regulators would have the 
confidence to discharge their duties when financial autonomy is in place. 
As can be seen from Table 6.4, the respondents’ views differed. Some 52.9% of the 
respondents strongly disagreed that the Department of Petroleum Resources has the 
financial autonomy to determine its own budgets, while 28.9% strongly agreed and 
the remaining 17.6% were neutral. On discovering divergence in the opinions of the 
respondents relating to the financial autonomy of DPR, Mann-Whitney tests were 
run to ascertain the actual discrepancies among the respondent groups. Table 6.5 
shows the results. 
Table 6.5 indicates that respondents from the PEF, PPMC and IOMC differed from 
four groups: the NEITI, NA, CS, and TU. On the one hand, 53.9%, 50.0% and 40.0% 
of PPMC, IOMC and MOMC respondents respectively agreed that the DPR has the 
financial autonomy to determine its own budgets. 54.5% of the respondents from the 
PEF took a neutral position. On the other hand, 80.0%, 77.8%, 100% and 90.0% of 
the respondents from the NEITI, NA, CS and TU respectively disagreed. The 
disagreement could be reliable given that the views of these four agencies is 
consistent with the argument made by the Operation Controller of the DPR in charge 
of the Nasarawa and Benue, who stated that the inability of the Department of 
Petroleum Resources to regulate the sector efficiently is due to a lack of government 
funding (Premium Times, 6th November 2012).  
Table 6.5: Mann-Whitney test relating to ‘The Department of Petroleum 
Resources regulatory independence in regulatory governance’ 
a) The Department of Petroleum Resources has financial autonomy to determine its own budgets. 
Groups N1 N2 C1 T1 
P2 .023 .028 .001 .001 
P3 .030 .021 .019 .022 
I1 .015 .025 .002 .001 
M1   .025 .041 
b) The Department of Petroleum Resources is free to make independent decisions relating to the 
regulations of the downstream petroleum sector. 
Groups P1 N2 C1 T1 
P2 .011 .020 .024 .011 
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Note: (a) D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA), P2= 
Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company (PPMC), N1 = Nigeria’s 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), M1= Major Oil Marketing 
Companies (MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade 
Union (TU). 
  (b) Only Mann-Whitney tests with p=values of equal to, or less than 0.05 (i.e. p<.05) are shown in the table. 
The above findings reveal that the respondent groups have different opinions in 
relation to the DPR’s financial autonomy. Therefore, since the mean and median 
scores are 2.63 and 2.0, meaning the percentage of the disagreement from the 
respondents is higher than the agreements, it could be argued that the DPR lacks the 
financial autonomy to determine its own budgets. By extension, this affects its 
regulatory functions of protecting the interest of the general public.  
6.4.1.1.2 The Department of Petroleum Resources is free to make independent 
decisions relating to the regulations of the downstream petroleum sector. 
For any regulatory agency to achieve its desired goal it should be free to make 
independent decisions. Independent decision-making is another vital aspect needed 
to attain good regulatory governance practice (Kaufmann, 2000; OECD, 2000). 
Nevertheless, this statement was developed in order to seek the opinion of the 
respondents on whether the DPR makes regulatory decisions independently, without 
outside interference.  
P3 .007 .014 .027 .008 
I1 .030 .046 .048 .028 
c) Department of Petroleum Resources effectively reprimands regulated companies that do not 
adhere to regulations. 
Groups P1 N1 N2 C1 T1 
D1 .003 .003 .008 .005 .008 
P2 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 
P3 .038 .030  .023 .042 
M1 .032 .034  .035  
I1 .035 .035  .038  
d) The Department of Petroleum Resources’ regulatory decisions are only overruled by a court of 
jurisdiction or a pre-established appellate panel. 
Groups N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 .018 .033 .022 .008 .045 .007 
P2 .005 .014 .008 .001 .021 .000 
e) The Department of Petroleum Resources independently recruits, deploys, promotes and disciplines 
its own personnel. 
Groups D1 P1 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
P2 .009 .002 .000 .014 .001 .034 .000 .000 
P3     .037  .010 .008 
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In Table 6.4, it can be seen from the mean and median scores of 2.96 and 3.00 that 
the respondents tended towards disagreement. Similarly, out of the 102 respondents, 
45 (representing 44.1%) of the respondents strongly disagreed that the DPR is free to 
make independent decisions relating to regulations of the downstream petroleum 
sector. However, 42.2% of the respondents strongly agreed with the statements, 
while 16.7% of the respondents took a neutral position. A Mann-Whitney test was 
run to determine whether significant differences exist between the respondent 
groups.  
Table 6.5 shows that the PEF, PPMC and IOMC differed from four groups: the 
PPRA, NA, CS and TU. A cross-tabulation test revealed that 63.6%, 80.0% and 
62.5% of the respondents from the PEF, PPMC and IOMC respectively strongly 
agreed that the DPR is free to make independent decisions relating to regulations of 
the downstream petroleum sector. This is contrary to the 54.6%, 55.5%, 71.4% and 
60.0% disagreement voiced by the respondents from the PPPRA, NA, CS, and TU 
respectively.  
The disagreement from the PPPRA is not surprising given that the DPR has dual 
mandates (to regulate the upstream and the downstream sector), and so interference 
may be experienced in their decision-making process. In the same vein, the 
disagreements from the NA respondents are most likely due to the fact that they are 
the highest law-making body in the country and are well informed about the DPR 
legal mandates, or they are of the view that the executive arm of the government is 
interfering in the decisions made by the DPR. Similarly, the disagreement expressed 
by the CS and TU might be associated with the fact that a non-governmental 
organisation that protects public interest could be of the opinion that, over the years, 
all corruption allegations in the sector were usually linked to government officials, 
the powerful elite and their associates (Petroleum Task Force, 2012). Hence, they 
believed that the DPR regulatory decisions are affected by outside influence. 
The disagreement is consistent with the assertion made by the Deputy Director of the 
DPR, which shows that the NA should make enabling laws that will render the 
Department sufficiently autonomous to make regulatory decisions independently 
(Premium times, 22 November, 2012). Given the evidence above, it could be argued 
that the Department of Petroleum Resources is not free to make independent 
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decisions relating to the regulations of the downstream petroleum sector. Hence, this 
may negatively affect the general public. Indeed, the lack of power of the regulatory 
agencies to make independent resolutions may threaten the stability of the sector and 
lead to systemic problems (OECD, 1999). 
6.4.1.1.3 The Department of Petroleum Resources effectively reprimands 
regulated companies that do not adhere to regulations. 
The main reason for the emergence of regulatory agencies is the need to protect the 
general public from unexpected exploitation by private entities. Since, the majority 
of private companies are profit making bodies, they are likely to use any avenue to 
maximise their investments. For such reasons, Quintyn and Kyprou (2007) and Reed 
(2002) believe that empowering regulatory agencies to reprimand regulated entities 
that violate existing regulations is necessary.  
From the descriptive statistics presented in Table 6.4, out of the 102 responses, 46 
(45.1%) respondents strongly disagreed that the DPR effectively reprimands 
regulated companies that do not adhere to regulations, whilst 44 respondents (43.1%) 
strongly agreed with the statements and 12 (11.8%) were neutral. The overall mean 
and median scores (3.11 and 3.00) are aligning towards neutral. To ascertain these 
differences, a Mann-Whitney test was run to determine if significant differences exist 
between the respondent groups.  
From Table 6.5, it is clear that the DPR and PEF differed from five groups: the 
PPPRA, NEITI, NA, CS, and TU. The cross-tabulation test revealed that 69.3%, 
90.9%, 66.6%, 60.0% and 62.5% of the respondents from the DPR, PEF, PPMC, 
MOMC and IOMC respectively strongly agreed that the DPR effectively reprimands 
regulated companies that do not adhere to regulations. Although the DPR and PEF 
act as regulatory agencies in the sector it can be argued that they effectively 
reprimand regulated companies, considering that, at present, indicted oil marketers 
are now facing trial in the court, while others are in the custody of the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) (Premium times, 22 November 2012). The 
PPMC, as a government that owns the marketing agency responsible for ensuring, 
among other things, the availability of petroleum products to sustain industries and 
domestic use, believes that marking companies (MOMC and IOMC) now distribute 
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most of products to the end users appropriately so there is no need for the DPR to 
take action against them (PPMC, 2012).  
Contrary to the agreed perception, 81.8%, 80.0%, 77.8%, 71.5% and 60.0% of the 
respondents from the PPPRA, NEITI, NA, CS and TU respectively disagreed that the 
DPR effectively reprimands regulated companies that do not adhere to regulations. 
The PPPRA’s disagreement could be due to the overlapping functions between them 
and the DPR (Nuhu-Koko, 2008). The PPPRA may argue that over the years of DPR 
existence not one company had been admonished, despite malpractices in the 
downstream sector, until the PPPRA was established (Subsidy Probe Report, 2012). 
Similarly, the disagreements voiced by the NEITI, NA, CS and TU are not surprising 
because the central aim of these four groups is to represent public interests. Thus, it 
was determined during the oil subsidy probe conducted by the NA that the federal 
government and regulatory agencies were reluctant to prosecute or revoke the 
licenses of oil-marketing companies engaged in sharp practices at the expense of the 
general public (Subsidy Probe Report, 2012). This assertion may have informed the 
disagreement of the respondents from the NEITI, NA, CS and TU. From the 
evidence above it is evident that the DPR does not reprimand companies effectively.  
6.4.1.1.4 The Department of Petroleum Resources regulatory decisions are only 
overruled by a court of jurisdiction or a pre-established appellate panel. 
As long as outside interference is possible in the regulatory process then regulatory 
governance cannot be effective (Kaufmann et al., 2003), hence the importance of this 
question. It is imperative for regulatory agencies to be empowered to make 
regulatory decisions so that no other body, arm of government, powerful elite or 
powerful corporation can overrule their resolutions, except a court of competent 
jurisdiction.  
From Table 6.4 it can be seen that the descriptive statistic test disclosed that out of 
the 102 respondents, 34 responses (33.9%) strongly agreed with the statement, 
whereas 32 (31.5%) were neutral. While 36 (35.3%) of the respondents strongly 
disagreed with the statement, overall the respondents were neutral, as indicated by 
the mean and median scores, both 3.00. 
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The Mann-Whitney test results in Table 6.5 show that the DPR and PEF’s views 
varied from those of the NEITI, NA, MOMC, IOMC, CS and TU. The cross-
tabulation disclosed that 69.3% and 72.7% of the respondents from the DPR and PEF 
strongly agreed that the DPR’s regulatory decisions are only overruled by a court of 
jurisdiction or a pre-established appellate panel, while 44.4% of the respondents from 
the NA took a neutral position. On the other hand, 80.0%, 40.0%, 50.0%, 57.1% and 
50.0% of the respondents from the NEITI, NA, MOMC, IOMC, CS and TU 
respectively strongly disagreed with the statement.  
These disagreements are consistent with the assertion that the presidency interferes 
with the DPR regulatory decision
9
 (Ifeanyi, 2012). This may have informed the 
decision of the NEITI, NA, MOMC, IOMC, CS and TU to disagree that the DPR 
regulatory decisions are only overruled by a court of jurisdiction or pre-established 
appellate panel. Therefore, it is evident that the decision of the DPR could also be 
overruled by other bodies. 
6.4.1.1.5 The Department of Petroleum Resources independently recruits, 
deploys, promotes and disciplines its own personnel 
A regulatory governance framework emphasises the importance of independence of 
regulatory agencies in terms of recruitment, deployment, promotion and discipline of 
the agencies’ personnel. Regulatory agencies are responsible for exercising 
autonomous authority over certain areas of human activity in a regulatory or 
supervisory capacity (OECD, 2002). Therefore, the autonomy to recruit, deploy, 
promote and discipline its own staff is vital in achieving regulatory objectives, and 
this informed the decision to ask the above statement.  
In Table 6.4 the descriptive statistics test illustrates that out of the 102 respondents, 
59 (57.8%) were strongly in agreement. Also, 42 (41.2%) of the respondents strongly 
disagreed with the statement. Only one respondent took a neutral position. The 
                                       
9
 ‘‘The current status of the DPR vis-à-vis the publicly known money-spinning NNPC could best be 
described as blurred and at worst obscured. The agency has been deeply or rather criminally buried 
into the bureaucratic day-to-day life of Presidency, a situation that has given rise to the plethora of 
fraud scandals especially in the award of oil blocs and collection and management of license fees and 
signature bonus’’ (Ifeanyi, 2012).  
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overall mean and median scores of 3.26 and 4.00 suggest that the respondents are in 
agreement. 
Table 6.5 discloses the differences among the respondent groups. The cross-
tabulation test revealed that 69.3%, 63.6%, 100.0%, 77.0%, 60.0% and 66.6% of the 
respondents from the DPR, PPPRA, PEF, PPMC, NEITI and NA respectively 
strongly agree that the DPR independently recruits, deploys, promotes and 
disciplines its own personnel. On the other hand, 60.0%, 62.5%, 85.7% and 80.0% of 
the respondents from the MOMC, IOMC, CS and TU respectively disagree. 
Nevertheless, the disagreements may have come about because over the year DPR 
officials have been complaining that the agency lacks the necessary manpower to 
carry out its regulatory responsibility (Ehinomen and Adeleke, 2012). According to 
the DPR Controller in charge of Nasarawa and Benue State, the department is so 
understaffed that, at present, the office has only one operational driver covering two 
states (Premium times, 2012). It is likely that the MOMC, IOMC, CS and TU 
disagreed based on the evidence above. 
It is also possible that the agreements voiced by the DPR, PPPRA, PEF, PPMC, 
NEITI and NA could be because the regulatory agencies’ board members are part 
and parcel of the agencies, and intervention of the board members in the recruitment, 
deployment, promotion and discipline of personnel is not regarded as outside 
interference. However, since six respondent groups agreed with the statement and the 
median score is 4.0, this would indicate agreement. Hence, it can be said that the 
DPR recruits, deploys, promotes and disciplines its personnel independently.  
6.4.1.2 Perceptions relating to the regulatory independence in setting Petroleum 
Product Pricing  
In order to test the independence of the PPPRA in regulatory governance five 
variables were developed. This is important given that PPPRA is responsible for 
regulating the price of petroleum products in the downstream sector. As guided by 
the Public Interest Theory of regulation and framework, five statements are 
developed to enable the examination of the PPPRA independence in relation to 
regulatory governance. 
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Table 6.6: Descriptive frequencies relating to the Petroleum Product Pricing 
Regulatory Agency’s independence 
 
Notes: (a) M=Mean, Md=Median, SD=Strongly Disagree, D=Disagree, N=Neutral, A=Agree, SA=Strongly Agree, TR=Total 
Responses.  
(b) Figures in brackets are percentages. 
 
Table 6.6 reveals that the descriptive frequencies and the percentages representing 
respondent opinions regarding the PPPRA, and illustrates that it has no substantive 
independence in regulatory governance. In all, 102 responses were recorded for each 
of the five statements. 
6.4.1.2.1 The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency has financial 
autonomy to determine its own budgets. 
This section examines the respondents’ view regarding the PPRRA’s financial 
autonomy. The motive behind asking the question is to discover whether the PPPRA 
has the authority to decide its own budget. Financial autonomy is regarded as a vital 
Statements M MD SD D N A SA TR 
a) The Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency has financial 
autonomy to determine its own 
budgets. 
 
3.00 
 
3.00 
 
 
22 
(21.6) 
 
17 
(16.7) 
 
19 
(18.6) 
 
27 
(26.5) 
 
17 
(16.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
b) The Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency is free to 
make independent decisions 
relating to the pricing of 
petroleum products in the 
downstream sector. 
 
3.20 
 
3.00 
 
5 
(4.9) 
 
28 
(27.5) 
 
22 
(21.6) 
 
36 
(35.3) 
 
11 
(10.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
c) The Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency effectively 
reprimands regulated companies 
that do not adhere to the pricing 
regulations. 
 
3.31 
 
4.00 
 
7 
(6.9) 
 
23 
(22.5) 
 
19 
(18.6) 
 
37 
(36.3) 
 
16 
(15.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
d) The Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency regulatory 
decisions are only overruled by a 
court of jurisdiction or a pre- 
established appellate panel. 
 
3.11 
 
3.00 
 
5 
(4.9) 
 
25 
(24.5) 
 
34 
(33.3) 
 
30 
(29.4) 
 
8 
(7.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
e) The Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency 
independently recruits, deploys, 
promotes and disciplines its own 
personnel. 
 
3.33 
 
4.00 
 
6 
(5.9) 
 
21 
(20.6) 
 
23 
(22.5) 
 
37 
(36.3) 
 
15 
(14.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
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aspect which provides regulatory agencies with the confidence to discharge its 
regulatory responsibility without hindrance (Crocker and Masten, 1996).  
Table 6.6 shows that 44 respondents, representing (43.2%) of the total respondents, 
strongly agreed that the PPPRA have the financial autonomy to determine its own 
budget. In contrast, 39 respondents (38.8%) strongly disagreed with the statement, 
while 19 respondents (18.6%) were neutral. The mean and median scores were equal 
(3.00), suggesting that the respondents are in a neutral position. On discovering these 
differences, a Mann-Whitney test was run to determine the actual differences that 
exist among the respondent groups.  
From Table 6.7 it can be seen that the NA’s view differed from that of seven groups: 
the DPR, PEF, PPPRA, PPMC, TU, MOMC, and IOMC. The position of the NEITI 
disagreed with four groups: the DPR, PPPRA, TU, and MOMC. The cross-tabulation 
test revealed that 61.6%, 81.8%, 50.0% and 60.0% of the respondents from DPR, 
PEF, MOMC, and TU respectively agreed that the PPPRA has the financial 
autonomy to determine its own budgets. In contrast, 53.9%, 60.0%, 88.9% and 
50.0%, of the respondents from the PPMC, NEITI, NA, IOMC respectively 
disagreed with the statement. Surprisingly, the responses from the respondents of the 
PPPRA were equal (i.e. 45.5% of agreed and 45% disagreed). 
Table 6.7: Mann-Whitney test relating to the Petroleum Product Pricing 
Regulatory Agency independence in regulatory governance  
a) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency has financial autonomy to determine its own 
budgets. 
Groups D1 P2 P1 P3 T1 M1 I1 
N2 .000 .000 .049 .009 .001 .004 .014 
N1 .001 .000   .003 .006  
b) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency is free to make independent decisions relating 
to the pricing of petroleum products in the downstream sector. 
Groups D1 T1 P1 P2 P3 I1 C1 N2 
N1 .000 .000 .009 .001 .000 .005 .001 .003 
c) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency effectively reprimands regulated companies 
that do not adhere to the pricing regulations. 
Groups D1 P1 N2 M1 T1 
N1 .002 .007 .020 .003 .018 
C1 .015 .031  .017  
d) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency regulatory decisions are only overruled by a 
court of jurisdiction or a pre-established appellate panel. 
Groups D1 P2 
M1 .007 .013 
N1 .020 .045 
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Note: (a) D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA), P2= 
Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company (PPMC), N1 = Nigeria 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), M1= Major Oil Marketing 
Companies (MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade 
Union (TU) 
  (b) Only Mann-Whitney tests with p=values of equal to, or less than 0.05 (i.e. p<.05) are shown in the table  
 
 
However, the disagreements voiced by the PPMC, NEITI, NA and IOMC are in line 
with the assertion that Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies’ failure to regulate 
the sector effectively is a result of poor government funding (Okpanachi, 2011). 
Oseni (2013) argued that Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies depend largely 
on government budgets to carry out their day to day operations, which negatively 
affects the agencies’ performance.  
As stated earlier, the respondents from the PPPRA were neutral in their views. One 
possible reason for this could be related to the element of interference within the 
agencies’ funds10. Given the evidence above, it is appropriate to argue that the 
PPPRA lacks the financial autonomy to determine its own budgets.  
6.4.1.2.2 The Petroleum Product Pricing Regulatory Agency is free to make 
independent decisions relating to the pricing of petroleum products in the 
downstream sector. 
The success of any regulation can only be achieved by making the regulatory agency 
sovereign from outside influence. This is important, given that the decision-making 
process, when independently accomplished by regulators, enhances the regulatory 
quality (OECD, 2000; Rossi, 1999). This statement was therefore developed to seek 
the perception of the respondents on whether the PPPRA is free to make independent 
decisions relating to the pricing of petroleum products in the downstream sector.  
                                       
10
 As reported in the national dailies, a federal minister was indicted for petroleum subsidy fraud 
amounting to N2, 755,646,744. 04 (This day, Monday 26 November, 2012). 
e) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency independently recruits, deploys, promotes and 
disciplines its own personnel. 
Groups D1 P2 P1 P3 N2 
N1 .000 .000 .027 .034  
I1 .033    .001 
C1 .003 .003   .006 
T1 .002 .003    
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As shown in Table 6.6, the descriptive statistics test revealed that 47 respondents 
(46.1%) strongly agreed that the PPPRA is free to make independent decisions 
relating to the pricing of petroleum products in the downstream sector. Only 33 
respondents (32.4%) strongly disagreed with the statement. On average, the mean 
and median scores (3.20 and 3.00) indicated agreement. Based on these views Mann-
Whitney tests were run. 
The Mann-Whitney test disclosed that the views of the respondents from the NEITI 
differed with respect to eight groups: the DPR, TU, PPPRA, PEF, PPMC, IOMC, CS 
and NA (see Table 6.7). Interestingly, a cross-tabulation test revealed that 100% and 
40.0% of the respondents from the NEITI and MOMC respectively disagreed with 
the statement. On the other hand, 44.4% and 57.1% of the respondents from the NA 
and CS took a neutral position, whereas 69.3%, 45.5%, 45.5%, 69.2% and 90.0% of 
the respondents from the DPR, PPPRA, PEF, PPMC and TU respectively agreed 
with the statement. The perceptions of the IOMC respondents were equal (37.5%) for 
both agreement and disagreement. 
The agreement voiced by these five groups (the DPR, PPPRA, PEF, PPMC and TU) 
are in line with the findings of Quintyn et al. (2003), that the freedom to make 
decisions represents the level of the agency’s independence from government 
authorities. From the above findings, the position of the five groups that agreed could 
be accurate because they are more informed on this subject than the other groups. 
Thus, it could be argued that the PPPRA is free to make independent decisions 
relating to the pricing of petroleum products in the downstream sector. 
6.4.1.2.3 The Petroleum Product Pricing Regulatory Agency effectively 
sanctions regulated companies that do not adhere to the pricing regulations 
Large and Andrew (2003) believe that for regulations to be effective and efficient, 
regulators need have a clear mandate to effectively sanction regulated companies 
engaged in improper or prohibited conducts. It is therefore crucial to seek the opinion 
of the stakeholders in this study on whether the PPPRA effectively reprimands 
regulated companies that do not adhere to pricing regulations. 
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The descriptive statistics test results in Table 6.6 reveal that of the 102 respondents, 
53 strongly agreed that the PPPRA effectively sanctions regulated companies that do 
not adhere to pricing regulations, 30 strongly disagreed, and 19 were neutral with 
respect to the statement. This revelation emphasises the importance of testing the 
above statement to discover the actual differences between the respondent groups. 
Table 6.7 shows the Mann-Whitney test results. NEITI’s view differed from five 
groups: the DPR, PPPRA, NA, MOMC, and TU. The responses given by the CS 
varied from those of the DPR, PPPRA and MOMC. However, from the cross-
tabulation test it is evident that only two groups were in disagreement: the NEITI and 
CS, with 70.0% and 57.1% respectively. Five groups (the DPR, PPPRA, NA, 
MOMC and TU) agreed that the PPPRA does effectively sanction regulated 
companies that do not adhere to pricing regulations. 
The agreement of these five groups could be related to the suspension of oil 
marketing companies from their business, pending their trial in court and other 
investigations,
11
 after the discovery of malpractice regarding a subsidy probe ordered 
by the Federal government (Daily Trust, 2012).  
From the analysis above the agreements opined could be more appropriate given that 
the DPR, PPPRA, NA, MOMC and TU are in a better position to be more informed 
than the other groups. In addition, the overall mean and median scores of 3.31 and 
4.0 suggest agreement with the statement that the PPPRA effectively sanctions 
regulated companies that do not adhere to pricing regulations.  
6.4.1.2.4 The Petroleum Product Pricing Regulatory Agency regulatory 
decisions are only overruled by a court of jurisdiction or a pre-established 
appellate panel 
It is vital for the regulatory authorities to have legal powers regarding regulatory 
decisions that cannot be overruled by other bodies, except a court of competent 
jurisdiction or a pre-established appellate panel (Kaufmann et al., 2003). In view of 
the importance of regulatory decision-making, the statement was developed and the 
                                       
11
 As reported by the federal ministry of finance: ‘25 oil marketers were listed as having been 
recommended for criminal investigation’ (Federal ministry of finance, 2012). 
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respondents were asked their perceptions regarding the PPPRA regulatory decisions 
and whether they are only overruled by a court of jurisdiction or pre-established 
appellate panel alone. 
Table 6.6 shows that of the 102 responses recorded 38 of the respondents strongly 
agreed that the PPPRA regulatory decisions are only overruled by a court of 
jurisdiction or pre-established appellate panel, 35 were neutral, and 30 strongly 
disagreed with the statement. The overall mean and median score of 3.11 and 3.00 
tend towards disagreement.  
The Mann-Whitney tests (Table 6.7) revealed that the MOMC and NEITI are of the 
same opinion, which contradicts that of the DPR and PEF. As indicated by the cross-
tabulation test, 70.0% and 50.0% of the respondents from the MOMC and NEITI 
respectively disagreed with the statement that PPPRA regulatory decisions are only 
overruled by a court of jurisdiction or pre-established appellate panel, 61.5% of the 
DPR respondents agreed with the statement, while 63.6% of the respondents from 
the PEF were neutral. 
Nevertheless, various groups accused the regulatory agencies of lacking the moral 
authority to make their own decisions. For example, the NA reproached government 
officials for their involvement in the subsidy regime (Subsidy Report, 2012). This is 
in line with the disagreement voiced by the respondents of the MOMC and NEITI. 
Their perception could be appropriate because the MOMC and NEITI are more 
likely to have better information on this subject than the DPR who agreed with the 
statement. Therefore, it is correct to argue that the PPPRA regulatory decisions can 
be overruled by bodies other than a court of competent jurisdiction or a pre-
established appellate panel.  
6.4.1.2.5 The Petroleum Product Pricing Regulatory Agency independently 
recruits, deploys, promotes and disciplines its own personnel 
Regulatory agencies should have the power to recruit competent staff in order to 
achieve their overall policy objectives. Therefore, the regulatory agencies’ autonomy 
to recruit, deploy, promote and discipline their own staff is fundamental in attaining 
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regulatory governance (Levine et al., 2005; OECD, 2000). Thus seeking 
respondents’ perceptions in relation to the above statement is imperative. 
Table 6.6 shows that out of the 102 responses recorded, 52 (51.0%) of the 
respondents were in agreement with the statement that the PPPRA independently 
recruits, deploys, promotes and disciplines its own personnel. In contrast, 27 (26.5%) 
were in disagreement while 23 (22.3%) took a neutral position.  
As set out in Table 6.7, the Mann-Whitney test shows that the NEITI’s perception 
varied from that of the DPR, PEF, PPPRA and PPMC. Similarly, the opinion of the 
respondents from the IOMC differed from that of the DPR and NA. The CS position 
contradicts that of the DPR, PEF and NA. Moreover, the TU’s stance disagreed with 
that of the DPR and PEF. Interestingly, five respondent groups: the DPR, PEF, 
PPPRA, PPMC, and NA were in agreement with overwhelming percentages of 
77.0%, 54.6%, 90.0%, 69.2% and 77.8% respectively. In contrast, 62.5% and 57.1% 
of the respondents from the IOMC and the CS disagreed that the PPPRA 
independently recruits, deploys, promotes and disciplines its own personnel. On the 
other hand, 60.0% of the respondents from NEITI were neutral, while there was 
40.0% of disagreement and 40.0% of neutrality from the respondents of the TU. 
It is evident that the PPPRA’s 2003 Act confers the agency with powers to recruit, 
discipline and promote its own staff. Indeed, Section (9) subsection (1-2) of the 
PPPRA Act states that ‘The Board shall appoint for the Agency such officers and 
other employees as it may, from time to time, deem necessary for the purposes of the 
Agency’ (PPPRA Act, 2003). Therefore, the groups that agreed might have 
capitalised their argument based on the provision of the PPPRA Act. Although the 
provision of the Act is regarded as theoretical, the agreement voiced by the PPPRA 
could be reliable given that it is in a better position to know whether it handles issues 
relating to the activities of its staff independently. Furthermore, the mean and mean 
and median scores of 3.33 and 4.0 indicate that the respondents overwhelmingly 
agreed that the PPPRA independently recruits, deploys, promotes and disciplines its 
own personnel. 
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6.4.1.3 Perceptions relating to the Petroleum Equalization Fund regulatory 
independence in good regulatory governance; 
As noted in Section 3.4.3, the PEF is another regulatory agency, mandated to 
equalise the price of petroleum products in Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector. 
Its aim is to regulate and unify the price throughout the country in the interest of the 
general public. Since the agency is responsible for protecting the interest of citizens 
by regulating the activities of companies, the adoption of the Public Interest Theory 
of regulation is suitable for this research. Guided by the Public Interest Theory of 
regulation as a theoretical framework and a regulatory governance framework in this 
study, five statements were developed relating to the Petroleum Equalisation Fund 
substantive independence in regulatory governance.  
Table 6.8 shows the frequencies and percentages of respondent views relating to the 
PEF’s independence. There are 102 responses recorded in each of the five 
statements. 
Table 6.8 Descriptive frequencies relating to the Petroleum Equalisation Fund’s 
independence  
Statements M MD SD D N A SA TR 
a) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund 
has financial autonomy to 
determine its own budgets. 
 
3.02 
 
 
3.00 
 
10 
(9.8) 
 
30 
(29.4) 
 
20 
(19.6) 
 
32 
(31.4) 
 
10 
(9.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
b) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund 
is free to make independent 
decisions relating to price 
equalisation in the downstream 
petroleum sector. 
 
3.06 
 
3.00 
 
 
9 
(8.8) 
 
27 
(26.5) 
 
23 
(22.5) 
 
35 
(34.3) 
 
8 
(7.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
c) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund 
effectively reprimands regulated 
companies that do not adhere to 
price equalisation policy. 
 
3.20 
 
3.00 
 
5 
(4.9) 
 
20 
(19.6) 
 
36 
(35.3) 
 
32 
(31.4) 
 
9 
(8.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
d) The Petroleum Equalisation 
Fund’s regulatory decisions are 
only overruled by a court of 
jurisdiction or a pre-established 
appellate panel. 
 
3.19 
 
 
3.00 
 
6 
(5.9) 
 
23 
(22.5) 
 
28 
(27.5) 
 
36 
(35.3) 
 
 
9 
(8.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
e) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund 
independently recruits, deploys, 
promotes and disciplines its own 
personnel. 
 
3.52 
 
4.00 
 
5 
(4.9) 
 
15 
(14.7) 
 
18 
(17.6) 
 
50 
(49.0) 
 
14 
(13.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
 
Note: (a) M=Mean, Md=Median, SD=Strongly Disagree, D=Disagree, N=Neutral, A=Agree, SA=Strongly Agree, TR=Total 
Responses  
(b) Figures in brackets are percentages 
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6.4.1.3.1 The Petroleum Equalization Fund has the financial autonomy to 
determine its own budgets. 
This section investigates the respondents’ views in relation to the PEF’s financial 
autonomy. The purpose of asking this question is to ascertain whether the PEF has 
the power to make decisions regarding its own budgets and finances, which is an 
important aspect that encourages regulatory quality (Litan et al., 2002).  
As shown in Table 6.8 the descriptive statistic run revealed that the overall mean and 
median scores of 3.02 and 3.00 indicate that the respondents are neutral to the 
statement. Out of the 102 responses, 43 (41.2%) of the total respondents strongly 
agreed that the PEF has the financial autonomy to determine its own budgets. In 
contrast, 40 (39.2%) strongly disagreed with the statement while 20 (19.6%) took a 
neutral position. These variations resulted in a Mann-Whitney test being run to 
determine whether significant differences exist between the respondent groups. 
Table 6.9: Mann-Whitney test relating to the statement that the Petroleum 
Equalisation Fund has no substantive independence in regulatory governance  
 
a) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund has the financial autonomy to determine its own budgets. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 C1 M1 
N2 .003 .002  .045 .007 .048 
N1 .008 .018 .013  .032  
T1 .007 .028   .044  
b) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund is free to make independent decisions relating to price 
equalisation in the downstream petroleum sector. 
Groups P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 
D1 .036 .026 .008 .003 .004 
I1    .035  
C1    .025  
T1    .025  
c) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund effectively reprimands regulated companies that do not adhere 
to price equalisation policy. 
Groups P1 P2 P3 N1 T1 N2 
D1 .008 .000 .003 .001 .005  
P2 .026     .009 
M1  .003 .044 .015   
d) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund’s regulatory decisions are only overruled by a court of 
jurisdiction or a pre-established appellate panel. 
Groups P1 M P3 N1 I1 N2 T1 
D1 .005 .000 .029 .000 .003 .025 .012 
e) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund independently recruits, deploys, promotes and disciplines its 
own personnel. 
Groups P1 N1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 .010 .003 .011 .004 .003 
P1    .012  
N2    .015  
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Note: (a) D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA), P2= 
Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company (PPMC), N1 = Nigeria 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), M1= Major Oil Marketing 
Companies (MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade 
Union (TU) 
  (b) Only Mann-Whitney tests with p=values of equal to, or less than 0.05 (i.e. p<.05) are shown in the table  
Table 6.9 shows that the NA’s view differed from that of five groups: the DPR, 
PPPRA, PPMC, CS and MOMC. Moreover, the NEITI’s opinion varies from the 
DPR, PPPRA, PEF and CS. Similarly, the TU’s position differs from that of the 
DPR, PPPRA and CS. The cross-tabulation test disclosed that 84.6%, 54.6%, 38.5%, 
45.5%, 40.0% and 57.2% of the respondents from the DPR, PEF, PPPC, PPPRA, 
MOMC and CS respectively agreed that the PEF has the financial autonomy to 
determine its own budgets. The agreements might be a result of the PEF Act (1975) 
which stated that the agency shall: ‘(b) Determine the amount of reimbursement due 
to any oil marketing company which has suffered a loss as a result of the operation of 
the enactment as aforesaid; (c) The payment of all disbursements is authorised under, 
or by virtue of this Act’ (PEF Act, 1975). This argument is not substantial because it 
is based on theory not practice.  
In contrast, 70.0%, 88.9% and 60.0% of the respondents from the NEITI, NA and 
TU respectively disagreed with the assertion. The disagreements of the respondents 
from NA, NEITI and TU could be appropriate, given that recently the House of 
Representatives Committee on the downstream petroleum sector criticised the huge 
financial claims paid to oil marketers by the PEF (NA, 2012). Moreover, the 
Ministry of Finance declared that all payments relating to price equalisation were to 
be suspended until further notice (Ministry of Finance, 2012). Hence, the 
disagreements could be more appropriate because the NA, which disagreed with 
statement, is in a better position to be well informed than the other groups, 
considering that the PEF-determined budgets are based on its laws. Therefore, it 
could be argued that the PEF lacks financial autonomy. 
6.4.1.3.2 The Petroleum Equalisation Fund is free to make independent 
decisions relating to price equalisation in the downstream petroleum sector. 
Attaining regulatory goals relies solely on the independence of agencies and their 
ability to make regulatory decisions without undue intervention (Lodge and Wegrich, 
2009; OECD, 2002). In this regard it is necessary to determine the perception of the 
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respondents on whether the PEF is free to make independent decisions relating to the 
pricing of petroleum products in the downstream sector. In Table 6.8 the descriptive 
statistics test shows that out of the 102 responses recorded, 42.3% of the respondents 
strongly agreed, 35.3% of the respondents strongly disagreed and 22.5% of the 
respondents were neutral. The overall mean and median (3.02 and 3.00) indicate that 
the respondents were neutral. A Mann-Whitney test was run to ascertain the 
differences among the groups.  
From Table 6.9 it is clear that the DPR’s position varies from that of the PEF, PPMC, 
NEITI, NA and MOMC. In the same vein, the opinion of the IOMC, CS and TU 
differs from that of the NA. The cross-tabulation test shows that 69.3%, 45.5%, 
62.5% 57.2% and 60.0% of the respondents from the DPR, PPPRA, IOMC, CS and 
TU respectively agreed that the PEF is free to make independent decisions relating to 
price equalisation in the downstream petroleum sector. In contrast, 54.6%, 46.2%, 
50.0%, 66.7% and 40.0% of the respondents from the PEF, PPMC, NEITI, NA and 
MOMC respectively disagreed with the statement. 
From the above findings it is difficult to state which way the groups are inclined. It is 
perhaps logical to accept the view of the respondent groups perceived to be more 
knowledgeable. But the PEF itself disagreed with the statement and it is likely that 
they are more knowledgeable than any other group. Likewise, the PPMC, which is a 
petroleum distribution company, may also be more knowledgeable than the other 
groups because it is the agency that distributes the petroleum products to other parts 
of the country; the NEITI may also be well informed because they have the privilege 
of auditing all oil and gas activities around the country; the NA may be more 
conversant than other groups since they are the highest law-making body in the 
country; and the MOMC are in the best position to give an informed opinion because 
they are a major marketing company and responsible for selling and distributing 
petroleum products to the nation. 
There is strong evidence that the five disagreeing groups, including the PEF, could 
be more knowledgeable then the other five that agreed with the statement. Hence, it 
is appropriate to argue that the PEF lacks the independence to make decisions 
relating to price equalisation.  
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6.4.1.3.3 The Petroleum Equalisation Fund effectively reprimands regulated 
companies that do not adhere to the price equalisation policy. 
The effectiveness of regulatory governance depends largely on the mandate given to 
the regulators, including the power to sanction companies (Large and Andrew, 
2003); hence the relevance of seeking the views of the respondents on whether the 
PEF effectively reprimands regulated companies that do not adhere to pricing 
regulations. As can be seen from Table 6.8, the descriptive statistic test shows that 
out of the 102 total responses recorded 41 of the respondents (40.2%) strongly 
agreed with the statement and 36 (35.3%) were neutral. Only 25 of the respondents 
(24.5%) were in disagreement. The overall mean and median scores of 3.20 and 3.0 
align towards agreement.  
Table 6.9 illustrates that the DPR’s view differs from that of the PPPRA, PEF, 
PPMC, NEITI and NA. The position of the PEF varies from that of the PPPRA and 
NA, and the MOMC’s opinion contradicts that of the PEF, PPMC and NEITI. The 
cross-tabulation reveals that 84.6%, 55.5% and 70.0% of the respondents from the 
DPR, NA and MOMC respectively were in agreement. On the other hand, 45.5%, 
70.0% and 50.0% of the respondents from PPPRA, NEITI, and TU respectively were 
neutral. Only two groups disagreed (i.e. the PEF and PPMC with 54.5% and 38.5% 
of responses).  
At present a number of indicted oil marketers are facing trial in court and others are 
in the custody of the EFCC or suspended pending investigation (Premium times, 22 
November 2012). This could be the reason for the agreement voiced by respondents 
in the majority of groups and the neutral position taken by the above three groups. As 
the PEF, which is in the best position to be the most knowledgeable, itself disagreed 
with the statement, it is appropriate to say that the PEF lacks the power to effectively 
sanction regulated companies that do not adhere to price equalisation policy. 
6.4.1.3.4 The Petroleum Equalisation Fund’s regulatory decisions are only 
overruled by a court of jurisdiction or a pre-established appellate panel. 
Respondent views were sought regarding the PEF’s regulatory decisions in order to 
determine whether their decisions are only overruled by a court of jurisdiction or a 
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pre-established appellate panel. One of the main reasons for asking this question is 
that good regulatory governance cannot be attained until regulatory agencies are 
empowered to make decisions that can only be overthrown by a court of jurisdiction 
(Kaufmann et al., 2003). In Table 6.8 data from the descriptive statistic test show that 
out of the 102 responses recorded, 45 respondents (44.2%) were in agreement that 
the PEF’s regulatory decisions are only overruled by a court of jurisdiction or a pre-
established appellate panel. In contrast, 29 (28.4%) strongly disagreed, whereas 28 
(27.5%) held a neutral position. The overall mean and median scores of 3.19 and 3.0 
indicate that the respondents tend towards agreement.  
From Table 6.9 it is evident that the Mann-Whitney test reveals that significant 
differences exist between the DPR opinions and seven other groups: the PPPRA, 
MOMC, PPMC, NEITI, IOMC, NA and TU. The cross-tabulation tests show that 
three respondent groups were in agreement with 92.3%, 53.9% and 50.0% of the 
DPR, PPMC and TU groups respectively. On the other hand, 54.5% and 50.0% of 
the respondents from the PEF and the IOMC took a neutral position, and 60.0%, 
55.5% and 70.0% of the respondents from the NEITI, NA and the MOMC 
respectively disagreed. The respondents from the PPPRA were divided equally and 
registered 45.5% both for agreement and disagreement.  
Based on these findings, the groups that disagreed could be said to be more 
knowledgeable than the other groups because the NEITI, during the course of its 
auditing assignment, would have been made aware if the PEF’s decision was only 
overruled by a court of jurisdiction; the NA is the highest law-making body with 
powers of oversight and thus it may also be in a good position to ascertain whether 
the PEF’s decision can only be overruled by a court or a pre-established appellate 
panel; and the MOMC, being regulated companies, are in a better position to 
determine whether the PEF’s decision can only be overridden by a court. The PEF 
itself is indecisive in relation to the statement. Thus, it is correct to argue that the 
decisions made by the PEF can be overridden by other bodies other than a court of 
jurisdiction or a pre-established appellate panel.  
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6.4.1.3.5 The Petroleum Equalisation Fund independently recruits, deploys, 
promotes and disciplines its own personnel. 
Interference in the recruitment process may affect the agency’s credibility and by 
extension it can affect the agency’s regulatory performance (OECD, 2002; Ahmad, 
1994). Hence it is necessary to seek respondent views on whether the PEF 
independently recruits, deploys, promotes and disciplines its own personnel. The data 
in Table 6.8 represents the respondents’ descriptive statistics. Out of the 102 
recorded responses, 64 (62.7%) of respondents strongly agreed with the statement, 
20 (19.6%) strongly disagreed and 18 (17.6%) held a neutral position. On average 
the mean and the median (3.52 and 4.00) indicate that the respondents were in 
agreement.  
As disclosed in Table 6.9, the DPR’s perception differs from that of the PPPRA, 
NEITI, IOMC, CS and TU. The opinion of the CS varies from that of the PPPRA and 
the NA. Cross-tabulation discloses that 71.4% of the respondents from the CS 
disagreed with the statement and the IOMC respondents were equally divided 
between agreement and disagreement, with 37.5% each. On the other hand, 100%, 
72.7%, 50.0%, 77.8% and 50.0% of the respondents of the DPR, PPPRA, NEITI, 
NA, and TU respectively agreed that the PEF independently recruits, deploys, 
promotes and disciplines its own personnel.  
The position of the five respondent groups that agreed could be appropriate given 
that all the groups have a direct relationship with the PEF. Hence, this would indicate 
that the PEF recruits, deploys, promotes and disciplines its own personnel 
independently. 
On a general note, out of the five statements developed in relation to the DPR 
regulatory independence only one was agreed by the respondents: there was strong 
disagreement with four of the statements. This clearly suggests that the DPR is 
lacking adequate independence arrangements to enable it to conduct its regulatory 
responsibility as one of the crucial mechanisms for achieving good regulatory 
governance and public interest. Stern and Holder (1999) posited that to maintain the 
credibility of regulatory agencies and provide good regulatory governance, the 
regulators should have the autonomy to make decisions freely, without interference. 
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Since the respondents disagreed with four statements HO1, which states that: HO1-
There are inadequate independence arrangements in place to enable Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory agencies to ensure good regulatory governance practice in 
the sector, is accepted in relation to DPR independence. 
In relation to PPPRA’s regulatory independence, out of the five questions asked the 
respondents disagreed with three questions and agreed with two. The findings 
disclose that the PPPRA lacks the financial autonomy to determine its own budgets, 
its decision can be overruled by other bodies other than just the Court of Competent 
Jurisdiction, and its lacks the power to make independent decisions in relation to 
petroleum pricing. On the other hand, the findings also reveal that the PPPRA has 
power to conduct its own recruitment, deployment, promotion, discipline and is able 
to sanction companies. Therefore, the research sub-hypothesis HO1 is accepted. At 
the same time the participant responses indicate that significant improvements are 
required to enable the PPPRA to discharge its duties.  
The findings relating to the PEF’s independence suggest that it lacks the autonomy to 
carry out its regulatory duties effectively. This was vindicated by the five statements 
that measured the level of PEF regulatory independence. It was discovered that the 
PEF has the power to recruit, promote, deploy and discipline its staff independently, 
but it lacks financial autonomy, the freedom to make decisions relating to price 
equalisation and the power to effectively reprimand companies. Moreover, its 
decisions can be overruled by other bodies. Hence, the research sub-hypothesis HO1 
is accepted.  
Table 6.10: Summary of the number of differences between groups in relation to 
the Nigeria’s downstream regulatory independence (this summarises table 6.5, 
6.7 and 6.9 above)  
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 Total  
D1 n/a 4 4 3 12 6 3 4 5 7 48 
P1 4 n/a 4 2 5 11 1 1 11 1 40 
P2 4 4 n/a 0 8 6 3 4 10 10 49 
P3 3 2 0 n/a 3 3 5 0 0 0 16 
N1 12 5 8 3 n/a 2 4 3 2 3 42 
N2 6 11 6 3 2 n/a 0 5 3 1 37 
M1 3 1 3 5 4 0 n/a 0 4 2 22 
I1 4 1 4 0 3 5 0 n/a 3 2 22 
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Note:        D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA), 
P2=Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company (PPMC), N1 = Nigeria’s 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), M1= Major Oil Marketing 
Companies (MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade 
Union (TU) 
N/A:          Not Applicable  
Table 6.10 records the number of times significant differences existed between the 
groups relating to the regulatory independence of the Nigeria’s downstream 
regulatory agencies. The PEF significantly differed 49 times with other groups. 
Similarly, DPR differed significantly with other groups 48 times, whereas NEITI 
recorded 42 significant differences with other groups. One of the important reasons 
for identifying these significant differences is that it helps to disclose the 
dysfunctional features of the interface between the groups, which may serve as guide 
for improving the regulatory independence in downstream petroleum sector of 
Nigeria.  
In explicit term, the overall findings showed that the status of regulatory governance 
practice in Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector in relation to independence is 
inadequate. Research sub-hypothesis HO1 which states that: HO1-There are 
inadequate independence arrangements in place to enable Nigeria’s downstream 
regulatory agencies to ensure good regulatory governance practice in the sector is 
accepted. For example DPR, which plays significant role in monitoring and 
regulating the activities in the downstream petroleum sector, is discovered not to 
have autonomy. This calls for the need for effective and efficient independence 
arrangements so that the regulatory agencies can discharge their regulatory mandates 
independently for the benefit of citizens. 
6.4.2 Regulatory accountability  
This section discusses and analyses the second sub-hypothesis relating to the 
accountability of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies. Accountability practice 
is another mechanism of good regulatory governance system. It is essential for a 
regulatory agency to justify its actions against the background of the mandate it has 
been given (Afrika and Bachmann, 2011; OECD, 2000). The hypothesis seeks 
respondent opinions regarding the accountability practices of the regulatory agencies 
C1 5 11 10 0 2 3 4 3 n/a 1 39 
T1 7 1 10 0 3 1 2 2 1 n/a 27 
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of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector. The following section discusses the main 
research hypothesis HO2. 
HO2 – Inadequate accountability mechanisms are in place and this affects the 
regulatory governance practice of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies 
This hypothesis was used in testing the accountability practice of the three Nigerian 
downstream regulatory agencies (DPR, PPPRA and PEF) in order to carefully 
address questions relating to their accountability practice. The next section discusses 
the findings from the DPR. 
6.4.2.1 Perceptions relating to the accountability practice of the Department of 
Petroleum Resources 
As stated in Section 3.4.1, DPR is one of the three regulatory agencies mandated to 
regulate Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector. Its mandate includes protecting the 
interests of the public and those of the government from the interests of regulated 
companies. 
These reasons informed the adoption of the Public Interest Theory of Regulation in 
order to determine whether the DPR is accountable for its actions. In line with the 
Public Interest Theory of Regulation and the framework for good regulatory 
governance practice, eight statements were produced to determine the views of 
respondents on whether DPR follows substantive accountability practice when 
conducting its regulatory functions.  
Table 6.11: Descriptive frequencies of the Department of Petroleum Resources 
accountability practices  
Statements M MD SD D N A SA TR 
a) Guidelines for obtaining import 
permits are clearly stated and 
publicised by the Department of 
Petroleum Resources. 
 
3.55 
 
4.00 
 
7 
(6.9) 
 
21 
(20.6) 
 
 
16 
(15.7) 
 
25 
(24.5) 
 
33 
(32.4) 
 
102 
(100) 
b) The Department of Petroleum 
Resources follows due process in 
the issue of import licenses to 
regulated companies. 
 
3.54 
 
4.00 
 
5 
(4.9) 
 
16 
(15.7) 
 
22 
(21.6) 
 
37 
(36.3) 
 
22 
(21.6) 
 
 
102 
(100) 
c) The Department of Petroleum 
Resources discloses information to 
the general public relating to the 
issue of import licenses. 
 
3.04 
 
3.00 
 
8 
(7.8) 
 
 
26 
(25.5) 
 
28 
(27.5) 
 
34 
(33.3) 
 
6 
(5.9) 
 
102 
(100) 
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d) The Department of Petroleum 
Resources discloses information to 
the National Assembly relating to 
the issue of import licenses. 
 
3.24 
 
3.00 
 
4 
(3.9) 
 
28 
(27.5) 
 
22 
(21.6) 
 
36 
(35.3) 
 
12 
(11.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
e) The Department of Petroleum 
Resources discloses the amount of 
imported petroleum products to the 
general public. 
 
2.94 
 
3.00 
 
9 
(8.8) 
 
35 
(34.3) 
 
20 
(19.6) 
 
29 
(28.4) 
 
9 
(8.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
f) The Department of Petroleum 
Resources discloses all discovered 
malpractices relating to importation 
of petroleum products. 
 
3.05 
 
3.00 
 
13 
(12.7
) 
 
26 
(25.5) 
 
20 
(19.6) 
 
29 
(28.4) 
 
14 
(13.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
g) The Department of Petroleum 
Resources discloses information 
relating to petroleum products 
refined locally. 
 
 
3.17 
 
 
3.00 
 
6 
(5.9) 
 
30 
(29.4) 
 
20 
(19.6) 
 
33 
(32.4) 
 
13 
(12.7 
 
102 
(100) 
h) The Department of Petroleum 
Resources discloses all the revenue 
it generates annually. 
 
3.24 
 
3.00 
 
7 
(6.9) 
 
32 
(31.4) 
 
14 
(13.7) 
 
28 
(27.5) 
 
21 
(20.6) 
 
102 
(100) 
 
Notes: (a) M=Mean, Md=Median, SD=Strongly Disagree, D=Disagree, N=Neutral, A=Agree, SA=Strongly Agree, TR=Total 
Responses  
(b) Figures in brackets are percentages 
Table 6.11 shows the descriptive frequencies and percentages of respondent views 
relating to the DPR’s accountability (102 responses were recorded in each of the 
eight statements). 
6.4.2.1.1 Guidelines to obtain import permits are clearly stated and publicised 
by the Department of Petroleum Resources  
It is expected for the purpose of proper accountability that regulatory agencies should 
clearly publish and state the guidelines to be adopted or used by regulated entities 
(Adenikinju, 2009; Das and Quainty, 2002). It is therefore important to seek 
respondent views on whether the guidelines for obtaining import permits are clearly 
stated and publicised by DPR. From Table 6.11 it can be seen that out of the 102 
recorded responses, 58 respondents (56.9%) were strongly in agreement. On the 
other hand, 28 respondents (27.5%) were strongly in disagreement, while 16 (15.7%) 
held a neutral position. Based on this, Mann-Whitney tests were run to determine 
where significant differences exist between the respondent groups.  
The findings in Table 6.12 reveal that the DPR respondents’ perceptions differ from 
the position held by the respondents from the PPPRA, PPMC, NEITI, NA, CS, and 
TU. The views of the PEF respondents varied from that of the PPPRA, NEITI, NA, 
CS and TU. Moreover, the cross-tabulation test disclose that the NEITI and CS 
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respondents were indecisive in their perception, with 40% and 40.2% agreeing and 
disagreeing respectively, and 60% and 44.4% of the respondents from the TU and 
NA respectively disagreed that the guidelines for obtaining import permits are clearly 
stated and publicised.  
On the other hand, 100%, 45.5%, 72.7%, and 69.3% of the DPR, PPPRA, PEF, 
PPMC respondents respectively agreed. It could be argued that their agreement is 
appropriate given that the DPR is the import permit license awarding body. 
Moreover the PPPRA is another regulating body that would not be able to regulate 
the pricing of petroleum products in the downstream sector without understanding 
the guidelines of import permit; therefore the agreement verdict is possibly true. 
Similarly, the PEF’s perception might be correct based on the fact that in order to 
equalise the price of petroleum products there has to be an understanding of the 
DPR’s import permit guidelines. It could also be argued that the PPMC, as the 
nations’ marketing and distributing company, should be in a good position to 
determine whether the DPR clearly publicises guidelines for import permits. 
Table 6.12: Mann-Whitney test relating to the Department of Petroleum 
Resources accountability practices  
a) Guidelines for obtaining import permits are clearly stated and publicised by the Department of 
Petroleum Resources. 
Groups P1 P3 N1 N2 C1 T1 
D1 .001 .026 .002 .000 .000 .000 
P2 .044  .040 .007 .019 .001 
b) The Department of Petroleum Resources follows due process in the issue of import licenses to 
regulated companies. 
Groups P1 P2 P3 N1 M C1 T1 
D1 .000 .027 .024 .009 .019 .000 .000 
P2 .005 .001 .010 
c) The Department of Petroleum Resources discloses information to the general public relating to the 
issue of import licenses. 
Groups P2 N1 M1 
P3 .041 .031 .033 
d) The Department of Petroleum Resources discloses information to the National Assembly relating 
to the issue of import licenses. 
Groups D1 P2 P3 N2 M1 
C1 .040 .001 .012 .023 .005 
P1  .007    
T1  .004    
e)  The Department of Petroleum Resources discloses the amount of imported petroleum products to 
the general public  
NIL 
f) The Department of Petroleum Resources discloses all discovered malpractices relating to 
importation of petroleum products. 
Groups N1 C1 T1 
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Note: (a) D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA), P2= 
Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company (PPMC), N1 = Nigeria 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), M1= Major Oil Marketing 
Companies (MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade 
Union (TU) 
  (b) Only Mann-Whitney tests with p=values of equal to, or less than 0.05 (i.e. p<.05) are shown in the table  
 
The findings above and the mean and median score of 3.55 and 4.0 would suggest 
that the majority of respondents are in agreement. Hence, it is appropriate to say that 
the DPR clearly publicises guidelines for import permits.  
6.4.2.1.2 The Department of Petroleum Resources follows due process in the 
issue of import licenses to regulated companies 
To ensure adequate accountability, regulators should comply with the appropriate 
accounting mechanisms, which are the main prerequisites for attaining good 
regulatory governance (Andres et al., 2008). Thus it is important to seek respondent 
perceptions on whether the DPR follows due process in the issue of import licenses 
to regulated companies. Table 6.11 displays the descriptive statistic findings. Of the 
102 responses recorded, 59 (57.9%) respondents strongly agreed with the statement, 
22 (21.6%) were neutral, and 21 (20.6%) strongly disagreed In view of this diversity, 
Mann-Whitney tests were run to ascertain the actual differences between the 
respondent groups. 
Table 6.12 discloses that the DPR’s perception differs from eight groups: the 
PPPRA, PEF, PPMC, NEITI, MOMC, CS and TU. The opinion of PEF is different 
from that of the PPPRA, CS and TU. According to the cross-tabulation test, 71.4% of 
the CS respondents disagree that the DPR follows due process in the issue of import 
licenses to regulated companies. Their position could be in line with that of the 
Senate Joint Committee which investigated the management of the Federal 
Government petroleum subsidy scheme. The committee discovered that many 
companies, despite lacking the capacity to import fuel and having no storage 
facilities or retail distribution outlets, were given importation licenses by the 
D1 .033 .050 .018 
g) The Department of Petroleum Resources discloses information relating to petroleum products 
refined locally. 
NIL 
h) The Department of Petroleum Resources discloses all the revenue it generates annually. 
Groups P1 
D1 .026 
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regulatory agencies (Vanguard, February 2012). In addition, 70% and 45.5% of the 
respondents from the TU and PPPRA respectively took a neutral position, while 
respondents from the NEITI were equally divided with 50% of agreements and 
disagreements respectively.  
On the other hand, 100% of the respondents from the DPR itself agreed that the 
organisation follows due process in the issue of import licenses to regulate 
companies. The DPR’s position might be considered reliable as they are the license 
awarding body and are probably more knowledgeable about the process than any 
other group. Likewise, 90.9% of the respondents from the PEF are in agreement, 
which may be due to the fact that it has a regulatory relationship with the same 
companies to which the DPR awarded the licenses for the importation and 
distribution of petroleum products; thus their position may also be reliable. In the 
same vein, 53.9% of the respondents from the PPMC were in agreement; their 
position could be credible given that they are responsible for the importation, 
distribution and marketing of petroleum products in the country. Similarly, 70% of 
the respondents from the MOMC agreed with the statement; their opinion could be 
deemed appropriate because they obtain their import licenses from their DPR and 
thus may have enhanced knowledge of whether the DPR followed due process. 
Equally, 62.5% of the respondents from the IOMC were in agreement and this 
position could be accurate given that before embarking into the downstream business 
they have to obtain licenses from the DPR. Hence, the agreed groups are perceived to 
be better informed than the others which disagreed. Moreover, the mean and median 
score (3.54 and 4.00) indicate that the majority of respondents are in agreement. 
Therefore this clearly indicates that the DPR follows due process in the issue of 
import licenses to regulated companies.  
6.4.2.1.3 The Department of Petroleum Resources discloses information to the 
general public relating to the issue of import licenses 
Disclosure is a fundamental aspect of accountability. For regulatory agencies to 
achieve good regulatory governance they must disclose information to those who 
gave them their regulatory mandates, not only to the legislature or the executive arm 
of government, but also to the general public (OECD, 2002; IMF, 2004). Therefore it 
is appropriate to ask for respondent views on whether the DPR discloses information 
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relating to the issue of import licenses to the general public. Table 6.11 illustrates 
that out of the 102 responses recorded, 40 respondents are strongly in agreement, 34 
strongly disagreed and 28 held a neutral opinion. On average, the mean and the 
median scores (3.04 and 3.0) show that respondents tended towards a neutral 
position. On this note, a Mann-Whitney test was run to determine the actual 
differences among the respondent groups.  
As presented in Table 6.12, the opinion of the PPMC varied from that of the PEF, 
NEITI and MOMC. The results from the cross-tabulation tests indicate that 61.5% of 
the respondents from the PPMC are in agreement, while 70% and 50% of the 
respondents from the NEITI and MOMC respectively do not agree that the DPR 
disclose information to the general public regarding the issue of import licenses. On 
the other hand, 63.6% of the PEF respondents’ perceptions were neutral. The 
PPMC’s agreement to the statement cannot be considered credible given that their 
NA revealed that regulators do not disclose information relating to petroleum 
importation in Nigeria.
12
 Moreover, the NEITI’s representatives’ disagreement can 
be deemed accurate given the fact that as NEITI is vested with constitutional powers 
to audit oil-related matters in the country, it might be aware of whether DPR 
discloses information to the general public relating to issue of import licenses. Hence 
it can be concluded that the DPR does not disclose information to the general public 
relating to the issue of import licenses.  
6.4.2.1.4 The Department of Petroleum Resources discloses information to the 
National Assembly relating to the issue of import licenses 
Respondent opinions were sought as to whether the DPR discloses information to the 
NA relating to the issue of import licenses. One of the prerequisites of accountability 
is information disclosure by regulatory agencies (Ansell and Gash, 2008). Table 6.11 
presents descriptive statistics of the respondents. Of the 102 responses recorded, 48 
of the respondents are strongly in agreement, 32 strongly disagree and 22 took a 
neutral position. The overall mean and median scores (3.24 and 3.00) indicate that 
the respondents are aligned towards agreement. From Table 6.12 it can be seen that 
                                       
12
 The Nigerian Senate reported that the regulatory agencies granted licenses to 42 oil marketers to 
import 4.8 billion litres of petroleum products for the second quarter of the year 2012 to curb fuel 
scarcity which was never disclosed to Nigeria’s media houses or the general public (Vanguard, 2012). 
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the Mann-Whitney tests highlight that the position of the CS respondents differs 
from that of the DPR, PEF, PPMC, NA and MOMC. The PPPRA’s respondents’ 
opinions varied from that of the PEF, while the TU respondents’ perception was in 
contrast to that of the PEF.  
As revealed by the cross tabulation test, 53.9%, 90.9%, 53.9%, 44.4%, and 60% of 
the respondents from the DPR, PEF, PPMC, NA, MOMC respectively agree that the 
DPR discloses information to the NA relating to the issue of import licenses. In 
contrast, 54.6% and 71.4% of the respondents from the PPPRA and CS disagreed, 
while 50% of the respondents from the TU were neutral.  
The positive replies from the DPR, PEF, PPMC, NA and MOMC respondents could 
be more fitting given the position of the DPR as a regulatory agency that issues 
import licences and the fact that the PEF equalises the price of the products from 
those companies which have obtained import licences from the DPR. Similarly, the 
PPMC and MOMC are the country’s marketing and distribution companies. The 
position of the NA might also be reliable since it has the constitutional powers to 
summon any agency to prove its action. Hence it can be said that the DPR discloses 
information to the NA relating to the issue of import licenses. 
6.4.2.1.5 The Department of Petroleum Resources discloses the amount of 
imported petroleum products to the general public  
Respondent views were asked on whether the DPR discloses the amount of imported 
petroleum products to the general public. Disclosure of information is essential in 
justifying the accountability of regulatory agencies (Averch and Johnson, 1962). The 
descriptive statistics in Table 6.11 show that out of the 102 responses recorded, 38 
respondents are strongly in agreement with the statement, 44 strongly disagree, while 
20 are neutral. From the Mann-Whitney test results in Table 6.12, it can be seen that 
there are no significant differences between the respondent groups. Although the 
overall mean and median scores (2.94 and 3.00) indicate that the respondents are 
neutral, the mean is aligning towards disagreement.  
Furthermore, 43.1% of the respondents disagree, while 19.6% and 37.2% of the 
respondents are neutral and in agreement respectively. Therefore, this indicates that 
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the DPR does not disclose the amount of imported petroleum products to the general 
public since the majority of respondents disagree. This is consistent with the findings 
of the Petroleum Task Force that the DPR does not provide information relating to 
the actual quantity of the petroleum products imported into the country (Petroleum 
Task Force, 2012).  
6.4.2.1.6 The Department of Petroleum Resources discloses all discovered 
malpractices relating to the importation of petroleum products  
The respondents’ opinions were sought on whether the Department of Petroleum 
Resources discloses all discovered malpractices relating to the importation of 
petroleum products. This is imperative because in 2012 the CBN governor alleged 
that the importation of petroleum products into the country was nothing but rent-
seeking (Sanusi, 2012). From Table 6.11 it can be seen that the descriptive statistics 
reveal that out of the 102 responses recorded, 43 of the respondents strongly agreed 
that the Department of Petroleum Resources discloses all discovered malpractices 
relating to the importation of petroleum products. In contrast, 39 of the respondents 
strongly disagreed with the statement and 20 respondents took a neutral position. The 
overall mean and median (3.05 and 3.00) suggest that the respondents’ perceptions 
were neutral. Thus, Mann-Whitney tests were run and the differences discovered are 
presented in Table 6.12. 
The tests divulged that the DPR’s opinion varies from that of three groups namely: 
the NEITI, CS and TU. The cross tabulation test shows that 69.3% of the respondents 
from the DPR agreed. The DPR agreements contradict the subsidy probe reports 
instigated by the Presidential Committee on the Verification and Reconciliation of 
Fuel Subsidy Payments and the National Assembly, which compelled oil marketing 
companies and regulatory agencies to refund huge amounts of money to the 
government treasury for the various malpractices committed (Subsidy report, 2012).  
Moreover, 70%, 42.9% and 70% of the of the NEITI, CS and TU respondents 
disagree that the Department of Petroleum Resources discloses all exposed 
malpractices relating to the importation of petroleum products. This position could 
be correct given that various reports, including that of the NEITI, revealed 
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monumental fraud in the downstream petroleum sector (Subsidy Report, 2012). 
Thus, this would indicate that the DPR does not disclose all exposed malpractices. 
6.4.2.1.7 The Department of Petroleum Resources discloses information relating 
to locally refined petroleum products. 
It was imperative to seek the respondents’ opinion on whether the Department of 
Petroleum Resources discloses information relating to locally refined petroleum 
products. This is because despite huge investment, the domestic refineries have failed 
to produce sufficient petroleum products to serve the needs of Nigerians (Ekpu and 
Ehighelua, 2004 and Blanchetot, et al., 2002). From Table 6.11, it is evident from the 
descriptive statistic test that out of the 102 responses recorded, 46 respondents 
representing 45.1% strongly agreed that the Department of Petroleum Resources 
discloses information relating to locally refined petroleum products. 36 respondents 
strongly disagreed with the statement and 20 respondents were neutral. The data in 
Table 6.12 reveals no significant differences between the groups. Thus, the overall 
mean and median scores of 3.17 and 3.00 indicate that the respondents’ position is 
neutral. 
One possible reason for the respondents’ neutral position could be related to the 
assertion that the refineries are under performing. This assertion is justified by 
Arowolo, (2004) who stated that in spite of the millions of dollars spent on refinery 
turnaround maintenance between 1998 and 2006, no sustainable improvements in 
refinery output have been achieved. Hence, the DPR does not disclose the amount of 
locally refined petroleum. 
6.4.2.1.8 The Department of Petroleum Resources discloses all the revenue it 
generates annually. 
Revenue disclosure is a very important mechanism in regulatory accountability. 
Regulators are required to publish not only their financial reports and justify any 
expenditure incurred, but also the revenue generated when fulfilling their duties 
(Botero, et al., 2004). Seeking the respondents’ views in relation to whether the 
Department of Petroleum Resources discloses all the revenue it generates annually, is 
essential for this study. As can be seen in Table 6.11, descriptive statistics reveal that 
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out of the 102 responses recorded, 49 respondents strongly agreed, 39 respondents 
strongly disagreed and 14 respondents were neutral in relation to the statement.  
The Mann-Whitney tests in Table 6.12 revealed that the DPR’s perception differed 
from that of the PPPRA’s. The cross tabulation showed 69.2% of the DPR 
respondents agreed; while, 45.5% of the PPPRA respondents disagreed with the 
statement that the Department of Petroleum Resources discloses all the revenue it 
generates annually. The disagreement voiced by the PPPRA is in line with accusation 
that the DPR does not disclose their annual revenue
13
. Indeed, lawmakers were 
startled when they discovered that the DPR had failed to produce evidence to justify 
their Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) and administrative charges (NASS, 2012). 
This incident clearly indicates that the DPR does not disclose its internally generated 
revenue. 
6.4.2.2 Perceptions relating to the accountability practice of the Petroleum Product 
Pricing Regulatory Agency;  
As noted in Section 3.4.2, the Petroleum Product Pricing Regulatory Agency 
(PPPRA) is another regulatory agency mandated to regulate Nigeria’s downstream 
petroleum sector. Its mandates include protecting the interest of the public and that of 
the government from the interests of the regulated companies. These reasons 
informed the adoption of the Public Interest Theory of regulation so as to determine 
whether the PPPRA are accountable for their actions. In line with the Public Interest 
Theory of Regulation and the regulatory governance framework, nine statements 
were made relating to seek the views of the respondents on whether the Petroleum 
Product Pricing Regulatory Agency has substantive accountability in conducting its 
regulatory functions. 
Table 6.13 shows the descriptive frequencies and percentages of the respondents’ 
views relating to the Petroleum Product Pricing Regulatory Agency’s accountability. 
Thus, 102 responses were recorded in each of the nine statements respectively. 
 
                                       
13
 The National Assembly warned public institution under the Ministry of Petroleum Resources not 
spends any funds unless it is appropriated by the National Assembly (NASS, 2012). 
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Table 6.13: Descriptive frequencies of Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory 
Agency accountability practices  
Statements M MD SD D N A SA TR 
a) Guidelines to determine the price 
of petroleum products are clearly 
stated and publicised by the 
Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency. 
 
3.30 
 
4.00 
 
14 
(13.7) 
 
19 
(18.6) 
 
13 
(12.7) 
 
 
34 
(33.3) 
 
22 
(21.6) 
 
102 
(100) 
b) The Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency follows due 
process in pricing of petroleum 
products. 
 
3.25 
 
3.00 
 
 
9 
(8.8) 
 
17 
(16.7) 
 
26 
(25.5) 
 
39 
(38.2) 
 
11 
(10.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
c) The Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency discloses to 
the general public all important 
information relating to the 
pricing of petroleum products  
 
3.22 
 
3.00 
 
6 
(5.9) 
 
29 
(28.4) 
 
18 
(17.6) 
 
35 
(34.3) 
 
14 
(13.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
d) The Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency discloses to 
the National Assembly all 
important information relating to 
the pricing of petroleum products  
 
3.30 
 
3.00 
 
4 
(3.9) 
 
29 
(28.4) 
 
19 
(18.6) 
 
32 
(31.4) 
 
18 
(17.6) 
 
102 
(100) 
e) The Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency audits all 
subsidy claims relating to the 
importation of petroleum 
products. 
 
3.19 
 
3.00 
 
8 
(7.8) 
 
27 
(26.5) 
 
17 
(16.7) 
 
 
38 
(37.3) 
 
12 
(11.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
f) The Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency follows due 
process relating to all subsidy 
payments 
 
2.99 
 
3.00 
 
15 
(14.7) 
 
21 
(20.6) 
 
28 
(27.5) 
 
26 
(25.5) 
 
12 
(11.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
g) The Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency discloses all 
discovered malpractices relating 
to the pricing of petroleum 
products. 
 
2.83 
 
3.00 
 
15 
(14.7) 
 
28 
(27.5) 
 
26 
(25.5) 
 
25 
(24.5) 
 
8 
(7.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
h) The Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency discloses all 
discovered malpractices relating 
to subsidy claims for petroleum 
products. 
 
2.95 
 
3.00 
 
12 
(11.8) 
 
22 
(21.6) 
 
33 
(32.4) 
 
29 
(28.4) 
 
6 
(5.9) 
 
102 
(100) 
i) The Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency periodically 
discloses all generated revenue to 
legitimate stakeholders. 
 
3.00 
 
3.00 
 
13 
(12.7) 
 
19 
(18.6) 
 
35 
(34.3) 
 
25 
(24.5) 
 
10 
(9.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
 
Note: (a) M=Mean, Md=Median, SD=Strongly Disagree, D=Disagree, N=Neutral, A=Agree, SA=Strongly Agree, TR=Total 
Responses (b) Figures in brackets are percentages 
 
6.4.2.2.1 Guidelines to determine the price of petroleum products are clearly 
stated and publicised by the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency 
One of the main functions of the PPPRA is primarily to determine the pricing policy 
of petroleum products (PPPRA, 2013). Therefore, it is important to ascertain the 
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respondents’ perception in relation to whether guidelines to determine the price of 
petroleum products are clearly stated and publicised by the Petroleum Products 
Pricing Regulatory Agency. Table 6.13 above illustrates that of the 102 responses 
recorded, 54.9% of the respondents are strongly in agreement. In contrast, 32.3% of 
the respondents strongly disagreed with the assertion, while 12.7% of the 
respondents took a neutral position. The mean and median scores (3.30 and 4.00) 
suggest agreement. Based on these divergent views, Mann-Whitney tests were run to 
ascertain if significant differences existed between the respondent groups.  
In Table 6.14, the Mann-Whitney test reveals that the CS and NA’s position varied 
from that of the PPPRA. The cross tabulation reveals that 72.8% of the respondents 
from the PPPRA agreed that guidelines to determine the price of petroleum products 
are clearly stated and publicised by the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory 
Agency. 
Table 6.14: Mann-Whitney test for the PPPRA’s accountability practices  
a) Guidelines to determine the price of petroleum products are clearly stated and publicised by the 
Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency. 
Groups P1 
C1 .001 
N2 .010 
b) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency follows due process in the pricing of 
petroleum products. 
Groups N1 C1 
P1 .017 .038 
M1 .003 .007 
c) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency discloses to the general public all important 
information relating to the pricing of petroleum products. 
Groups P3 N1 C1 I1 T1 
D1   .036   
P1 .010 .003 .001 .030  
P2  .017 .004   
N2 .009 .001 .000 .006 .004 
M1  .040 .016   
d) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency discloses to the National Assembly all 
important information relating to the pricing of petroleum products. 
Groups P3 N1 N2 C1 I1 T1 
P1 .017 .033    .011 
P2 .005 .011 .033 .029 .015 .004 
M1      .041 
e) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency audits all subsidy claims relating to the 
importation of petroleum products. 
Groups P3 N1 C1 T1 
D1 .006 .002 .002 .028 
P1 .008 .003 .003 .029 
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Note: (a) D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA), P2= 
Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company (PPMC), N1 = Nigeria Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), M1= Major Oil Marketing Companies 
(MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade Union (TU) 
  (b) Only Mann-Whitney tests with p=values of equal to, or less than 0.05 (i.e. p<.05) are shown in the table.  
The reason for the agreement voiced by the PPPRA might be because it is 
responsible for the pricing of petroleum products, so disagreeing with this statement 
would indicate it is not fulfilling its own job adequately. On the other hand, 66.6% 
and 85.7% of the respondents from the NA and the CS disagreed that the guidelines 
to determine the price of petroleum products are clearly stated and publicised by the 
Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency. This is consistent with the fact that a 
number of oil marketers sell petroleum products above the price approved by the 
government
14
 and the National Assembly criticised the PPPRA pricing template
15
. 
Hence, this finding this could be related to the failure of the PPPRA to clearly 
publish guidelines to determine the price of petroleum products.  
                                       
14
 The Department of Petroleum Resources closed three oil depots and a number of fillings stations 
selling petrol above official prices (PUNCH OCTOBER 12, 2012 BY STANLEY OPARA) 
 
15
 The current template being used by the PPPRA in computing and paying PSF includes in-built 
prices for wastages and inefficiencies (eg. Lightering exercises, demurrage) that could be plugged to 
save the nation’s scarce resources. We, therefore, recommend the template be revised. Henceforth the 
PPPRA margin of error on the payment template for ascertaining allowable volumes on imported 
products should be no more than +/5% compared to the current +/-10% (National Assembly, 2012).
 
 
f) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency follows due process relating to all subsidy 
payments. 
Groups P3 P2 N1 N2 M2 C1 T1 
P1 .000 .000 .020 .049 .008 .001 .000 
g) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency discloses all discovered malpractices relating 
to the pricing of petroleum products. 
Groups P3 P2 N1 C1 
P1 .002 .001 .004 .003 
T1 .013 .047 .018 .021 
h) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency discloses all discovered malpractices relating 
to subsidy claims for petroleum products. 
Groups P3 N1 T1 
D1 .004 .010  
P1 .001 .003 .005 
N2 .005 .013 .049 
i) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency periodically discloses all generated revenue to 
legitimate stakeholders. 
Groups P3 P2 N1 I1 
D1 .011 .001 .002 .006 
P1 .032 .037 .012 .045 
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6.4.2.2.2 The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency follows due 
process in the pricing of petroleum products. 
The PPPRA was burdened with the responsibility of determining the price of 
petroleum products to regulate their supply and distribution. Hence, it is necessary to 
seek the opinion of respondents on whether the Products Pricing Regulatory Agency 
follows due process in pricing of petroleum products. 
From Table 6.13, it is evident that the descriptive statistics disclose that out of the 
102 responses recorded, 50 respondents strongly agreed, 26 respondents were neutral 
and 26 respondents strongly disagreed that the Products Pricing Regulatory Agency 
follows due process in the pricing of petroleum products. The overall mean and 
median scores (3.25 and 3.00) show that the respondents were aligned towards 
agreement. 
Table 6.14 illustrates that the opinion of the PPPRA and MOMC varied from that of 
the NEITI and CS. The cross tabulation test revealed that 72.8% and 90% of the 
respondents from the PPPRA, and PEF agreed. The position of these groups 
contradicts the assertion that the Board of the PPPRA should immediately be 
dissolved for not following due process regarding its duties
16
 (Amanze, 2011).  
In contrast, 50% and 42.9% of the respondents from the NEITI and the CS disagreed. 
The disagreements could be reliable given that the NEITI is the agency responsible 
for ensuring transparency (due process) in the petroleum sector of the country. Thus, 
they would be better informed than the other groups, on whether the PPPRA 
discharged their duties diligently. Hence, it will be argued that the PPPRA does not 
follow due process in the pricing of petroleum products. 
                                       
16
 The oil workers also called on the Federal Government to immediately dissolve the PPPRA Board, 
declaring that the agency had lost its political and economic relevance. They noted that core investors 
in the downstream sector were marginalised in the import allocation, while brief case companies are 
favoured by the PPPRA. The oil workers further alleged that cabals in the PPPRA Board determined 
who gets what in the fuel imports scheme and demanded that the Ministry of Petroleum should 
henceforth, supervise the agency’s activities and ensure that only entities that have facilities for 
imports, distribution and supply benefit from the imports scheme (Amanze, 2011). 
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6.4.2.2.3 The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency discloses to the 
general public, all important information relating to the pricing of petroleum 
products. 
Disclosure is one of the fundamental aspects of accountability (Buchanan, and 
Tollison, 1984). Therefore, respondents’ views were sought on whether the 
Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency discloses all important information 
relating to the pricing of petroleum products to the general public. Table 6.13 
revealed that out of the 102 responses recorded, 49 respondents strongly agreed with 
the statement, 35 of the respondents strongly disagreed and 18 were neutral. 
Therefore, Mann-Whitney tests were run to determine whether significant 
differences existed among the respondent groups.  
From the data presented in Table 6.14, it is clear that the Mann-Whitney tests 
showed that the CS, PPMC and NEITI’s perceptions differed from six groups 
namely: the DPR, PPPRA, PEF, NA, MOMC and TU. Moreover, the cross 
tabulation test revealed that 72.8%, 63.6%, 100% and 60% of the respondents from 
the PPPRA, PEF, NA and MOMC agreed that the Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency discloses all important information relating to the pricing of 
petroleum products, to the general public.  
On the other hand, 61.6%, 70% and 85.7% of the respondents from the PPMC, 
NEITI, and CS were in disagreement with the assertion and 60% of the respondents 
from the TU were neutral, whilst the DPR and IOMC respondents were indecisive.  
From the above analysis, it is evident that the agreement position is appropriate, 
because the NA has the legal authority to ask any agency in the country to disclose 
its activities, as such it should be better informed than any other group. Also, on 
average the mean and median scores (3.22 and 3.00) indicate that the majority of the 
respondents tend towards agreement. Therefore, it can be argued that the Petroleum 
Products Pricing Regulatory Agency discloses all important information relating to 
the pricing of petroleum products, to the general public.  
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6.4.2.2.4 The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency discloses all 
important information relating to the pricing of petroleum products to the 
National Assembly. 
The respondents’ opinions were sought on whether the Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency discloses all important information, relating to the pricing of 
petroleum products, to the National Assembly. One of the preconditions of 
accountability is information disclosure (Busse, and Hefeker, 2007). The data from 
the descriptive statistics test confirmed, as outlined in Table 6.13, that out of the 102 
respondents 49% of the respondents strongly agreed, 32.3% strongly disagreed, 
whereas, 18.6% took a neutral position. The overall mean and median scores (3.30 
and 3.00) also indicate that the respondents tended towards agreement. Based on this 
information, Table 6.14 disclosed that the Mann-Whitney tests and the PPPRA, PEF, 
NA, MOMC and CS perceptions differed from that of the PPMC, NEITI, IOMC and 
TU respectively.  
Furthermore, the cross tabulation tests illustrate that 63.7%, 73.7%, 55.6%, 70% and 
57.1% of the respondents from the PPPRA, PEF, NA, MOMC and CS respectively, 
were in agreement that the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency does 
disclose all important information relating to the pricing of petroleum products, to 
the National Assembly. On the contrary, 61.6%, 50% and 50% of the respondents 
from the PPMC, NEITI and TU respectively, disagreed. The respondents from the 
IOMC were split between agreement and disagreement, with 37.5% each. Given that 
as it may, the agreed view could be more suitable taking into consideration the fact 
that the respondents from the PPPRA and the PEF are regulators. Moreover, the NA, 
as the highest law making body and the MOMC, as major marketers, are likely to be 
more knowledgeable in this subject than the other groups. Hence, this would indicate 
that the PPPRA provides important information to the National Assembly, relating to 
the pricing of petroleum products.  
6.4.2.2.5 The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency audits all subsidy 
claims relating to the importation of petroleum products. 
The respondents’ views relating to the auditing of fuel subsidy claims were sought, 
as in Nigeria the fuel subsidy has become a major issue of concern because of 
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allegations that it was fraudulent (Sunusi, 2012). Hence, it is vital to determine 
whether the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency audits all subsidy claims 
relating to the importation of petroleum products. The descriptive statistics presented 
in Table 6.13, reveal the mean and median scores (3.19 and 3.00) which suggest that 
the respondents have a neutral perception. Of the 102 responses recorded, 50 (49.1%) 
respondents were strongly in agreement, 35 (34.3%) strongly disagreed and 17 
(16.7%) were neutral.  
The data from Table 6.14 derived from the Mann-Whitney tests indicate that the 
respondents from the DPR, PPPRA, and IOMC overwhelmingly agreed, with 77%, 
72.7% and 50% respectively. This differs from the respondents of the PPMC, NEITI 
and CS who disagreed with 69.2%, 60% and 85.7% respectively. Considering the 
nature of the statement it can be argued that the disagreement position could be seen 
to be more accurate. This is because the NEITI was vested with constitutional 
powers to audit all petroleum matters, including petroleum subsidies in the country 
and hence, it is party to more information on this subject than the other respondent 
groups. Consequently, this implies that the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory 
Agency does not audit all subsidy claims relating to the importation of petroleum 
products. 
6.4.2.2.6 The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency follows due 
process relating to all subsidy payments 
Another issue of concern is the assertion that the PPPRA pays subsidies to 
companies that have never imported petroleum products into the country (Subsidy 
Probe Report, 2012). Therefore, the respondents’ perceptions were sought in relation 
to the statement above. From the descriptive statistic tests in Table 6.13 it was noted 
that the mean and median scores were 2.99 and 3.00, with the mean moving towards 
the neutral position. However, out of the 102 responses received, 37.3% of the 
respondents were strongly in agreement that the Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency follows due process relating to all subsidy payments. On the 
other hand, 36 respondents, representing 35.3% strongly disagreed with the statement 
and 27.5% of the respondents took a neutral position. This revelation informed the 
use of Mann-Whitney tests.  
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Table 6.14 shows that the PPPRA’s opinion differed from seven groups namely: the 
PPMC, PEF, NEITI, NA, MOMC, CS and TU. The findings from the cross 
tabulation tests reveal that 90.9% of the respondents from the PPPRA are in 
agreement. However, 81.8%, 40% and 57.1% of the respondents from the PEF, 
MOMC and CS were neutral. Whereas, 77%, 50%, 55.4% and 60% of the 
respondents from the PPMC, NEITI, NA and TU strongly disagreed with the 
statement. In spite of the agreements voiced by the respondents of the PPPRA, there 
were revelations from credible agencies (including the NEITI and NA) and audits 
firms that the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency does not follow due 
process relating to subsidy payments
17
. Hence, this signifies that the PPPRA is not 
transparent in the payment of petroleum subsidy.  
6.4.2.2.7 The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency discloses all 
discovered malpractices relating to the pricing of petroleum products. 
This statement sought the respondents’ perceptions in order to ascertain whether the 
PPPRA discloses malpractices relating to the pricing of petroleum products. The 
findings from the descriptive statistic test, as presented in Table 6.13, illustrate that 
the overall mean and median score of 2.83 and 3.00 indicate that the respondents 
respectively tended to disagree. Of the 102 responses recorded, 33 of the respondents 
strongly agreed. On the other hand, 26 of the respondents were neutral and 43 of the 
respondents strongly disagreed that the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory 
Agency discloses all discovered malpractices relating to the pricing of petroleum 
products. On this note, Mann-Whitney tests results were presented in Table 6.14 
above. 
Furthermore, the cross tabulation tests observed that 63.6% and 50% of respondents 
from the PPPRA and TU were in agreement. On the contrary, 72.7% of the 
respondents from the PEF were neutral and 77%, 70% and 85.7% of the respondents 
                                       
17
 Subsidy payments were made by PPPRA without the signature of external auditors and independent 
inspectors of shore tank certificates. The PPPRA fraudulently paid oil marketers N1.07tn. The PPPRA 
was asked to refund N312bn it paid to itself, while the marketers who “violated the Petroleum Subsidy 
Fund” were directed to return N8.6bn to the government treasury (KPMG audits report, NEITI audits 
report, Faruk Lawan-led committee report, Imoukhede-led committee report, Nuhu Ribadu-led 
committee report, 2012). 
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from the PPMC, NEITI and CS opposed the statement. This position could be 
reliable because the NEITI is in charge of the country’s transparency practice and, as 
such, it is in a better position to ascertain the PPPRA’s disclosure practice. The 
disagreements stated by the respondents of the CS, which is the public interest 
representative, could also be correct since they are best placed to determine whether 
the PPPRA reports exposed malpractices to the general public. The disagreement is 
consistent with the National Assembly which recommended the persecution of a 
PPPRA official
18
 for not disclosing malpractices in the sector (Subsidy Reports 
2012). Therefore, this evidence illustrates that the PPPRA does not disclose 
unprofessional conduct relating to pricing. 
6.4.2.2.8 The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency discloses all 
discovered malpractices relating to subsidy claims for petroleum products. 
This section asked the respondents’ for their view in relation to whether the 
Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency discloses all discovered malpractices 
relating to subsidy claims for petroleum products. Table 6.13 presents the descriptive 
statistics of the respondents. Out of the 102 responses 34.2% of the respondents were 
strongly in agreement, 32.4% were neutral and 33.4% strongly disagreed that the 
Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency discloses all discovered malpractices 
relating to subsidy claims for petroleum products. The table also shows the mean and 
median scores of 2.95 and 3.0 respectively, moving towards disagreement.  
In Table 6.14, it can be seen that the Mann-Whitney tests reveal that the DPR’s 
position differed from that of the PPMC and the NEITI respectively. The tests also 
show that the views of the respondents from the PPPRA diverged from five groups, 
namely: the PPMC, NEITI and TU. Likewise, the opinion of the respondents from 
the NA contradicted that of the PPMC, PEF, NEITI and TU. The cross tabulation 
unveiled that respondents from the DPR, PPPRA and NA were in agreement with 
46.2%, 72.7%, and 55.5%. On the other hand, another three of the respondent groups 
disagreed with 76.9%, 70% and 50% from the PPMC, NEITI, and TU respectively. 
                                       
18
 According to the National Assembly report on oil subsidy, the Chairman of the Board of PPPRA 
from 2009 - 2011, and the entire Members of the Board during the same period are hereby 
reprimanded and should be persecuted by anti-corruption agencies for not disclosing malpractices in 
the sector
18
 (Subsidy reports 2012). 
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However, the percentage of agreements from the DPR respondents is low (46.2%) 
and 38.5% were neutral. This, together with the fact that 33.3% of the NA 
respondents held a neutral position, would indicate that only the PPPRA actually 
agreed (PPPRA, 72.7%). Thus, it can be argued that the disagreements indicated by 
the PPMC, NEITI and TU respondents are more appropriate, because evidence 
suggests that the PPPRA usually conspires with oil marketers to defraud the amount 
allocated to petroleum subsidies (National Assembly Subsidy Report, 2012). On this 
note, the PPPRA possibly does not disclose any mismanagement relating to subsidy 
claims.  
6.4.2.2.9 The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency periodically 
discloses all generated revenue to legitimate stakeholders. 
The regulatory agencies should account for all revenue they generate in the course of 
discharging their regulatory responsibility (Chong, and López-De-Silanes, 2002). 
Hence, the respondents’ views were sought in relation to the above statement. In 
Table 6.13, the descriptive statistics reveal that out of the 102 responses recorded, 35 
of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement, 32 respondents strongly 
disagreed, while 35 respondents were neutral. The overall mean and median of 3.00 
and 3.00 indicate that the respondents were neutral. From the Mann-Whitney test, it 
is clear that the DPR and PPPRA respondents’ perception differed from that of the 
PPMC, PEF, NEITI and IOMC respondents, as can be seen in Table 6.14. The cross 
tabulation revealed that 76.9%, 54.5% of the respondents from DPR and PPPRA are 
in agreement that the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency periodically 
discloses all generated revenue to legitimate stakeholders. Unlike the aforementioned 
groups, 81.8% and 50% of the respondents from the PEF and IOMC were indecisive, 
whilst, 61.6% and 60% of the respondents from the PPMC and NEITI disagreed with 
the statement. The disagreement finding could be reliable, because the Nigeria’s 
Senate discovered that the PPPRA does not disclose its annual revenue to legitimate 
stakeholders (Premium Times, 2012)
19
. Therefore, this suggests that the PPPRA does 
not publish all information related to generated revenue.  
                                       
19
 The inability by PPPRA to provide documents backing the salary expenditure and revenue 
generated. Some the regulators (including PPPRA) think that except appropriations are drawn directly 
from the Consolidated Revenue Fund, they are not accountable to the parliament for. Nobody can 
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6.4.2.3 Perceptions relating to the accountability practice of the Petroleum 
Equalisation Fund; 
As discoursed in Section 3.4.3, the Petroleum Equalisation fund was established by 
Decree No.9 of 1975, mainly to administer Uniform Prices of Petroleum products 
throughout the country for the benefit of general public. Consequently, this is one of 
the justifications for the adoption of the Public Interest Theory as a theoretical 
framework for this study, in order to establish whether the PEF is accountable for 
their actions. Considering the theory and the framework for good regulatory 
governance practice, nine statements were developed to determine the respondents’ 
perceptions on whether the Petroleum Equalisation Fund has substantive 
accountability in regulatory governance. Table 6.15 disclosed the frequencies and the 
percentages of the respondents’ views on whether the Petroleum Equalisation Fund 
has substantive accountability in regulatory governance. There were 102 responses 
from each of the nine statements. 
Table 6.15: Descriptive frequencies of the Petroleum Equalisation Fund 
accountability practices  
Statements M MD SD D N A SA TR 
a) Guidelines to equalise the price of 
petroleum products are clearly 
stated and publicised by the 
Petroleum Equalisation fund. 
 
3.24 
 
3.00 
 
7 
(6.9) 
 
20 
(19.6) 
 
26 
(25.5) 
 
40 
(39.2) 
 
9 
(8.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
b) The Petroleum Equalisation fund 
follows due process in equalising 
the price of petroleum products in 
the country. 
 
3.39 
 
4.00 
 
5 
(4.9) 
 
20 
(19.6) 
 
22 
(21.6) 
 
40 
(39.2) 
 
15 
(14.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
c) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund 
follows due process in determining 
bridging costs. 
 
3.43 
 
4.00 
 
3 
(2.9) 
 
19 
(18.6) 
 
28 
(27.5) 
 
35 
(34.3) 
 
17 
(16.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
d) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund 
discloses to the general public, 
important information relating to 
price equalisation of petroleum 
products. 
 
3.30 
 
3.50 
 
5 
(4.9) 
 
25 
(24.5) 
 
21 
(20.6) 
 
36 
(35.3) 
 
15 
(14.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
e) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund 
discloses to the National 
Assembly, information relating to 
price equalisation of petroleum 
products. 
 
3.38 
 
3.00 
 
3 
(2.9) 
 
21 
(20.6) 
 
29 
(28.4) 
 
32 
(31.4) 
 
17 
(16.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
f) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund 
audits all bridging claims relating 
to the transportation of petroleum 
 
3.53 
 
4.00 
 
4 
(3.9) 
 
18 
(17.6) 
 
21 
(20.6) 
 
38 
(37.3) 
 
21 
(20.6) 
 
102 
(100) 
                                                                                                            
receive money on behalf of Nigeria; spend it on his own behalf without recourse to the National 
Assembly’’ the senate said (Premium Times, 2012). 
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products. 
g) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund 
follows due process relating to 
payment of bridging claims. 
 
3.27 
 
3.00 
 
8 
(7.8) 
 
23 
(22.5) 
 
21 
(20.6) 
 
33 
(32.4) 
 
17 
(16.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
h) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund 
discloses all significant discovered 
malpractices relating to bridging 
claims 
 
3.14 
 
3.00 
 
9 
(8.8) 
 
29 
(28.4) 
 
19 
(18.6) 
 
29 
(28.4) 
 
16 
(15.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
i)  The Petroleum Equalisation Fund 
discloses all revenue it generates 
relating to the registration of 
transporters. 
 
3.24 
 
3.00 
 
9 
(8.8) 
 
24 
(23.5) 
 
26 
(25.5) 
 
20 
(19.6) 
 
23 
(22.5) 
 
102 
(100) 
 
Note: (a) M=Mean, Md=Median, SD=Strongly Disagree, D=Disagree, N=Neutral, A=Agree, SA=Strongly Agree, TR=Total 
Responses (b) Figures in brackets are percentages 
 
6.4.2.3.1 Guidelines to equalise the price of petroleum products are clearly 
stated and publicised by the Petroleum Equalisation Fund 
To ensure accountability practice is in place, regulators are expected to clearly 
publish and state the guidelines to be used by all stakeholders. In doing so, it 
guarantees the effectiveness of good regulatory governance (IMF, 2004 and Cook, 
1999). On this note, the respondents’ opinion was sought in relation to the above 
statement. The descriptive statistics tests in Table 6.15 revealed that out of the 102 
responses recorded, 49 of the respondents were strongly in agreement, 27 of the 
respondents strongly disagreed and 26 were neutral.  
Table 6.16: Mann-Whitney test, relating to the Petroleum Equalisation Fund 
accountability practices 
a) Guidelines to equalise the price of petroleum products are clearly stated and publicised by the 
Petroleum Equalisation fund. 
NIL 
b) The Petroleum Equalisation fund follows due process in equalising the price of petroleum products 
in the country. 
Groups P1 N1 N2 P3 I1 C1 T1 
P2 .003 .002 .001 .015 .012 .009 .004 
c) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund follows due process in determining bridging costs. 
Groups P2 N1 M1 C1 
D1 .013 .004  .009 
P1 .005 .011 .006 .025 
P3 .007  .039  
d) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund discloses to the general public, important information relating to 
price equalisation of petroleum products. 
Groups D1 P1 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
P2 .025 .001 .001 .000 .011 .002 .028 .003 .003 
e) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund discloses to the National Assembly, information relating to price 
equalisation of petroleum products. 
Groups D1 P1 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
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Note: (a) D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA), P2= 
Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company (PPMC), N1 = Nigeria 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), M1= Major Oil Marketing 
Companies (MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade 
Union (TU) 
  (b) Only Mann-Whitney tests with p=values of equal to, or less than 0.05 (i.e. p<.05) are shown in the table  
 
Data presented in Table 6.16 from the Mann-Whitney test discloses that no 
differences were detected among the groups. However, the overall mean and the 
median scores of 3.24 and 3.00 suggest that the respondents incline towards 
agreement. One possible reason for this is that it could be that it is common 
knowledge that all stakeholders in the country are aware of the bridging guidelines. 
In addition, even the general public are mindful that petroleum products are 
subsidised through the bridging procedure. Therefore all the respondent groups are in 
a good position to be well informed. This suggests that the PEF clearly states and 
publicises guidelines to equalise petroleum products in the country.  
6.4.2.3.2 The Petroleum Equalisation Fund follows due process in equalising the 
price of petroleum products in the country 
The PEF was mandated to determine and equalise the price of petroleum products 
throughout the country (PEF, 2012). Hence it is important to seek respondent views 
on whether the PEF follows due process in equalising the price of petroleum 
products in the country. The mean and the median of 3.39 and 4.00 given in Table 
6.15 suggest that respondents are in agreement with the statement. Out of the 102 
P2 .003 .001 .001 .001 .002 .003 .003 .001 .000 
f) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund audits all bridging claims relating to the transportation of 
petroleum products. 
Groups D1 P2 C1 T1 
P3 .007 .000 .012 .021 
g) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund follows due process relating to the payment of bridging claims. 
Groups P1 P3 N1 C1 T1 
D1 .011 .003 .006 .003 .001 
P2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
M1 .026 .009 .016 .007 .003 
h) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund discloses all significant discovered malpractices relating to 
bridging claims. 
NIL 
i) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund discloses all revenue it generates relating to the registration of 
transporters. 
Groups D1 P1 P3 N1 M1 I1 C1 
P2 .012 .000 .000 .001 .000 .001 .002 
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responses recorded, 53.9% of the respondents are strongly in agreement and 24.5% 
of the respondents strongly disagreed while 21.6% of the respondents were neutral. 
The Mann-Whitney test detected differences among the respondent groups. 
The perception of the respondents from the PEF varied from that of the PPRA, 
NEITI, NA and IOMC, as shown in Table 6.16. The differences among the PEF and 
PPMC, CS and TU are based on the strength of the agreements. The cross-tabulation 
test discloses that, 54.5% and 55.6% of the respondents from the PPPRA and NA are 
neutral in relation to the statement, whereas 60% and 50% of the respondents from 
the NEITI and IOMC respectively disagreed that the PEF follows due process in 
equalising the price of petroleum products in the country.  
By contrast, 76.9%, 90.9%, 53.9% 57.1% and 50% from the DPR, PEF, PPMC, CS 
and TU respectively are in agreement. The position of these groups could be more 
appropriate given that the DPR and PEF as regulators and the PPMC as distributors 
of petroleum products should understand the due process of price equalisation better 
than any other group. Similarly, the CS and TU, as associations that protect public 
interest, ought to be aware of the due process relating to price equalisation in the 
country. Hence this shows that the PEF follows due process in equalising the price of 
petroleum products. 
6.4.2.3.3 The Petroleum Equalisation Fund follows due process in determining 
bridging costs 
As stated earlier in Section 3.4.3, the importance of bridging is emphasised by the 
need to ensure equitable product distribution to all parts of the country at a uniform 
price in order to prevent petroleum products shortages (PEF, 2012). As a result, 
respondent perceptions are sought relating to the above statement. Table 6.15 shows 
the descriptive frequencies of the respondents and that the mean and the median 
scores of 3.43 and 4.0 indicate agreement. In addition, out of the 102 responses 
recorded, 52 of the responses strongly agreed with the statement, 28 took a neutral 
position, while 22 of the respondents strongly disagreed.  
Table 6.16 presents the differences between the respondent groups. The cross-
tabulation test revealed that 63.6% of the respondents from the PPPRA were neutral 
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and 70% and 57.2% of the respondents from the NEITI and CS respectively 
disagreed that the PEF follows due process in determining bridging costs. In contrast, 
69.2%, 90.9%, 53.9%, 100% and 50% of the respondents from the DPR, PEF, PPMC 
and MOMC respectively agreed with the statement. Consequently, the agreed 
position may perhaps be more reliable than the other groups’ perception due to the 
fact that the DPR and PEF have the power to determine bridging costs in the 
downstream sector. In the same way, the PPMC and MOMC are responsible for the 
marketing and distribution of products, as well as for claiming bridging costs after 
products were allocated and as such they should be more knowledgeable than other 
groups. This clearly implies that the PEF follows due process while ascertaining 
bridging costs. 
6.4.2.3.4 The Petroleum Equalisation Fund discloses to the general public, 
important information relating to the price equalisation of petroleum products 
As a regulatory body, the PEF is expected to disclose information to the general 
public since they are the major stakeholders in the sector. This fact indicates that it is 
important to find out respondent views on the above statement. On average, the mean 
and median scores of 3.30 and 3.50 indicate a leaning towards agreement, as shown 
in Table 6.15. Equally, the table discloses that from a total of 102 responses 
recorded, 30 respondents strongly disagreed, 21 were neutral and 51 strongly agreed.  
The Mann-Whitney and cross-tabulation tests reveal that respondents from the 
PPPRA were indecisive, with 36.4% equally disagreeing and agreeing. This makes 
them different from the respondents of the DPR, PEF, NA, MOMC, IOMC and TU 
who overwhelmingly agreed with 69.3%, 90.9%, 66.2%, 50%, 50%, and 60% 
respectively. As shown in Table 6.15 the differences that exist between PEF and the 
five groups (DPR, NA, MOMC, IOMC and TU) are as a result of the extent of 
agreement.  
On the other hand, 38.5%, 60%, 42.9% of the respondents from the PPMC, NEITI 
and CS disagreed with the statement. These negative perceptions could be 
appropriate because the CS, which directly serves as the voice of the general public, 
is in the best position out of all the groups to understand whether the PEF discloses 
important information relating to price equalisation of petroleum products to the 
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general public. This is in line with the findings of the NA that the general public is 
not informed of the costs incurred during the bridging of petroleum products 
(Petroleum Task Force, 2012). This indicates that the PEF does not provide the 
general public with information relating to bridging costs.  
6.4.2.3.5 The Petroleum Equalisation Fund discloses to the National Assembly 
information relating to price equalisation of petroleum products. 
The PEF is mandated to administer the price equalisation scheme to ensure the 
survival of the government’s policy of uniform pump prices for petroleum products 
nationwide (Gillies, 2009; PEF, 2012). Thus respondent opinion relating to the above 
statement was sought. Overall, the respondents tended towards agreement as 
indicated by the mean and median score of 3.38 and 3.0 respectively. Likewise, 
Table 6.15 reveals that out of the 102 responses recorded, 49 respondents strongly 
agreed and 29 were neutral, while 24 strongly disagreed with the statement. 
From Table 6.16 it can be seen that the Mann-Whitney test indicates that the PEF’s 
opinion was in direct opposition to the view of the respondents from the DPR, 
PPPRA, PPMC, NEITI, NA, MOMC, IOMC and TU. The cross-tabulation 
confirmed that the divergence of views from the respondents of the PEF and other 
groups (i.e. DPR, PPMC, NA and MOMC) are due to the strength of the agreement: 
69.2%, 90.9%, 53.9%, 44.4%, 60%, 37.5% and 36.4% of the respondents from the 
DPR, PEF, PPMC, NA, MOMC, IOMC and PPPRA respectively agreed. Only the 
respondents from the CS (42.9%) disagreed with the statement, while 50% and 40% 
of the respondents from the TU and NEITI held a neutral position. 
The perception of the respondents from the NA and NEITI appropriately justified the 
agreement voiced because they have the legal authority to demand information from 
any regulatory agency; as such they are in the best position to independently assess 
the PEF disclosure practice than any other group. Based on this it could be argued 
that the PEF provides the NA with information concerning price equalisation of 
petroleum products.  
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6.4.2.3.6 The Petroleum Equalisation Fund audits all bridging claims relating to 
the transportation of petroleum products. 
The descriptive statistics test in Table 6.15 show respondent perceptions in relation 
to the above statement. Out of the 102 responses recorded, 57.9% strongly agreed, 
21.5% strongly disagreed and 20.6% were neutral. Therefore, with a mean score of 
3.53 and a median score of 4.00, on average, it can be said that the respondents 
agreed that the PEF audits all bridging claims relating to the transportation of 
petroleum products. To justify accountability practice, all expenditure is required to 
be audited by regulators (Gilardi, 2008; World Bank, 2004). 
Table 6.16 discloses that the perception of the respondents from the PPMC differs 
from four groups: the DPR, PEF, CS and TU. In addition, the cross-tabulation test 
reveals that 61.6% of the respondents from the PPMC disagreed. On the other hand, 
92.3%, 90.9%, 42.9% and 60% of the respondents from the DPR, PEF, CS, and TU 
respectively agreed with statement. Consequently, it can be said that the groups 
which agreed are in a better position to understand whether or not the PEF audits all 
bridging claims. Since all claims need to be verified by the DPR and PEF prior to 
being paid out, no company will receive payment until it has submitted documents to 
the auditors to clarify the distribution of petroleum products (PEF, 2012; Gillies, 
2009). The CS and TU could also be well-informed given that they represent the 
interests of the consumers. This would signify that the PEF does audit all bridging 
claims relating to the transportation of petroleum products. 
6.4.2.3.7 The Petroleum Equalisation Fund follows due process relating to the 
payment of bridging claims 
The above statement sought respondent views on whether due process, relating to the 
payment of bridging claims, is adhered to. From the descriptive statistics test, it can 
be said that the overall mean and the median scores of 3.27 and 3.00 indicate a 
neutral position. Of the 102 responses recorded, 50 respondents strongly agreed, 31 
respondents strongly disagreed and 21 of the respondents were neutral.  
The tests disclosed that 84.6% and 90.9% of the respondents from the DPR and the 
PEF agree that the PEF follows due process relating to the payment of bridging 
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claims. However, 45.5%, 53.9%, 50% 71.4% and 60% of respondents from the 
PPPRA, PPMC, NEITI, CS and TU respectively disagreed. The disagreement 
perception could be more appropriate because it is consistent with the findings of the 
federal government, among others.
20
 Hence it can be concluded that the PEF does not 
follow due process relating to the payment of bridging claims. 
6.4.2.3.8 The Petroleum Equalisation Fund discloses all significant discovered 
malpractices relating to bridging claims 
Analysis of Table 6.15 reveals that out of the 102 responses recorded, 46 respondents 
(44.1%) strongly agreed and 38 (37.2%) strongly disagreed with the statement, while 
16 (18.6%) were neutral. The overall mean and median score of 3.14 and 3.00 
indicate a neutral position. Respondent opinions were further subjected to a Mann-
Whitney test and no differences in the way the respondents perceived the statement 
were detected. One possible reason for this could be the fact that various audit 
reports discovered significant malpractices in the sector (NA, 2012). In line with this 
assertion, it is appropriate to argue that the PEF does not disclose any malpractice 
exposed in the sector.  
6.4.2.3.9 The Petroleum Equalisation Fund discloses all the revenue it generates 
relating to the registration of transporters 
Respondent views were sought on whether the PEF discloses all the revenue it 
generates relating to the registration of transporters. As indicated by the descriptive 
statistics test results in Table 6.15, overall the respondent groups tended towards 
agreement, as justified by the mean and median score of 3.24 and 3.00 respectively. 
In addition, out of the 102 responses recorded, 43 respondents strongly agreed, 33 
strongly disagreed and 26 were neutral.  
                                       
20
 According to the Ministry of Finance, payments are being made to marketers with no issues against 
their names. Those with discrepancies and those that have been indicted by the committee would have 
to have their documents verified by the auditor before payments could be made (Imoukhede-led 
Committee Report, 2012). 
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The Mann-Whitney tests indicate that the DPR, PPPRA and PEF position varied 
from that of five groups: the PPMC, MOMC, CS, IOMC and NEITI. The cross-
tabulation shows that the discrepancy that exists between the PEF and DPR, PPPRA 
results from the level of agreement. However, 61.6%, 45.5% and 90.9% of the 
respondents from the DPR, PPPRA and PEF respectively were in agreement. One 
possible reason for such a result could be that if the PEF, DPR and PPPRA disagreed 
with the statement it might have justified the allegation that as regulators they do not 
declare generated revenue (NA, 2012).  
In contrast, 61.6%, 40%, 42.9%, 37.5% and 40%, of the respondents from the 
PPMC, MOMC, CS, IOMC and NEITI respectively disagreed. The groups who 
disagreed are in a better position to determine whether the PEF discloses revenue 
because the MOMC, IOMC, as regulated companies, are aware of how much they 
paid the PEF as revenue, and the NEITI, with a legislative mandate, audits the PEF 
incomes. As such they are in a better position to provide an autonomous assessment 
of whether the PEF discloses generated revenue. It appears that the PEF do not 
disclose revenue generated. 
In summary, the research sub-hypothesis HO2 is accepted in relation to the regulatory 
accountability of DPR. This is because the findings have determined that the DPR 
does not disclose the amount of locally refined petroleum products and imported 
products. In addition, the DPR does not disclose any malpractice in the sector. 
Moreover, the DPR does not keep the general public and NA informed about the 
process regarding the issue of import and internally generated revenue respectively, 
which are major indicators of accountability practice.  
In relation to PPPRA, the research sub-hypothesis HO2 is accepted. This is because 
out of the nine accountability indicators tested, seven were rejected by the 
respondents. Therefore, it can be concluded that the PPPRA lacks substantive 
accountability.   
In relation to PEF, the research sub-hypothesis HO2 is rejected, because out of the 
nine indicators used to measure the status of accountability practice by the PEF, the 
respondents agree with five. This shows that the PEF has an element of 
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accountability, a significant mechanism of good regulatory governance regime 
(Cubbin and Stern, 2005; OECD, 2002). 
Table 6.17: Summary of the number of differences between groups in relation to 
Nigeria’s downstream regulatory accountability (this summarises tables 6.12, 
6.14 and 6.16)  
Note:  D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA),  
P2=Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company (PPMC), N1 = Nigeria’s Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), M1= Major Oil Marketing Companies (MOMC), I1= 
Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade Union (TU) 
N/A:  Not Applicable  
From Table 6.17 it can be seen that the PEF differed with other groups significantly 
68 times, while PPPRA and DPR recorded 49 and 42 significant differences, 
respectively. The overall summary of the findings in relation to the second 
hypothesis tested are that Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies are not always 
consistent in relation to the accountability practice which is one of the prerequisite 
for ensuring good regulatory governance system. The analysis further revealed that 
almost all activities involving financial information are not being accounted for 
properly by regulatory agencies. Moreover, the findings also showed the need for 
urgent and adequate accountability practice among Nigeria’s downstream regulatory 
agencies.  
6.4.3 Regulatory transparency 
As stated in Section 2.5.3, transparency is an essential element of good regulatory 
governance (Cubbin and Stern, 2006; D’souza, 2001). This section analyses the 
transparency practice of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies. In order to assist 
the analysis, research hypothesis HO3 was developed. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 Total  
D1 n/a 4 6 7 8 1 1 1 9 5 42 
P1 4 n/a 10 9 9 2 3 3 7 4 49 
P2 6 10 n/a 9 8 5 4 5 12 9 68 
P3 7 9 9 n/a 1 2 3 0 2 0 33 
N1 8 9 8 1 n/a 1 4 0 1 0 32 
N2 1 2 5 2 1 n/a 0 1 2 3 17 
M1 1 3 4 3 4 0 n/a 1 2 1 19 
I1 1 3 5 0 0 1 1 n/a 1 0 12 
C1 9 7 12 2 1 2 2 1 n/a 0 36 
T1 5 4 9 0 0 3 1 0 0 n/a 22 
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HO3 – Inadequate transparency mechanisms are in place and these affect the 
regulatory governance practice of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies;  
Transparency is one of the major ways in which a regulatory agency’s goals, 
decisions, underlying principles, data and other information, as well as terms of 
accountability are provided to the public in a comprehensive, accessible and timely 
manner (De Geest, 1992). The three Nigerian downstream regulatory agencies (DPR, 
PPPRA and PEF) were tested under the above research hypotheses to carefully test 
the questions relating to their transparency practices. 
6.4.3.1 Perceptions relating to the transparency practice of the Department of 
Petroleum Resources;  
As noted earlier in Section 3.4.1, the DPR is one of the three regulatory agencies 
mandated to regulate Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector. Its mandate includes 
designing and implementing regulations for the welfare of general public. This 
informed the decision to employ the Public Interest Theory of Regulation in this 
study to determine whether the DPR are transparent in discharging their duties. 
Taking into account this theory of regulation and transparency as a framework for 
good regulatory governance practice, five statements were developed in order to 
ascertain the perceptions of the respondents relating to the DPR transparency 
practice.  
In the descriptive statistic test, 102 responses were recorded in each of the five 
statements, as shown in Table 6.18 below. 
Table 6.18: Descriptive frequencies of the Department of Petroleum Resources’ 
transparency practice 
Statements M MD SD D N A SA TR 
a) The Department of Petroleum Resources 
consults all legitimate stakeholders in 
major regulatory decisions. 
 
2.79 
 
3.00 
 
25 
(24.5) 
 
23 
(22.5) 
 
17 
(16.7) 
 
22 
(21.6) 
 
15 
(14.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
b) The methods used for the measurement 
of petroleum products by the Department 
of Petroleum Resources are transparent. 
 
3.21 
 
3.00 
 
10 
(9.8) 
 
18 
(17.6) 
 
 
31 
(30.4) 
 
27 
(26.5) 
 
16 
(15.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
c) The methods used by the Department of 
Petroleum Resources for the issue of 
import licenses to regulated companies 
are transparent. 
 
3.21 
 
3.00 
 
8 
(7.8) 
 
22 
(21.6) 
 
28 
(27.5) 
 
29 
(28.4) 
 
15 
(14.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
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d) The methods used by the Department of 
Petroleum Resources in monitoring the 
quantity of imported petroleum products, 
are transparent. 
 
3.19 
 
3.00 
 
11 
(10.8) 
 
17 
(16.7) 
 
29 
(28.4) 
 
 
 
32 
(31.4) 
 
13 
(12.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
e) When the Department of Petroleum 
Resources refrains from disclosing 
confidential information relating to its 
activities, the rationale for such non-
disclosure is explained and justified. 
 
2.92 
 
3.00 
 
13 
(12.7) 
 
25 
(24.5) 
 
30 
(29.4) 
 
 
25 
(24.5) 
 
9 
(8.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
 
Note: (a) M=Mean, Md=Median, SD=Strongly Disagree, D=Disagree, N=Neutral, A=Agree, SA=Strongly Agree, TR=Total 
Responses  (b) Figures in brackets are percentages 
 
6.4.3.1.1 The Department of Petroleum Resources consults all legitimate 
stakeholders in major regulatory decisions 
Consultation is an important aspect of regulatory transparency (Baldwin et al., 2012). 
To achieve regulatory governance objectives, regulatory authorities should involve 
or consult all legitimate stakeholders in regulatory decisions. Hence it was necessary 
to question respondents about the above statement. The overall mean and median 
scores of 2.79 and 3.00 shown in Table 6.18 indicate that the respondents tend 
towards disagreement. Moreover, out of the 102 responses recorded, 37 respondents 
strongly agreed with the statement, 48 strongly disagreed and 17 took a neutral 
position. The Mann-Whitney tests highlighted no differences among the groups. 
Table 6.19: Mann-Whitney test relating to the Department of Petroleum 
Resources’ transparency practice 
a) The Department of Petroleum Resources consults all legitimate stakeholders in major regulatory 
decisions. 
NIL 
b) The methods used by the Department of Petroleum Resources for the measurement of petroleum 
products are transparent. 
Groups P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 
c) The methods used by the Department of Petroleum Resources for the issue of import licenses to 
regulated companies are transparent. 
Groups P3 N1 
D1 .004 .024 
d) The methods used by the Department of Petroleum Resources in monitoring the amount of 
imported petroleum products are transparent. 
Groups P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 C1 T1 
D1 .006 .004 .005 .024 .024 .004 .003 
M1  .030    .030 .019 
e) When the Department of Petroleum Resources refrains from disclosing confidential information 
relating to its activities, the rationale for such non-disclosure is explained and justified. 
Groups P3 N1 C1 T1 
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Note: (a) D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA), 
P2=Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company (PPMC), N1 = Nigeria’s 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), M1= Major Oil Marketing 
Companies (MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade 
Union (TU) 
  (b) Only Mann-Whitney tests with p=values of equal to, or less than 0.05 (i.e. p<.05) are shown in the table 
From Table 6.19 it is evident there was a significant difference in the way the 
respondent groups reacted to the statement. One possible reason for this might be 
related to the assumption that the DPR does not involve legitimate stakeholders in 
decision-making processes (Ehinomen and Adeleke, 2012). Given that the overall 
mean score of 2.79 suggests disagreement and that the majority of the respondents 
(47%) disagreed with the statement that the DPR consults all legitimate stakeholders 
in major regulatory decisions, the implication is that the DPR does not consult 
legitimate stakeholders on major regulatory decisions. 
6.4.3.1.2 The methods used for the measurement of petroleum products by the 
Department of Petroleum Resources are transparent 
The DPR is responsible for measuring the quantity and quality of petroleum products 
used in the country (DPR, 2102). It was because of this, and because transparency as 
part of regulatory governance framework is so important, that this statement was 
developed. In Table 6.18, the descriptive frequencies reveal that out of the 102 
responses recorded, 43 of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement, 31 
were neutral and 28 strongly disagreed. Since the mean and median scores are 3.21 
and 3.00, it would seem likely that the respondents are inclined towards the agree 
position. A Mann-Whitney test was run and the data presented in Table 6.19 shows 
significant differences between the groups. 
As disclosed by the cross-tabulation tests, the differences between the DPR, PPMC 
and MOMC are as a result of the strength of agreement. The test also reveals that 
100%, 61.6% and 60% of the respondents from the DPR, PPMC and MOMC 
respectively agreed. On the other hand, 45.5%, 54.5% and 60% of the PPPRA, PEF 
and TU respectively were indecisive and 70%, 44.4%, 50% and 57.2% of the 
respondents from the NEITI, NA, IOMC and CS respectively disagreed. It is 
probably appropriate to concur with the position of the NEITI, NA, IOMC, and CS 
D1 .037 .020 .017 .000 
P1    .009 
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who disagreed, because they are best placed to be informed about this issue. The 
NEITI, CS and NA have the legitimate right to check the practice of transparency by 
regulatory agencies. Moreover, the disagreement trend is in line with the assertion 
that some oil marketers are selling adulterated petroleum products because of the 
failure of the DPR to ascertain the quality of the products (Anthony and Ijewere, 
2011). This clearly indicates that the methods used by the DPR to measure petroleum 
products are not transparent.  
6.4.3.1.3 The methods used for the issue of import licenses to regulated 
companies by the Department of Petroleum Resources are transparent 
It is important for this study to determine whether there is transparency in the process 
of the issuance of import licences by the DPR. This is because the manner in which 
import permit licenses are awarded could determine how business practices will best 
take place. It was discovered from the descriptive statistics test results in Table 6.18 
that out of the 102 responses recorded, 44 respondents strongly agreed with the 
statement, 28 were neutral and 30 strongly disagreed. Since the mean and median 
scores of 3.21 and 3.00 indicate that the respondents tend towards agreement, Mann-
Whitney tests were run. 
Table 6.18 shows that the perceptions of DPR, PEF and MOMC differ from that of 
the PPMC, NEITI, IOMC and TU. The respondents from the PEF disagreed with the 
opinions of the PPPRA, IOMC, CS and TU. From the cross-tabulation tests it was 
ascertained that 100%, 72.8% and 60% of the respondents from the DPR, PEF and 
MOMC agreed with the statement. The reason for this agreement could be that the 
DPR as regulators and the MOMC as the companies that obtain import licenses 
might choose to argue that they are undertaking their work in a transparent fashion. 
On the other hand, 63.6%, 44.4%, and 57.1% of the respondents from the PPPRA, 
NA and CS respectively held a neutral position and 46.2%, 50%, 62.5% and 50% of 
the respondents from the PPMC, NEITI, IOMC and TU resepctively disagreed that 
the methods used by the DPR for the issue of import licenses to regulated companies 
are transparent. The disagreement voiced by the PPMC, NEITI, IOMC and TU are in 
line with the NEITI and the Faruk Lawal-led audit reports which state that that DPR 
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is not transparent in the issuance of import licenses.
21
  These factors signify that the 
DRP is not transparent in relation to the above statement. 
6.4.3.1.4 The methods used by the Department of Petroleum Resources in 
monitoring the amount of imported petroleum products are transparent 
Respondent perceptions were tested in relation to the above statement. The rationale 
for asking this question is that the DPR is responsible for ascertaining the quantity of 
petroleum products imported into the country. From Table 6.18 it can be seen that 
44.1% of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement, 28.4% were neutral and 
the remaining 27.5% strongly disagreed. Overall, the groups were neutral (mean = 
3.19 and median = 3.00).  
However, the Mann-Whitney test results, in Table 6.19, reveal that the DPR’s 
perception differed from that of the NEITI and PPMC. In addition, the cross-
tabulation test showed that 84.7% of the DPR agreed that the methods used products 
by the DPR to monitor the quantity of imported petroleum are transparent. This is not 
surprising because the DPR would hardly admit that it is not transparent in 
performing its regulatory duties. 
In contrast, 60% and 46.2% of the respondents from the NEITI and PPMC disagreed 
with the statement. Moreover, as the NEITI is in charge of ensuring transparency in 
the oil sector, it can be said that rejection of this hypothesis is in line with the 
findings of the NA that certain marketers received payments (subsidy) and that the 
products were not supplied to the country.
22
 This clearly describes a lack of 
transparency in the methods used by the DPR, in monitoring the quantity of imported 
petroleum products.  
                                       
21
 These companies, according to investigations made by the National Assembly, were blacklisted due 
to their failure to meet the guidelines required for fuel importers in Nigeria. The development comes 
as a result of the Farouk Lawan led ad-hoc Committee on Subsidy Regime investigation (Subsidy 
Report, 2012). 
 
22
 Over N230.184 billion was paid to the marketers on a PMS volume of 3,262,960,225 litres which, 
based on the records made available as part of this study was not supplied (National Assembly 
Subsidy Report, 2012). 
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6.4.3.1.5 When the Department of Petroleum Resources refrains from disclosing 
confidential information relating to its activities, the rationale for such non-
disclosure is explained and justified 
Respondent opinions were sought in respect to the statement above. It is imperative 
for the purpose of transparency that when regulators do not provide certain 
information, justification for such action should be explained. In Table 6.18, it can be 
seen that out of the 102 responses recorded, 30 respondents are neutral with respect 
to the statement, 34 strongly agreed and 38 strongly disagreed. With the overall 
respondent groups tending towards the disagreement position, as indicated by the 
mean of 2.92 and median of 3.00, Mann-Whitney tests were run to determine 
whether significant differences existed among the respondent groups. 
From the results shown in Table 6.19, it is evident that the DPR’s perception differs 
from four groups: the PPMC, NEITI, CS and TU. The opinion of the PEF varied 
from that of the NEITI, CS and TU. Differences were also discovered between the 
TU respondents and PPPRA as well as the MOMC. The cross-tabulation test 
revealed that 53.9% and 54.5% of the respondents from the DPR and PEF 
respectively are in agreement that when the DPR refrains from disclosing 
confidential information relating to its activities, the rationale for such non-disclosure 
is explained and justified. However, 45.5%, and 50% of the respondents from the 
PPPRA and MOMC held a neutral position.  
In contrast, 53.9%, 60%, 57.2% and 80% of the PPMC, NEITI, CS and TU 
respondents respectively disagreed with the statement. The disagreements expressed 
by the PPMC, NEITI, CS and TU respondents could be appropriate, as recently the 
NA alleged that revenue generating agencies, including the DPR, do not disclose 
information or justify the reasons for the non-disclosure of what they generated in the 
course of their duties (National Assembly, 2012). Therefore, this shows that the DPR 
does not justify the rationale for non-disclosure of information. 
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6.4.3.2 Perceptions relating to the transparency practice of the Petroleum Product 
Pricing Regulatory Agency 
As stated in Section 3.4.2, the PPPRA is the regulatory agency with the legislative 
mandate to regulate the pricing of petroleum products in the downstream sector. The 
rationale for establishing the agency is to stabilise the price of the products by 
making it affordable to the general public. Accordingly, the Public Interest Theory of 
regulation was adopted in this study. In line with the theory and transparency as 
mechanisms of good regulatory governance practice, four statements were carefully 
worded in order to help determine the perceptions of the respondents on whether the 
PPPRA practices substantive transparency in regulatory governance. 
Table 6.20 shows the descriptive frequencies and percentages of the respondents’ 
views relating to the PPPRA’s transparency practice: 102 responses were recorded in 
each of the four statements respectively. 
Table 6.20: Descriptive frequencies and percentages concerning the Petroleum 
Product Pricing Regulatory Agency’s transparency practice 
Statements M MD SD D N A SA TR 
a) The Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency consults all 
legitimate stakeholders on major 
regulatory decisions. 
 
3.06 
 
3.50 
 
16 
(15.7) 
 
23 
(22.5) 
 
12 
(11.8) 
 
41 
(40.2) 
 
10 
(9.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
b) The methods used by the 
Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency in reviewing 
the price of petroleum products, 
are transparent. 
 
3.16 
 
3.00 
 
10 
(9.8) 
 
17 
(16.7) 
 
31 
(30.4) 
 
35 
(34.3) 
 
9 
(8.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
c) The methods used by the 
Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency in 
determining the actual price of 
petroleum products are 
transparent. 
 
3.21 
 
 
3.00 
 
6 
(5.9) 
 
26 
(25.5) 
 
26 
(25.5) 
 
29 
(28.4) 
 
15 
(14.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
d) When the Petroleum Products 
Pricing Regulatory Agency 
refrains from disclosing 
confidential information relating 
to its activities, the rationale for 
such non-disclosure is explained 
and justified. 
 
3.25 
 
3.00 
 
8 
(7.8) 
 
18 
(17.6) 
 
33 
(32.4) 
 
27 
(26.5) 
 
16 
(15.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
 
Note: (a) M=Mean, Md=Median, SD=Strongly Disagree, D=Disagree, N=Neutral, A=Agree, SA=Strongly Agree, TR=Total 
Responses (b) Figures in brackets are percentages 
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6.4.3.2.1 The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency consults all 
legitimate stakeholders on major regulatory decisions 
Appropriate consultation of all parties contributes to the effectiveness of the 
regulatory process, improves the quality of regulatory decisions and increases the 
possibility of the regulator receiving overwhelming support and co-operation from 
all stakeholders (Zhang and Thomas, 2009). This statement was developed based on 
this assertion. From Table 6.20 it is clear that the overall mean of 3.06 and median of 
3.50 indicate that the respondents tend to agreement. The test further showed that out 
of the 102 responses recorded, 51 respondents strongly agreed, 39 strongly 
disagreed, while 12 took a neutral position. A different test was also carried out to 
ascertain if significant differences existed between the respondent groups.  
From Table 6.21 it is clear that the NEITI, NA, CS, TU and PPMC disagreed with 
the position held by the MOMC and IOMC. The cross-tabulation test revealed that 
60% and 62.5% of the respondents from the MOMC and IOMC respectively agreed 
that the PPPRA consults all legitimate stakeholders on major regulatory decisions. 
One possible reason for this could be that the MOMC and IOMC, as regulated 
companies, are constantly in contact with the PPPRA and as such, the PPPRA might 
consult them on regulatory decisions.  
Table 6.21: Mann-Whitney test relating to the Petroleum Product Pricing 
Regulatory Agency’s regulatory transparency practice 
 
a) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency consults all legitimate stakeholders in major 
regulatory decisions. 
Groups N1 T1 N2 C1 
I1 .011 .009 .003 .050 
M1   .029  
b) The methods used by the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency in reviewing the price of 
petroleum products are transparent. 
Groups P1 P2 M1 C1 T1 
P3 .015  .032   
N1 .005 .019 .008   
N2 .001 .003 .001 .007 .006 
T1 .014  .025   
c) The methods used by the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency in determining the actual 
price of petroleum products are transparent. 
Groups N1 C1 N2 
P1 .015 .035  
P2 .005 .011 .031 
M1 .020 .043  
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d) When the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency refrains from disclosing confidential 
information relating to its activities, the rationale for such non-disclosure is explained and 
justified. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 I1 
N1 .005 .001 .002 .029 .008 
 
Note: (a) D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA), 
P2=Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company (PPMC), N1 = Nigeria’s 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), M1= Major Oil Marketing 
Companies (MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade 
Union (TU) 
  (b) Only Mann-Whitney tests with p=values of equal to, or less than 0.05 (i.e. p<.05) are shown in the table  
In contrast, 60%, 88.9%, 57.2% 70% and 46.2% of the respondents from the NEITI, 
NA, CS, TU and PPMC respectively overwhelmingly disagreed with the statement. 
These disagreements could be deemed appropriate, based on the fact that the NEITI, 
NA, CS, TU and PPMC are also legitimate stakeholders that need to be consulted by 
the regulators before they make a major decision. Moreover, the PPPRA was accused 
of not widely consulting stakeholders about their decision to increase the price of 
petroleum products in 2012 (Nuhu-Koko, 2012). Therefore, it is argued that the 
PPPRA does not consult stakeholders when making major regulatory decisions.  
6.4.3.2.2 The methods used by the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory 
Agency in reviewing the price of petroleum products are transparent 
Over the years the price of petroleum products is constantly adjusted by the PPPRA 
(See Section 3.5.1 for details). Therefore, it is necessary to ascertain whether these 
adjustments in the pump price are transparent. Table 6.20 shows that out of the 102 
responses recorded, 31 respondents were neutral, 44 strongly agreed and 27 strongly 
disagreed with the statement. Overall, the respondent groups are neutral, as revealed 
by the mean and median of 3.21 and 3.00 respectively.  
Table 6.21 presents the results which exhibit a significant difference of equal to, or 
less than the alpha value of 0.05. Cross-tabulation further reveals that 81.8%, 63.6% 
and 70% of the respondents from the PPPRA, PEF and MOMC respectively agreed 
with the statement. The reason for this agreement could be associated with the 
assertion that the PPPRA is trying to deregulate the price of petroleum products 
(PPPRA, 2012). In contrast, 57.1% and 80% of the respondents from the CS and TU 
remained indecisive.  
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Of the respondents from the NEITI, NA and PPMC, 50%, 55.6% and 46.2% 
disagreed with the statement. This disagreement is in line with the assertion that the 
PPPRA pricing template is not realistic in determining the actual price of petroleum 
products (Ojameruaye, 2011; Yossifov et al., 2003). Therefore, this implies that the 
methods used in reviewing the price of the petroleum products are not transparent. 
6.4.3.2.3 The methods used by the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory 
Agency in determining the actual price of petroleum products are transparent 
The pricing of petroleum products has a direct impact on the general public. 
Therefore, the perceptions of respondents are relevant in relation to the above 
assertion. In Table 6.20 the descriptive statistics disclose that out of the 102 
responses recorded, 32 of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement, 26 
were neutral and 44 strongly agreed. In general, the respondent groups were in 
agreement, as revealed by the mean of 3.21 and the median of 3.00. 
Table 6.21 presents the results of the Mann-Whitney tests for the differences present 
between the respondent groups. The table shows that the PPPRA and MOMC’s 
perception differs from that of the NEITI and CS. Similarly, the PEF’s opinion varies 
from that of the NEITI, CS, and NA. Furthermore, the cross-tabulation test shows 
that 72.7%, 63.6% and 60% of the respondents from the PPPRA, PEF, and MOMC 
respectively agreed that the methods used in determining the actual price of 
petroleum products by the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency are 
transparent. However, 55.6% of the respondents from the NA held a neutral view.  
On the other hand, 71.4% and 60% the respondents from the CS and NEITI 
disagreed. The disagreements are closely related to the assertion that the PPPRA 
does not act sincerely when using a pricing template to determine the price of 
petroleum products in the country (NA, 2012). Given this evidence, the 
disagreements could be considered the most appropriate, since the NEITI has the 
power to independently assess the transparency practice in the sector. It is therefore 
concluded that the PPPRA is not transparent in determining the price of petroleum 
products.  
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6.4.3.2.4 When the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency refrains 
from disclosing confidential information relating to its activities, the rationale 
for such non-disclosure is explained and justified 
It is relevant to seek the perceptions of respondents in relation to the above 
statement, the reason being is that it is essential that regulatory agencies justify the 
reason for refraining from disclosing confidential information (Baldwin et al., 2012; 
Nicoletti, and Scarpetta, 2003). Table 6.20 presents the descriptive frequencies of the 
respondents and the overall mean of 3.25 and the median of 3.00 show that the 
respondents tend towards agreement. In addition, out of the 102 responses recorded, 
43 respondents strongly agreed, 33 were neutral and 26 strongly disagreed.  
From the Mann-Whitney tests it can be deduced that the opinion voiced by the 
NEITI respondents differed from that of the DPR, PPPRA, PEF, PPMC and IOMC 
respondents, as shown in Table 6.21. The cross tabulation tests reveal that 61.6%, 
54.6%, 63.6% and 62.5% of the respondents from the DPR, PPPRA, PEF, and IOMC 
respectively agreed that when the PPPRA refrains from disclosing confidential 
information relating to its activities, the rationale for such non-disclosure is 
explained and justified. The position of these groups (the DPR, PPPRA, PEF and 
IOMC) contradicts the findings of the NA that the PPPRA refrains from revealing its 
revenues and no reason is given for the non-disclosure (NA, 2012; Neumayer, 2002). 
This assertion is consistent with 80% of the respondents from the NEITI who 
disagreed with the statement.  
In addition, the disagreement indicated by the NEITI could be seen as being more 
appropriate because it is the body established by law to ensure transparency in the oil 
sector. As such, it is in a better position to provide an independent assessment on 
whether the PPPRA justifies the non-disclosure of confidential information. 
Therefore, this would suggest that the PPPRA does not justify the reasons for non-
disclosure of information.  
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6.4.3.3 Perceptions relating to the transparency practice of the Petroleum 
Equalisation Fund 
This section analyses the findings relating to the transparency practice of the PEF. 
Guided by the Public Interest Theory of regulation and the regulatory transparency as 
a principle of good regulatory governance practice, three statements were developed 
in order to seek the respondents’ views regarding transparency practice of the PEF.  
Table 6.22 shows the descriptive frequencies and percentages of respondent views 
relating to the PEF’s transparency practice: 102 responses were recorded for each of 
the three statements. 
Table 6.22: Descriptive frequencies of the respondents’ views relating to the 
Petroleum Equalisation Fund transparency practice 
 
Note: (a) M=Mean, Md=Median, SD=Strongly Disagree, D=Disagree, N=Neutral, A=Agree, SA=Strongly Agree, TR=Total 
Responses (b) Figures in brackets are percentages 
6.4.3.3.1 The Petroleum Equalisation Fund consults all legitimate stakeholders 
on major decisions relating to price equalisation 
This statement sought respondent views on whether the PEF consults all legitimate 
stakeholders on major decisions relating to price equalisation. Jalilian et al. (2007) 
emphasises the need for consultation which helps to determine a regulatory system 
that is transparent and predictable. The findings presented in Table 6.22 show that 
out of the 102 responses recorded, 47 respondents strongly agreed, 15 were neutral 
Statements M MD SD D N A SA TR 
a) The Petroleum Equalisation 
Fund consults all legitimate 
stakeholders on major decisions 
relating to price equalisation. 
 
3.13 
 
3.00 
 
11 
(10.8) 
 
29 
(28.4) 
 
15 
(14.7) 
 
30 
(29.4) 
 
17 
(16.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
b) The methods used in determining 
the actual cost of bridging the 
petroleum products by the 
Petroleum Equalisation Fund are 
transparent. 
 
3.23 
 
3.00 
 
7 
(6.9) 
 
24 
(23.5) 
 
28 
(27.5) 
 
25 
(24.5) 
 
18 
(17.6) 
 
102 
(100) 
c) When the Petroleum 
Equalisation Fund refrains from 
disclosing confidential 
information relating to its 
activities, the rationale for such 
non-disclosure is explained and 
justified. 
 
2.96 
 
3.00 
 
9 
(8.8) 
 
27 
(26.5) 
 
33 
(32.4) 
 
25 
(24.5) 
 
8 
(7.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
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and 40 strongly disagreed. Overall, the groups agreed, as revealed by the mean and 
median scores of 3.13 and 3.00 respectively. Hence, Mann-Whitney tests were run.  
Table 6.23: Mann-Whitney test relating to the Petroleum Equalisation Fund’s 
transparency practice 
Note: (a) D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA), 
P2=Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company (PPMC), N1 = Nigeria’s 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), M1= Major Oil Marketing 
Companies (MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade 
Union (TU) 
  (b) Only Mann-Whitney tests with p=values of equal to, or less than 0.05 (i.e. p<.05) are shown in the table  
The differences that existed between the respondent groups are shown in Table 6.23. 
As disclosed by the cross-tabulation tests, 53.9%, 90.9%, 46.2%, 80, 50% and 71.4% 
of the respondents from the DPR, PEF, PPMC, MOMC, IOMC, and CS respectively 
agreed with the statement. However, 70%, 88.9%, 36.4% and 70% of the 
respondents from the NEITI, NA and TU respectively disagreed with the statement 
that the PEF consults all legitimate stakeholders on major decisions relating to price 
equalisation.  
Since consultation is one of the components of transparency (Gilardi, 2005; Jacobs, 
2004), the disagreement voiced by the NEITI, NA and TU could be appropriate 
because the NEITI has the constitutional mandate to ensure that all oil and gas 
related matters in Nigeria are transparent, and the NA is the country’s highest 
legislative body and has the authority to ensure that all agencies conduct their duties 
transparently. Hence it can be argued that the PEF does not consult all legitimate 
stakeholders about major decisions relating to price equalisation. 
a) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund consults all legitimate stakeholders on major decisions relating 
to price equalisation. 
Groups P1 P3 D1 M1 I1 C1 T1 
P2 .001 .001 .001 .001 .007 .001 .001 
N2 .027 .005 .011 .004 .047 .028  
N1  .033 .047 .013    
b) The methods used in determining the actual cost of bridging the petroleum products by the 
Petroleum Equalisation Fund are transparent. 
Groups M1 I1 
N1 .009 .015 
c) When the Petroleum Equalisation Fund refrains from disclosing confidential information relating to 
its activities, the rationale for such non-disclosure is explained and justified. 
Groups P3 D1 N2 T1 
N1  .007  .002 
T1 .030  .038  
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6.4.3.3.2 The methods used in determining the actual cost of bridging the 
petroleum products by the Petroleum Equalisation Fund are transparent 
Table 6.22 shows the descriptive frequencies of the respondents. The mean of 3.23 
and the median of 3.00 indicate that the respondents tend towards agreeing with the 
statement. Out of the total responses recorded, 43 respondents strongly agreed, 28 
held neutral positions and 31 strongly disagreed. When respondent perceptions were 
subjected to the Mann-Whitney test, differences existed among groups, as presented 
in Table 6.23. The cross-tabulation test ascertained that 60% and 50% of the 
respondents from the MOMC, and IOMC overwhelmingly agreed. But in contrast, 
80% of the respondents from the NEITI disagreed, and as the organisation has the 
power to ascertain transparency practice in the country, and coupled with the fact 
that the price of petroleum products in other parts of the country differ because of the 
failure to ascertain the actual bridging costs, (Dolgin, 2009) it can be concluded that 
the methods used to determine the actual cost of bridging are not transparent.  
6.4.3.3.3 When the Petroleum Equalisation Fund refrains from disclosing 
confidential information relating to its activities, the rationale for such non-
disclosure is explained and justified 
When the above statement was tested using descriptive statistics, it was discovered 
that out of the 102 responses recorded, 33 respondents expressed a neutral position, 
36 strongly disagreed and 33 strongly agreed, as presented in Table 6.22. Overall the 
respondent groups were inclined towards disagreement, as indicated by the mean of 
2.96 and the median of 3.00. 
The results from the Mann-Whitney tests are presented in Table 6.23 and show the 
differences between the respondent groups. Cross tabulation tests reveal that 61.5% 
and 60% of the respondents from the DPR and TU were in agreement. On the other 
hand, 46.2%, 70% and 44.4% of the respondents from PPMC, NEITI and NA 
respectively disagreed. The position of the groups that disagreed could be accurate 
given that the primary responsibility of the NEITI is to ensure accountability and 
transparency in the oil sector; hence it should be better informed than the other 
groups. This would indicate that the PEF does not justify the rationale for non-
disclosure of confidential information relating to its activities. 
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In summary, the research sub-hypothesis HO3 is accepted in relation to DPR’s 
regulatory transparency. This is because the respondent replies to all five indicators 
tested confirmed that the actions in the statements are not practiced by the DPR. 
Consequently, a lack of transparency is one of the major impediments to attaining a 
good regulatory governance regime (Dublin-Green et al., 1998). Similarly, the 
research sub-hypothesis HO3 is accepted in relation to PPPRA. This is because the 
four methods used to measure the status of the PPPRA’s transparency practice 
indicated that openness, in relation to regulatory activities, is non-existent. The 
findings relating to PEF’s regulatory transparency are also accepted (the research 
sub-hypothesis HO3), because it was evident from the findings above that all three 
statement indicators used to ascertain the status of the PEF’s transparency practice 
were rejected by the respondents. 
Table 6.24 shows that DPR and NEITI significantly differed with other groups 27 
and 23 times respectively. Hence, the findings from respondents in relation to the 
transparency practice in the downstream petroleum sector indicate a level of non-
compliance among the regulators. In addition, the findings show that the legitimate 
stakeholders are only consulted on some issues that are of less concern, for example 
issues that have to do with revenue generation for the agencies. On the other hand, 
stakeholders are hardly consulted on critical issues that have to do with new 
regulation, for example if there is a change in the price of petroleum products. 
Furthermore, when the regulatory agencies refrain from disclosing confidential 
information they hardly ever justify the reason for the non-disclosure. In addition, the 
finding revealed an almost complete absence of due process in the award of import 
permits, payments of bridging and subsidy claims etc. Consequently, this negatively 
affects the regulatory governance practice of Nigeria’s downstream sector. The 
results further point out the need for adequate consultations, due process and 
openness in carrying out all regulatory activities by the regulatory authorities for the 
welfare of the general public.  
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Table 6.24: Summary of the number of differences between groups in relation to 
the Nigeria’s downstream regulatory transparency (this summarises table 6.19, 
6.21 and 6.23) 
Note: D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA), 
P2=Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company (PPMC), N1 = Nigeria’s Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), M1= Major Oil Marketing Companies (MOMC), I1= 
Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade Union (TU) 
  N/A:  Not Applicable  
6.4.4 Regulatory expertise 
As noted in Section 2.5.4, expertise is a fundamental aspect of regulatory governance 
framework. Therefore, this section analyses the last research hypothesis where 
respondents were asked to express their opinion regarding the regulatory expertise of 
Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies. 
HO4 – Lack of required expertise affects the regulatory governance practice of 
Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies 
To achieve good regulatory governance it is imperative that the regulators are highly 
trained in the field of regulation and governance (Duso and Röller, 2003) and have 
the expertise to formulate and implement a good regulatory governance system 
(Djankov, 2002). Hence hypothesis HO4 was tested in three different regulatory 
agencies (DPR, PPPRA and PEF) in order to ascertain the expertise of Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory agencies in relation to regulatory governance practice. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 Total  
D1 n/a 2 3 4 7 3 1 1 3 3 27 
P1 2 n/a 1 1 3 2 0 0 1 2 12 
P2 3 1 n/a 1 3 2 2 1 2 1 16 
P3 4 1 1 n/a 2 1 1 0 0 1 11 
N1 7 3 3 2 n/a 0 4 3 0 1 23 
N2 3 2 2 1 0 n/a 3 2 2 2 17 
M1 1 0 2 1 4 3 n/a 0 2 2 15 
I1 1 0 1 0 3 2 0 n/a 0 0 7 
C1 3 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 n/a 0 10 
T1 3 2 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 n/a 12 
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6.4.4.1 Perceptions relating regulatory governance expertise of the Department of 
Petroleum Resources 
Guided by Public Interest Theory of regulation and considering regulatory expertise 
as a regulatory governance mechanism, six statements were developed to ascertain 
respondent opinions on whether the DPR has substantive expertise in regulatory 
governance. Table 6.25 below shows the descriptive frequencies of the respondent 
views: 102 responses for each of the six statements were recorded. 
Table 6.25: Descriptive frequencies of the Department of Petroleum Resources’ 
expertise in regulatory governance  
 
Note: (a) M=Mean, Md=Median, SD=Strongly Disagree, D=Disagree, N=Neutral, A=Agree, SA=Strongly Agree, TR=Total 
Responses (b) Figures in brackets are percentages 
6.4.4.1.1 The Department of Petroleum Resources has the capacity to regulate 
the downstream petroleum sector 
The first statement sought respondent views on whether the DPR has the capacity to 
regulate the downstream petroleum sector. From Table 6.25 it can be seen that the 
overall mean and median of 3.20 and 3.50 indicate agreement. Out of the 102 
responses recorded, 51 respondents were strongly in agreement, 18 held a neutral 
Statements M MD SD D N A SA TR 
a) The Department of Petroleum Resources 
has the capacity to regulate the 
downstream petroleum sector. 
 
3.20 
 
3.50 
 
16 
(15.7) 
 
17 
(16.7) 
 
18 
(17.6) 
 
33 
(32.4) 
 
 
18 
(17.6 
 
102 
(100) 
b) The Department of Petroleum Resources 
deploys skilled personnel to conduct its 
downstream regulatory functions. 
 
3.54 
 
4.00 
 
3 
(2.9) 
 
18 
(17.6) 
 
21 
(20.6) 
 
41 
(40.2) 
 
19 
(18.6) 
 
102 
(100) 
c) Staff from the Department of Petroleum 
Resources receive necessary training to 
ensure the implementation of quality 
regulations in the downstream sector. 
 
3.39 
 
4.00 
 
3 
(2.9) 
 
25 
(24.5) 
 
19 
(18.6) 
 
39 
(38.2) 
 
16 
(15.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
d) The Department of Petroleum Resources 
is effective in putting in place a 
framework for good regulatory 
governance. 
 
3.37 
 
4.00 
 
6 
(5.9) 
 
18 
(17.6) 
 
24 
(23.5) 
 
40 
(39.5) 
 
14 
(13.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
e) The appointment of the executive 
management of the Department of 
Petroleum Resources is primarily based 
on merit. 
 
3.16 
 
3.00 
 
10 
(9.8) 
 
25 
(25.5) 
 
26 
(25.5) 
 
21 
(20.6) 
 
20 
(19.6) 
 
102 
(100) 
f) The personnel of the Department of 
Petroleum Resources discharge their 
regulatory duties in a professional 
manner. 
 
3.35 
 
4.00 
 
6 
(5.9) 
 
24 
(23.5) 
 
17 
(16.7) 
 
38 
(37.3) 
 
17 
(16.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
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view and 33 strongly disagreed. Mann-Whitney tests were run to ascertain whether 
there were any differences between the respondent groups. 
Table 6.26: Mann-Whitney test relating to the Department of Petroleum 
Resources’ regulatory governance expertise 
 
Note: (a) D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA), 
P2=Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company (PPMC), N1 = Nigeria’s 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), M1= Major Oil Marketing 
Companies (MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade 
Union (TU) 
  (b) Only Mann-Whitney tests with p=values of equal to, or less than 0.05 (i.e. p<.05) are shown in the table  
A number of dissimilarities were apparent among the groups in relation to the 
question of whether the DPR has the capacity to regulate the downstream petroleum 
sector (see Table 6.26). The cross-tabulation test reveals that the NEITI was 
indecisive with 50% equally agreeing and disagreeing. The respondents from the 
PPPRA, NA and TU disagreed with 54.4%, 66.7% and 60% respectively. One 
possible reason for these results could be the assertion that the DPR has not 
a) The Department of Petroleum Resources has the capacity to regulate the downstream petroleum 
sector. 
Groups P1 N2 N1 T1 
M1 .004 .022 .037 .005 
P3 .008 .037  .012 
I1 .016 .040  .020 
b) The Department of Petroleum Resources deploys skilled personnel to conduct its downstream 
regulatory functions. 
Groups P1 P2 N1 C1 
D1 .000 .005 .000 .015 
M1 .008  .010  
I1 .033  .032  
P3 .024  .027  
c) Staff from the Department of Petroleum Resources receive the necessary training to ensure the 
implementation of quality regulations in the downstream sector. 
Groups D1 P2 P3 M1 
T1 .002 .001 .012 .005 
d) The Department of Petroleum Resources is effective in establishing a framework for good regulatory 
governance. 
Groups N1 T1 
I1  .001 
M1 .024 .031 
e) The appointment of the executive management of the Department of Petroleum Resources is 
primarily based on merit. 
Groups P1 N1 C1 T1 
P2 .025 .027 .009 .006 
M1 .034  .046 .028 
f) The personnel of the Department of Petroleum Resources discharge their regulatory duties in a 
professional manner. 
NIL 
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demonstrated enough ability to showcase its capacity to regulate the sector (NA, 
2012). 
In contrast, 84.6%, 80% and 75% of the respondents from the PPMC, MOMC and 
IOMC respectively agreed that the DPR has the capacity to regulate the downstream 
petroleum sector. The agreements could be appropriate given that the MOMC and 
IOMC, as regulated companies in the sector, are in a better position than any other 
group to determine whether the DPR has the capacity to regulate the sector. 
Similarly, the PPMC’s opinion might be well-informed because it works hand in 
hand with the DPR – while the PPMC is in charge of marketing and distribution, the 
DPR monitors the distribution, quality and quantity of petroleum products. 
Therefore, this indicates that the DPR may have the capacity to regulate the sector.  
6.4.4.1.2 The Department of Petroleum Resources deploys skilled personnel to 
conduct its downstream regulatory functions 
Respondent perceptions were tested in relation to the above statement. From Table 
6.25 it can be seen that the descriptive statistics test reveal that overall the respondent 
groups agreed, as indicated by the mean and median scores of 3.54 and 4.00 
respectively. Out of the 102 respondents, 60 strongly agreed with the statement, 21 
strongly disagreed and 21 were neutral.  
The Mann-Whitney test results, presented in Table 6.26, illustrate the differences 
between the groups. Of the respondents from the PPPRA and NEITI, 45.5% and 50% 
respectively disagreed, according to the cross-tabulation test. In contrast, 100%, 
81.8%, 81.9%, 80%, 65.5% and 42.9% of the DPR, PEF, PPMC, MOMC, IOMC and 
CS respondents respectively overwhelmingly agreed that the DPR deploys skilled 
personnel to conduct its downstream regulatory functions. The position of these 
respondent groups might be true given that two of the six are regulatory agencies 
(DPR and PEF) and two are regulated companies (MOMC, IOMC). Thus they are 
possibly in a better position to answer this question than the other groups. This would 
imply that the DPR deploys skilled personnel to conduct its downstream regulatory 
functions. 
175 
 
6.4.4.1.3 Staff from the Department of Petroleum Resources receive the 
necessary training to ensure the implementation of quality regulations in the 
downstream sector 
Table 6.25 displays the descriptive statistics of the perceptions of respondents in 
relation to the above statement. Out of the 102 responses recorded, 55 strongly 
agreed, 28 were strongly in disagreement and 19 took a neutral position. Overall, the 
respondent groups agreed, as shown by the mean of 3.39 and the median of 4.00.  
Table 6.26 reveals a number of differences between the respondent groups which 
were uncovered by the Mann-Whitney test. The cross-tabulation test showed that 
80% of the TU respondents disagreed with the statement. In contrast, 92.3%, 90.9%, 
69.3% and 90% of the DPR, PEF, PPMC and MOMC respondents respectively 
agreed that staff from the DPR do receive the necessary training to ensure the 
implementation of quality regulations in the downstream sector. Moreover, these 
groups are more likely to be better informed on this subject than any of the other 
groups, because the staff from the DPR, PEF, PPMC and MOMC work closely with 
one another. As such, it is concluded that the DPR staff do receive the required 
training. 
6.4.4.1.4 The Department of Petroleum Resources is effective in establishing a 
framework for good regulatory governance 
An effective regulation helps to achieve the social welfare objectives set out by the 
government through regulatory authority (Djankov, 2003). Hence respondent 
opinions were tested in relation to the above statement. The descriptive statistics in 
Table 6.25 show that out of the 102 recorded responses, 53.2% of the respondents 
strongly agreed, 23.5% took a neutral position and 23.5% strongly disagreed with the 
statement. Overall, the respondent groups agreed, with a mean of 3.37 and median of 
4.00 respectively. Mann-Whitney tests were run to determine whether differences 
exist between the respondent groups. 
Table 6.26 shows the differences between the respondent groups. From the cross-
tabulation tests it is clear that 80% and 50% of the MOMC and IOMC respondents 
overwhelmingly agreed that the DPR is effective in establishing a framework for 
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good regulatory governance. In contrast, 60% and 50% of the NEITI and TU 
respondents disagreed. This negative position could be true because it is consistent 
the assertion made by Nwokeji (2007) that the DPR lacks the autonomy to 
effectively set and establish a framework for good regulatory governance. Based on 
this evidence, it can be said that the process used by the DPR to establish a 
framework for good regulatory governance by DPR is ineffective.  
6.4.4.1.5 The appointment of the executive management of the Department of 
Petroleum Resources is primary based on merit 
According to Levy, and Spiller (1996), to ensure good regulatory governance the 
executive head of regulatory agencies must be a trusted expert who will use 
professional judgment to decide what should be done. Respondent perceptions of this 
issue were analysed. The descriptive statistics in Table 6.25 disclose that out of the 
102 respondents, 41 strongly agreed with the statement, 35 strongly disagreed and 26 
held a neutral position. Overall, the groups tended towards agreement, as shown by 
the mean and the median scores of 3.16 and 3.00 respectively.  
From Table 6.26, it can be seen that the opinion voiced by the PEF respondents 
differs from that of the PPPRA, NETIT, CS and TU. Similarly, the views of the 
MOMC respondents varies from those of the PPPRA, CS and TU. The cross-
tabulation tests show that 54.5% and 70% of the PEF and MOMC respondents were 
in agreement, while 72.7% of the PPPRA respondents were neutral. In contrast, 60%, 
71.4% and 50% of NEITI, CS and TU respondents disagreed with the statement that 
the appointment of the DPR’s executive management is based primarily on merit. 
This disagreement is consistent with the assertion that the appointments to head any 
agency in Nigeria are not based on merit (Vanguard, 2005). Therefore, the 
appointment of the DPR’s executive management cannot be said to be based 
primarily on merit. 
6.4.4.1.6 The personnel of the Department of Petroleum Resources discharge 
their regulatory duties in a professional manner 
The integrity of the regulatory agency staff is very important because compromising 
their interests through bribery or threats would mean that the overall effectiveness 
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and credibility of the regulatory institution would suffer (Levine et al., 2005). The 
descriptive statistics tests are presented in Table 6.25. Out of the 102 responses 
recorded, 55 of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement, 17 were neutral 
and 30 strongly disagreed. The Mann-Whitney tests revealed no differences in the 
way the respondents answered the question. 
Although it has been alleged that DPR staff were involved in bribery scandals in the 
downstream sector (Subsidy Probe Report, 2012), the majority of the respondents 
were in agreement with the statement, as indicated by the overall mean of 3.35 and 
median of 4.00. Thus, and given that 56% of the total respondents agreed, it can be 
concluded that the DPR’s personnel discharge their regulatory duties in a 
professional manner.  
6.4.4.2 Perceptions relating to the regulatory governance expertise of the 
Petroleum Product Pricing Regulatory Agency 
A lack of expertise and necessary skills prevent many regulatory agencies from 
achieving good regulatory objectives (Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2007). In line with the 
Public Interest Theory of regulation, six statements developed to help to ascertain 
whether the PPPRA has the required expertise to regulate the pricing of petroleum 
products in the downstream petroleum sector. The descriptive frequencies and the 
percentages of the respondents’ views are presented in Table 6.27. For each of the 
six statements 102 responses were recorded.  
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Table 6.27: Descriptive frequencies and the percentages the Petroleum Product 
Pricing Regulatory Agency regulatory expertise 
 
Note: (a) M=Mean, Md=Median, SD=Strongly Disagree, D=Disagree, N=Neutral, A=Agree, SA=Strongly Agree, TR=Total 
Responses (b) Figures in brackets are percentages 
6.4.4.2.1 The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency has the capacity to 
regulate the pricing of petroleum products 
Table 6.27 above shows the descriptive frequencies of the respondents in relation to 
the above assertion. Out of the 102 responses recorded, 56 respondents strongly 
agreed, 32 strongly disagreed and 14 were neutral. No differences were detected 
when Mann-Whitney tests were run. 
 
 
Statements M MD SD D N A SA TR 
a) The Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency has the 
capacity to regulate the pricing of 
petroleum products. 
 
3.33 
 
4.00 
 
11 
(10.8) 
 
21 
(20.6) 
 
14 
(13.7) 
 
35 
(34.3) 
 
21 
(20.6) 
 
102 
(100) 
b) The Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency deploys 
skilled personnel to conduct its 
regulatory functions relating to 
the pricing of petroleum 
products. 
 
3.54 
 
4.00 
 
3 
(2.9) 
 
14 
(13.7) 
 
23 
(22.5) 
 
49 
(48.0) 
 
13 
(12.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
c) Staff from the Petroleum 
Products Pricing Regulatory 
Agency receive the necessary 
training to ensure the 
implementation of high quality 
regulations relating to the pricing 
of petroleum products. 
 
3.39 
 
4.00 
 
3 
(2.9) 
 
18 
(17.6) 
 
26 
(25.5) 
 
46 
(45.1) 
 
9 
(8.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
d) The Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency is effective in 
establishing a framework for 
good regulatory governance. 
 
3.16 
 
3.00 
 
7 
(6.9) 
 
22 
(21.6) 
 
29 
(28.4) 
 
36 
(35.3) 
 
8 
(7.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
e) The appointment of executive 
management of the Petroleum 
Products Pricing Regulatory 
Agency is primarily based on 
merit. 
 
3.14 
 
3.00 
 
11 
(10.8) 
 
23 
(22.5) 
 
24 
(23.5) 
 
29 
(28.4) 
 
15 
(14.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
f) The personnel of the Petroleum 
Products Pricing Regulatory 
Agency discharge their 
regulatory duties in a 
professional manner. 
 
3.35 
 
3.00 
 
4 
(3.9) 
 
24 
(23.5) 
 
24 
(23.5) 
 
32 
(31.4) 
 
18 
(17.6) 
 
102 
(100) 
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Table 6.28: Mann-Whitney test relating to the Petroleum Product Pricing 
Regulatory expertise 
  
Note: (a) D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA), 
P2=Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company (PPMC), N1 = Nigeria’s 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), M1= Major Oil Marketing 
Companies (MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade 
Union (TU) 
  (b) Only Mann-Whitney tests with p=values of equal to, or less than 0.05 (i.e. p<.05) are shown in the table  
As shown in Table 6.28, no differences were found to exist between the respondent 
groups. Nevertheless, there has been an insinuation that over the years the PPPRA 
has failed to ensure the availability of petroleum products in the country and price 
stability (Iwayemi, 2008). However, the overall mean score of 3.33 and the median 
of 4.00 indicate that the respondent groups agree that the PPPRA has the capacity to 
regulate the pricing of petroleum products. It is also evident from Table 6.24 that 
54.9% of the total respondents are in agreement; only 31.4% disagreed and 13.7% 
were indecisive. Therefore this would indicate that the PPPRA has the capacity to 
regulate the pricing of petroleum products. 
a) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency has the capacity to regulate the pricing of 
petroleum products. 
NIL 
b) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency deploys skilled personnel to conduct its 
regulatory functions relating to the pricing of petroleum products. 
NIL 
c) Staff from the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency receive the necessary training to 
ensure the implementation of high quality regulations relating to the pricing of petroleum products. 
Groups N1 P3 C1 
D1 .002 .003 .009 
P1 .004 .005 .014 
P2 .001 .001 .005 
M1 .007 .013 .024 
d) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency is effective in establishing a framework for 
good regulatory governance. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 N2 I1 T1 
N1 .001 .004 .011 .018 .017 .006 
P3 .026 .037 .018 .026   
e) The appointment of the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency’s executive management is 
based primarily on merit. 
Groups D1 P1 C1 M1 P2 
N1 .005 .023 .002 .046 .000 
N2 .027  .021  .000 
P3 .019  .029  .000 
f) The personnel of the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency discharge their regulatory 
duties in a professional manner. 
NIL 
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6.4.4.2.2 The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency deploys skilled 
personnel to conduct its regulatory functions relating to the pricing of 
petroleum products 
Baldwin et al. (2012) posited that skilled personnel contribute towards achieving 
good regulatory objectives. Hence the above statement is relevant to this study. As 
seen in Table 6.27, on average the mean and median scores of 3.54 and 4.00 suggest 
that the respondent groups are in agreement with the statement. In addition, out of 
the 102 responses recorded, 62 were strongly in agreement, 23 were neutral and only 
17 strongly disagreed. When the Mann-Whitney test was conducted no significant 
differences were discovered among the groups. 
However, in spite of the findings described in the NA’s subsidy report that the 
PPPRA lacks qualified personnel to carry out regulatory duties, the majority of 
respondents agreed with the statement. As revealed by the descriptive statistic test, 
60.7% of the respondents maintained an agreed position and only 16.6% disagreed 
with the statement. Based on this, it can be argued that the PPPRA does deploy 
skilled personnel to conduct its regulatory functions relating to the pricing of 
petroleum products. 
6.4.4.2.3 Staff from the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency receives 
the necessary training to ensure the implementation of high quality regulations 
relating to the pricing of petroleum products 
In this section, respondent views were analysed on whether staff from the PPPRA 
receive the necessary training to fulfill their duties. The descriptive statistics 
presented in Table 6.27 show that of the 102 responses recorded, 55 respondents 
strongly agreed with the statement, 21 strongly disagreed and 26 took a neutral 
position. On average, the mean and median scores are 3.29 and 4.00, which indicate 
the respondents’ agreement to the statement.  
The Mann-Whitney tests run highlighted differences among the respondent groups, 
as presented in Table 6.28. The cross-tabulation test revealed that 50% and 57.1% of 
NEITI and CS respondents respectively disagreed. In contrast, respondents from the 
DPR, PPPRA, PEF, MOMC and IOMC overwhelmingly agreed with 81.9%, 81.9%, 
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90.9%, 80% and 50% respectively. Their position might be valid given that three of 
the groups (the DPR, PPPRA and PEF) are regulatory agencies, responsible for the 
training of their personnel, while one group (the MOMC), as a regulated entity, could 
have first-hand knowledge on whether or not the PPPRA staff receive necessary 
training. Hence it can be said that the PPPRA staff receive the necessary training. 
6.4.4.2.4 The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency is effective in 
putting in place a framework for good regulatory governance 
The effectiveness of any regulatory agency in implementing a framework of 
regulatory governance determines the quality of the regulatory governance regime 
(Shleifer, 2005). This informed the decision to include the above statement. The 
findings from the descriptive statistics show that of the 102 responses recorded, 44 
respondents strongly agreed with the statement, 29 strongly disagreed and another 29 
took a neutral position (Table 6.27). In general, the respondents were neutral, as 
indicated by the mean and median scores of 3.16 and 3.00 respectively.  
In addition, Mann-Whitney test results disclosed that perceptions of the NEITI 
respondents differ from those of six groups: the DPR, PPPRA, PEF, NA, IOMC and 
TU (see Table 6.28). Likewise, the PPMC’s perception varied from that of the DPR, 
PPPRA and NA. Also the cross-tabulation tests show that 76.9%, 72.7%, 54.5% and 
50% of the respondents from the DPR, PPPRA, PEF and IOMC respectively agreed. 
In contrast, 60% and 46.2% of the respondents from TU and PPMC were neutral, 
whilst 80% and 44.4% of respondents from the NEITI and NA disagreed that the 
PPPRA is effective in implementing a framework for good regulatory governance.  
The NA has the power to independently assess the effectiveness of the PPPRA in 
establishing a framework of good regulatory governance. Hence, the disagreements 
voiced are perceived to be more appropriate and are consistent with the assertion 
made by Ehinomen and Adeleke (2012) that the PPPRA is ineffective in establishing 
a framework for good regulatory governance. 
182 
 
6.4.4.2.5 The appointment of the executive management of the Petroleum 
Products Pricing Regulatory Agency is primarily based on merit 
The views of the respondents were sought in relation to whether the appointment of 
the executive management of the PPPRA was primarily based on merit. Table 6.27 
shows that out of the 102 responses, 44 strongly agreed with the statement, 34 
strongly disagreed and 24 held a neutral position. Overall, the groups tended towards 
a neutral perception, as revealed by the mean and median scores of 3.14 and 3.00 
respectively. The Mann-Whitney table indicates the differences between the 
respondent groups and the cross-tabulation test shows that 69.3%, 90.9%, 50% and 
71.4% of respondents from the DPR, PEF, MOMC and CS respectively are in 
agreement that the appointment of the executive management of the PPPRA is based 
primarily on merit. The respondents from the PPPRA were neutral with 45.5%.  
In contrast, 53.9%, 80% and 55.5% of the PPMC, NEITI and NA respondents 
disagreed with the statement. Given that the respondents from the PPPRA are 
indecisive, the perception of the NA could be more appropriate because it has the 
constitutional power to screen appointments to the PPPRA executive management. 
Therefore it can be argued that appointments are not based on merit. Indeed, this is 
similar to the assertion that most appointments to head an agency are politically 
motivated (Nuhu-Koko, 2008).  
6.4.4.2.6 The personnel of the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency 
discharge their regulatory duties in a professional manner 
Table 6.27 presents the findings from the descriptive statistics in relation to whether 
the personnel of the PPPRA discharge their regulatory duties in a professional 
manner. The results show that, overall, the respondent groups agreed, as indicated by 
the mean and median of 3.35 and 3.00 respectively. Nevertheless, out of the 102 
responses recorded, 50 respondents strongly agreed, 28 strongly disagreed and 24 
were neutral. The Mann-Whitney tests did not detect any differences in how the 
groups perceived the statement. 
Despite the assertion that staff from the PPPRA do not discharge their duties in a 
professional manner (Subsidy Report, 2012), 49% of the respondents agreed, only 
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27.4% disagreed while 23.5% were indecisive. This implies that the staff from the 
PPPRA do not conduct their regulatory responsibilities in a professional manner. 
6.4.4.3 Perceptions relating to the regulatory governance expertise of the 
Petroleum Equalisation Fund 
The research sub-hypothesis HO4 was developed and then used to test the PEF’s 
expertise in regulatory governance. As guided by the regulatory governance 
framework and Public Interest Theory of regulation, respondents were asked their 
opinions on six statements in relation to the regulatory expertise of the PEF. Table 
6.29 shows the descriptive frequencies of the respondent views. There were 102 
responses recorded for each of the six statements.  
Table 6.29: Descriptive frequencies and percentages of the Petroleum 
Equalisation Fund’s regulatory governance expertise  
. 
Statements M MD SD D N A SA TR 
a) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund 
has the capacity to regulate 
bridging activities in accordance 
with its mandate. 
 
3.25 
 
3.50 
 
8 
(7.8) 
 
24 
(23.5) 
 
19 
(18.6) 
 
36 
(35.3) 
 
15 
(14.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
b) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund 
deploys the necessary personnel 
to conduct its regulatory 
functions relating to the 
downstream petroleum sector. 
 
3.33 
 
3.00 
 
 
5 
(4.9) 
 
17 
(16.7) 
 
30 
(29.4) 
 
39 
(38.2) 
 
11 
(10.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
c) Staff from the Petroleum 
Equalisation Fund receive the 
necessary training to ensure the 
implementation of high quality 
regulations relating to its 
mandate. 
 
3.30 
 
3.50 
 
3 
(2.9) 
 
25 
(24.5) 
 
23 
(22.5) 
 
40 
(39.2) 
 
11 
(10.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
d) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund 
is effective in putting in place a 
framework for good regulatory 
governance in accordance with 
its mandate. 
 
3.23 
 
3.00 
 
5 
(4.9) 
 
30 
(29.4) 
 
17 
(16.7) 
 
37 
(36.3) 
 
13 
(12.7) 
 
102 
(100) 
e) The appointment of executive 
management of the Petroleum 
Equalisation Fund is primarily 
based on merit. 
 
2.99 
 
3.00 
 
13 
(12.7) 
 
28 
(27.5) 
 
20 
(19.6) 
 
29 
(28.4) 
 
12 
(11.8) 
 
102 
(100) 
f) The personnel of the Petroleum 
Equalisation Fund discharge their 
regulatory duties in a 
professional manner. 
 
3.35 
 
3.00 
 
4 
(3.9) 
 
24 
(23.5) 
 
26 
(25.5) 
 
28 
(27.5) 
 
20 
(19.6) 
 
102 
(100) 
 
Note: (a) M=Mean, Md=Median, SD=Strongly Disagree, D=Disagree, N=Neutral, A=Agree, SA=Strongly Agree, TR=Total 
Responses (b) Figures in brackets are percentages 
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6.4.4.3.1 The Petroleum Equalisation Fund has the capacity to regulate bridging 
activities in accordance with its mandate 
This section analyses respondent views on whether the PEF has the capacity to 
regulate bridging activities in accordance with its mandate. The descriptive statistics 
show that out of the 102 responses recorded, 51 respondents were strongly in 
agreement, 19 held a neutral view and 32 strongly disagreed. The mean and median 
scores of 3.25 and 3.50 indicate that the respondents are in agreement. Mann-
Whitney tests were run to ascertain if significant differences existed among the 
respondent groups. 
Table 6.30: Mann-Whitney test relating to the Petroleum Equalisation Fund 
regulatory governance expertise 
 
Note: (a) D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA), 
P2=Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company (PPMC), N1 = Nigeria’s 
a) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund has the capacity to regulate bridging activities in accordance 
with its mandate. 
Groups D1 P1 N1 N2 T1 C1 P3 
P2 .033 .020 .011 .004 .001 .006 .040 
I1  .048 .032 .018 .009 .030  
M1   .032 .008    
b) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund deploys the necessary personnel to conduct its regulatory 
functions relating to the downstream petroleum sector. 
Groups D1 I1 P3 N1 N2 C1 T1 P1 
P2 .007 .005 .001 .000 .002 002 .001 .001 
M1    .021    .048 
c) Staff from the Petroleum Equalisation Fund receive the necessary training to ensure the 
implementation of high quality regulations relating to its mandate. 
Groups P3 I1 C1 T1 
P2 .009 .027 .003 .010 
M1   .014  
d) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund is effective in putting in place a framework for good regulatory 
governance in accordance with its mandate. 
Groups C1 T1 
M1 .003 .001 
I1 .006 .012 
e) The appointment of executive management of the Petroleum Equalisation Fund is based primarily 
on merit. 
Groups P3 N1 I1 C1 T1 
P2 .001 .023 .002 .003 .003 
f) The personnel of the Petroleum Equalisation Fund discharge their regulatory duties in a 
professional manner. 
Groups P2 P3 N1 C1 T1 
P1 .004    .008 
D1 .009 .017 .022 .045 .005 
M1 .020 .022 .036 .049 .005 
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Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), M1= Major Oil Marketing 
Companies (MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade Union 
(TU)   (b) Only Mann-Whitney tests with p=values of equal to, or less than 0.05 (i.e. p<.05) are shown in the table.  
Table 6.30 illustrates the differences between the respondent groups. Of the NEITI 
respondents, 40% were neutral and the remaining 60% were equally divided between 
agreement and disagreement (30% each). In contrast, 55.5%, 71.4% and 70% of the 
NA, CS and TU respondents disagreed that the PEF has the capacity to regulate 
bridging activities in accordance with its mandate. In addition, the disagreed 
perception is in line with the assertion that most consumers, in other parts of the 
country, are forced to buy petroleum products above the official price
 
.
23
  
On the other hand, 69.2%, 54.5%, 72.9%, 53.9%, 70% and 75% of respondents from 
the DPR, PPPRA, PEF, PPMC, MOMC and IOMC respectively are in agreement. 
This agreement could be appropriate because the DPR, PPPRA and PEF, as 
regulators, are in the best position to determine the regulatory capacity of the PEF 
than any other group. Similarly, the PPMC, MOMC and IOMC, as marketing and 
regulated companies with a direct working relationship with the PEF, might be in a 
better position to ascertain its capacity. This signifies that the PEF has the capacity to 
carry out its regulatory duties. 
6.4.4.3.2 The Petroleum Equalisation Fund deploys the necessary personnel to 
conduct its regulatory functions relating to the downstream petroleum sector 
The perceptions of respondents were sought and tested in relation to the above 
assumption. As presented in Table 6.29, the descriptive statistics test show that the 
overall mean and median (3.33 and 3.00) tend to indicate agreement. However, of the 
102 responses recorded, the majority of 50 respondents agreed with the statement, 30 
took a neutral position, while 22 disagreed. 
According to the Mann-Whitney test results presented in Table 6.30, it is clear that a 
number of differences exist between the respondent groups. The cross-tabulation 
reveals that 45.5%, 50%, 42.9% and 50% of the respondents from the PPPRA, 
                                       
23
 Most consumers have never obtained fuel at the price specified by the government. At the best of 
times only consumers around Lagos have managed to obtain fuel at the official price (Arowolo, 2012).  
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NEITI, CS and TU respectively held a neutral position. By contrast, 69.2%, 90.9%, 
80% 50% and 44.4% of the DPR, PEF, MOMC, IOMC and NA respondents 
respectively were in agreement. The agreement could be correct, given that the DPR 
and PEF are regulating bodies and the MOMC and IOMC are regulated firms; hence, 
they are more likely to be better informed than the other groups. This is consistent 
with the belief that the problem with the downstream sector has nothing to do with 
the deployment of personnel (Nuhu-Koko, 2008). Therefore this denotes that the PEF 
does deploy the necessary personnel.  
6.4.4.3.3 Staff from the Petroleum Equalisation Fund receive the necessary 
training to enable them to set high quality regulations relating to its mandate 
Training of regulatory agencies personnel increases the possibility of a good 
regulatory governance regime (Zhang, 2010). This justified the importance of asking 
for the respondents’ perceptions on the statement above. Table 6.29 provides the 
descriptive statistics of the respondents. Overall, the groups’ mean and median scores 
of 3.30 and 3.50 suggest agreement. Out of the 102 responses recorded, 51 were 
strongly in agreement with the statement, 28 strongly disagreed and 23 were neutral. 
Table 6.30 presents the differences between the respondent groups. 
As a result of the cross-tabulation tests, it is evident that 57.2% and 83.5% of the 
respondents of CS and PPMC are in disagreement. In contrast, 91%, 70%, 62.5% and 
50% of PEF, MOMC, IOMC and TU respondents agreed that staff from the PEF 
receive the necessary training to enable them to set high quality regulations relating 
to its mandate. The agreed perception could be correct, given that the PEF is a 
regulating agency responsible for the training of its personnel and is in the best 
position to be well informed. Similarly, the MOMC and IOMC, which interact with 
PEF personnel in the course of their business, should be better placed than other 
groups to determine whether or not the PEF staff are highly trained. Hence it can be 
argued that the PEF staff do receive the necessary training. 
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6.4.4.3.4 The Petroleum Equalisation Fund is effective in establishing a 
framework for good regulatory governance in accordance with its mandate 
The reason for asking the above statement is because good regulatory governance 
framework is considered to be the foundation for attaining regulatory objectives 
(Zhang et el., 2005). From Table 6.29 it can be seen that the descriptive statistics 
show that out of the 102 recorded responses, 50 respondents strongly agreed, 17 were 
neutral and 35 strongly disagreed. The mean score of 3.23 indicates that overall the 
respondents are inclined to agree, while the median score of 3.00 suggests that the 
respondents’ perception is neutral. To ascertain the actual differences between the 
respondent groups, Mann-Whitney tests were carried out and the results can be seen 
in Table 6.30. 
The cross-tabulation test reveals that 57.20% and 60% from the respondents of the 
CS and TU respectively disagreed that the PEF is effective in establishing a 
framework for good regulatory governance in accordance with its mandate. The 
disagreement is in line with the assertion that the PEF is ineffective in setting a price 
equalisation framework (Arowolo, 2012)
24
. On the other hand, 50% of respondents 
from both the MOMC and IOMC agreed with the statement. The MOMC and IOMC, 
as regulated companies, are in a better position than any other group to understand 
whether or not the PEF’s regulatory frameworks are effective; hence, it can be said 
that the PEF is effective in establishing a framework for good regulatory governance 
in accordance with its mandate. 
6.4.4.3.5 The appointment of executive management of the Petroleum 
Equalisation Fund is based primarily on merit 
Experience and integrity of the executive management are prerequisites for the 
success of a regulatory governance regime (Zhang and Thomas, 2009). Therefore it 
is essential to seek and analyse respondent perceptions regarding the above 
                                       
24
 All these agencies were set up to make fuel available and affordable to the citizens of this oil-rich 
nation, but have ended up fueling poverty and compounding the crisis of doing business in the 
country. The poor have always been told that a litre of kerosene should sell at a subsidized price of 
N50. But the product is never available for anything less than double the official price. Of what use to 
the ordinary Nigerian is the official pricing system? Of what use are these fuel agencies to the 
ordinary consumer? (Arowolo, 2012). 
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statement. Table 6.29 presents the descriptive statistics of the respondents. Out of the 
102 recorded responses, 41 strongly agreed with the statement, 20 were neutral and 
41 strongly disagreed. The mean and median of 2.99 and 3.00 indicate that the 
respondent groups tend towards neutral.  
According to the Mann-Whitney tests, differences were discovered among the 
respondent groups as shown in Table 6.30. The cross-tabulation revealed that 91% of 
the PEF respondents agreed. One possible reason for this result could be that PEF has 
to agree that the appointment of executive management is based primarily on merit. 
In contrast, 69.3%, 60%, 50%, 57.2% and 50% of respondents of the PPMC, NEITI, 
IOMC, CS and TU respectively disagreed that the appointment of the PEF’s 
executive management is primarily based on merit. These groups could be correct, 
considering the assertion that all appointments to head regulatory agencies in Nigeria 
are politically motivated (Vanguard, 2005). Hence it is appropriate to argue that the 
appointment of the PEF’s executive management is not based on merit. 
6.4.4.3.6 The personnel of the Petroleum Equalisation Fund discharge their 
regulatory duties in a professional manner 
Professionalism is vital in regulatory governance so as to ensure consistency and 
reliability (World Bank, 2003). Therefore respondent views were sought in relation 
to the statement above. From Table 6.29 it can be seen that the overall mean and 
median scores of 3.35 and 3.00 indicate that the respondent groups were in 
agreement. Out of the 102 recorded responses, 48 strongly agreed with the statement, 
26 were neutral and 28 strongly disagreed. Mann-Whitney tests were run to ascertain 
if differences existed among the respondent groups. The resulting differences 
discovered are set out in Table 6.30.  
The cross-tabulation shows that 76.9%, 90.9%, and 60% of the DPR, PEF and 
MOMC respondents, respectively, agreed that the PEF’s personnel discharge their 
regulatory duties in a professional manner. Both regulatory bodies (the DPR and the 
PEF) and regulated companies (the MOMC) were indicted for conspiring to defraud 
the sector (Soreide, 2011). Hence one possible reason why they agreed to the 
statement may have been to rebuff the allegation.  
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On the other hand, the PPPRA and IOMC respondents were indecisive; the rationale 
for this result may be that they had been accused of colluding with regulated 
companies to perpetrate frauds in the sector (Petroleum Task Force Report, 2012). 
Similarly, respondents from the TU were indecisive, which could be due to the fact 
that they make up some of the PEF staff, and therefore they may have decided not to 
disclose negative practices. In contrast, 46.2%, 50% and 57.1% of the PPPMC, 
NEITI and CS respectively disagreed. The disagreement is synonymous with the 
allegation that staff from downstream regulatory agencies are corrupt and collude 
with other government officials and oil-marketers in fraudulent activities in the 
sector.
25
  Consequently, it is obvious that PEF personnel do not discharge their duties 
professionally. 
In summary, the overall findings show that the DPR have the required expertise in 
regulatory governance. Moreover, the indicators indicate that DPR personnel receive 
the necessary training, discharge their duties in a professional manner, deploy skilled 
personnel and may have the capacity to regulate the sector. Hence the research sub-
hypothesis HO4 is rejected in this regard. The research sub-hypothesis HO4 is 
rejected in relation PPPRA’s regulatory expertise. This is because the findings 
showed that four out of six practices analysed in this chapter are carried out by the 
PPPRA. Hence, the PPPRA has some level of regulatory expertise. The findings in 
relation to the PEF’s regulatory expertise indicate that the respondents agreed with 
four out of six statements. Hence, the research sub-hypothesis HO4 which states that: 
HO4- Lack of required expertise affects the regulatory governance practice of the 
Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies, is rejected. 
From Table 6.31 it can be seen that the PEF recorded a total of 40 significant 
differences, while NEITI and MOMC differed significantly with other respondents 
groups 30 and 28 times respectively. The results in relation to regulatory expertise 
disclosed that the regulators in Nigeria’s downstream sector have the required 
knowledge to regulate the sector. But other results indicate that the appointment to 
head the agencies are politically motivated, which is a threat to the good regulatory 
governance practice. Similarly, the investigation revealed that the personnel from the 
                                       
25 An investigation found out that the oil subsidy fraud was perpetrated by regulatory agencies, 
marketing companies and public officers in the industry (National Assembly Subsidy Report, 2012). 
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regulatory agencies frequently attend required regulatory training. Moreover, the 
overall findings in this regard showed that the regulatory agencies have the capacity 
to regulate the activities in the downstream petroleum sector, but at the same time 
stressed the need for enhancement of the system with new technology for easier 
monitoring.  
Table 6.31: Summary of the number of differences between groups in relation to 
the Nigeria’s downstream regulatory expertise (this summarises table 6.26, 6.28 
and 6.30) 
 
Note: D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA), 
P2=Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company (PPMC), N1 = Nigeria’s Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), M1= Major Oil Marketing Companies (MOMC), I1= 
Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade Union (TU) 
 N/A:  Not Applicable  
 
6.6 Interim conclusion  
In this chapter the findings of the questionnaire survey administered to the 
stakeholders of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector were presented and analysed 
accordingly. The main purpose of the chapter was to assess the status of current 
regulatory governance practices in Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector with the 
aim of providing recommendations for enhancement. The results reveal that 
regulatory agencies do have the required expertise to regulate the sector. In addition, 
they do have the ability to recruit, deploy, promote and discipline their personnel 
independently. On the other hand, the results reveal that in practice, Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory agencies lack the financial independence and autonomy to 
make certain regulatory decisions and do not have the power to admonish companies. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 Total  
D1 n/a 1 4 4 5 1 0 0 3 2 20 
P1 1 n/a 4 4 3 0 4 3 1 1 21 
P2 4 4 n/a 7 6 3 1 3 6 6 40 
P3 4 4 7 n/a 1 2 2 0 1 2 23 
N1 5 3 6 1 n/a 1 8 4 1 1 30 
N2 1 0 3 2 1 n/a 2 2 1 0 12 
M1 0 4 1 2 8 2 n/a 0 5 6 28 
I1 0 3 3 0 4 2 0 n/a 2 4 18 
C1 3 1 6 1 1 1 5 2 n/a 0 20 
T1 1 1 6 2 1 0 6 4 0 n/a 21 
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The results also highlight the fact that Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies 
have obvious deficiencies in the way they handle their accountability practices. In the 
case of transparency practice, the findings reveal that the activities of Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory agencies are, in fact, far removed from the international best 
practice of good regulatory governance.  
Table 6.32: Overall number of significant differences recorded between groups 
 
Note: D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA), 
P2=Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company (PPMC), N1 = Nigeria’s Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), M1= Major Oil Marketing Companies (MOMC), I1= 
Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade Union (TU) 
 N/A: Not Applicable  
 
Table 6.32 shows the total number of times each respondent group differed 
significantly with other groups. Identifying the significant differences in perception 
among the respondents groups in relation to the elements of good regulatory 
governance practice is another major contribution of this research. Indeed, detecting 
the significant differences may help in revealing the dysfunctional characteristics of 
the relationship between respondent groups, which may give the policy makers an 
opportunity to improve the regulatory governance of Nigeria’s downstream 
petroleum sector. However, the overall findings indicate that the main prerequisites 
of good regulatory governance are not being met by Nigeria’s downstream regulatory 
agencies, particularly in relation to their independence, accountability and 
transparency practices. Therefore, the main research hypothesis which states that: 
HO1 – -The regulatory governance practice in Nigeria’s downstream petroleum 
sector is not fit for purpose, is accepted. Hence it is evident that total reorganisation 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 Total  
D1 n/a 11 17 18 32 11 5 6 20 17 137 
P1 11 n/a 19 16 20 15 8 7 20 8 124 
P2 17 19 n/a 17 25 16 10 13 30 26 173 
P3 18 16 17 n/a 7 8 11 0 3 3 83 
N1 32 20 25 7 n/a 4 20 10 4 5 127 
N2 11 15 16 8 4 n/a 5 10 8 6 83 
M1 5 8 10 11 20 5 n/a 1 13 11 84 
I1 6 7 13 0 10 10 1 n/a 6 6 59 
C1 20 20 30 3 4 8 13 6 n/a 1 104 
T1 17 8 26 3 5 6 11 6 1 n/a 83 
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and re-regulation are required in the sector to enable the enhancement of good 
regulatory governance practice.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Analysis of interview findings 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented and analysed the questionnaire findings. The aim of 
this chapter is to discuss the findings arising from the interview survey, which was 
conducted with twenty participants, two from each of the ten stakeholders groups 
chosen for their high level of expertise and experience in Nigeria’s downstream 
petroleum sector. The remainder of the chapter is divided into the following sections: 
Section 7.2 discusses interview procedures; Section 7.3 analyses the findings arising 
from the follow-up interview while Section 7.4 concludes the chapter.  
7.2 The interview procedures  
In order to achieve the aim of analysing the findings obtained from the follow-up 
interview, certain procedures were adopted. Stephens (2009) and Grbich (2007) 
posited that the procedure for obtaining, interpreting and organising data depends on 
the research questions, or the purpose for which the research is undertaken. These 
procedures include data presentation, data reduction and drawing conclusions (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994).  
Stephens (2009) opined that it is important for researchers to consider introducing 
themselves and making enquiries before actually meeting the research participants. 
Strobl et al., (2000) warned that at the beginning of this process, respondents may 
experience a degree of uneasiness as such encounters may be alien to them. Thus this 
study addressed this issue and, in order to create a relaxed atmosphere for the 
participants, significant efforts were made by the researcher to present him/herself in 
such a way that respondents would feel comfortable. The respondents were assured 
that their identity would not be disclosed at any time. In addition, in order to deal 
with this issue of respondent confidentiality, a code was allocated to each of the 
twenty interviewees,
26
 thereby eliminating the need to print their names or identify 
their place of work. 
                                       
26
 R01A, R01B, R02A, R02B, R03A, R03B, R04A, R04B, R05A, R05B, R06A, R06B, R07A, R07B, 
R08A, R08B, R09A, R09B, R10A and R10B. 
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The respondents were also reassured that the data collected from the interview would 
only be used by the research team. This precaution had a positive impact on the 
interview process and the participants were comfortable and relaxed when being 
questioned. Those respondents who were reluctant to participate in a telephone 
interview were sent a questionnaire by email, which resulted in achieving a high 
response rate. Other interviewees, who agreed to the telephone interview, had their 
responses recorded using a digital Dictaphone. All efforts were made to transcribe 
and analyse the interview findings as swiftly as possible, to ensure that the 
expressions used and the originality of the interviews were captured appropriately. 
Nonetheless, due to the limitations of resources and time, this was sometimes 
unachievable. 
Stephens (2009) pointed out that data presentation involves understanding and noting 
down the information collected from the interviewees and then interpreting it. 
Generally, data gathered from an interview is not transcribed exactly; moreover, only 
the most appropriate points cited by participants are usually analysed. Having 
presented and transcribed the data, the researcher then sent recorded responses to the 
individual respondents, in the form of written files, in order to validate the answers, 
as it has been argued that this approach of validating information in mixed-method 
research enhances the research outcome (Saunders et al., 2009). Furthermore, it 
allows participants to double-check their earlier assertions and to make amendments 
if necessary (Parahoo, 2006). Fortunately, all the twenty respondents agreed to 
review their earlier statements and provide input. Indeed, this feedback proved to be 
most beneficial and all additional observations were incorporated into the findings.  
 
After collecting the corrected data, data reduction was conducted. The process of 
data reduction includes simplifying, focusing, deleting, and transforming the data 
from the original record and re-writing the final files (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Further, Stephens (2009) argued that the procedure helps to simplify the work and 
makes it easily understandable, as the ideas are divided into themes and the patterns 
created are centred on the significance of the statements under investigation. McCabe 
(2008) and Grbich (2007) added that these procedures might enable the researcher to 
produce an easy and indeed simple picture of the issues evolving from the 
                                                                                                            
 
195 
 
investigation. On this note, due to the small number of respondents, this thesis 
decided to manually analyse the data collected from the interview as its volume did 
not warrant the use of Nvivo or any other relevant software.  
7.3 Analyses of the interview findings 
As stated earlier, in Section 5.4.3.2, the study adopted a semi-structured interview 
method to validate the issues arising from the questionnaire findings. In view of the 
above, seven areas were identified as requiring further clarification, to which the 
carefully chosen experts responded in an objective manner. (See interview questions 
in Appendix 2). The seven issues emerging from the questionnaire findings are as 
follows. 
7.3.1 Concerns relating to the inadequate independence of Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory agencies 
Literature on regulatory governance suggests that absolute autonomy in the 
regulatory process could enable regulators to establish good regulatory policies. It is 
widely accepted that regulatory agencies must be able to perform their duties in an 
objective manner, which necessitates they must be free from political influence or 
pressure when making regulatory decisions (OECD, 2009; Horn, 1995). But the 
findings from the questionnaire disclosed that Nigeria’s downstream regulatory 
agencies lack sufficient autonomy to discharge their responsibility. Indeed, 
respondents queried Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies’ level of 
independence. Furthermore, the interview participants were also of the opinion that 
there were serious issues affecting the regulatory independence of Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory agencies. When interviewees were asked to explain the 
factors that have affected, or might have affected the freedom of the regulators to act 
in an independent manner, they put forward different reasons. The majority of the 
interviewees identified the following issues as having the most impact on the 
independence of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies:  
 
i) Political factors: according to a number of interviewees, political interference has 
a significant impact on the regulators’ level of autonomy. Below are a number of 
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assertions made by respondents who commented on the subject of political 
interference. 
One of the respondents from the Civil Society said that: ‘One major problem 
affecting the independence of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies is 
politically motivated. Indeed, all managerial appointments to head the regulatory 
agencies are determined by the powerful politician or elite, as such interventions 
within the regulatory agencies are unavoidable’ (R01A). 
In the same vein R06B commented: ‘The Government’s and the elite’s interference 
in budget allocation is a major factor. Even the award of a contract is usually 
determined by either the elite or politicians, regardless of whether the contractors 
are unqualified or lack the skills to handle the projects.’ 
Similarly, R09B and R06A share the same view that political interference has 
negatively affected the independence of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies. 
ii) Legislative factors: In addition, a few interviewees stated that inadequate 
legislation impacted the autonomy of Nigeria’s downstream regulators. 
One of the interviewees from a regulated company stated: ‘At present almost every 
decision of downstream petroleum sector is determined by either the office of the 
Minister or the Presidency. Remember the recent attempt of the government to 
remove fuel subsidies? What justification does the presidency use for the increase in 
the price of the petroleum products? This is a matter for regulatory experts’ (R04A). 
Another participant added: ‘There is a lacuna in the legislation of downstream 
petroleum sector. For instance, it is very wrong to say that an agency like the 
Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) is under the watch of the Ministry of 
petroleum Resources. This contributes to nothing but unnecessary bureaucracy’ 
(R09A). 
Moreover, R07A pointed out that: ‘The regulators of downstream sector are 
hamstrung by the lack of government will to reform, or even regulate the sector 
based on current legislation. This is because the government official benefits from 
subsidies which contribute to market inefficiencies and unfair advantages. 
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Consequently, these have obviously hindered the autonomy of Nigeria’s downstream 
regulatory agencies.’ 
A participant from regulatory agencies argues that: ‘At the moment it will be very 
difficult for Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies to have the required 
independence as obtained in other countries, simply because the refineries are not 
working at optimal capacity. The government depends on the importation of 
petroleum products by regulated companies and these companies are profit 
orientated. Their dominance influences most of the regulatory decisions in the sector. 
For example, the recent subsidy probe is enough evidence for the regulatory 
agencies to rebuke the licences of many companies. Unfortunately, doing so will 
contribute to the shortages of petroleum products all over the country because the 
local refineries are not producing at full capacity’ (R02A). 
In the same vein, R10A, R01B and R05B were of the similar opinion that poor 
legislation and the undue power granted to Ministers has affected the autonomy of 
Nigeria’s downstream regulators.  
iii) Capture by the regulated industries: Other interviewees stated that Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory agencies were not independent because of capture by 
regulated entities.  
A participant from a regulatory agency stated that: ‘I doubt if the regulatory 
agencies have the capacity to manage and supervise regulated companies. The 
companies have more expertise then the regulators and the regulators depend on 
these companies for certain information. Therefore, the companies take 
advantage of that’ (R02B). 
Likewise R08A said: ‘If you look carefully, the majority of the policies of 
downstream petroleum favours the regulated companies. This is because the 
companies have financial capacity and connections with government officials, as 
such they can influence most of the regulatory decisions in the sector.’  
Respondents R10B and R05A also agreed that capture by regulated firms contributed 
to the lack of independence of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies.  
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iv) Inadequate financial allocation: Another factor mentioned by the interviewees 
was poor financial allocation. 
 
One of the participants stated that: ‘For over twenty years now there has not been 
any financial allocation to either build new refineries, loading depots or to lay down 
pipelines and the regulators do nothing about it, because it is absolutely a 
government decision’ (R03B).  
 
In addition, another commented: ‘The regulatory agencies have no power to 
determine expenditure. The regulators have to get approval for all their spending 
from the executive arm of the government. I think this is a major contributing factor 
to their lack of independence’ (R07B).  
 
In the same vein, participants R03A, R04B and R08B opined that financial autonomy 
would guarantee the required level of regulatory independence in Nigeria’s 
downstream sector. 
 
All the interviewees agreed that there was a need for a total overhaul of Nigeria’s 
downstream sector. Some participants argued that even if the proposed Petroleum 
Industry Bill (PIB) were to be put before the National Assembly and become law, the 
challenges present in the downstream sector would still persist. They believe that the 
bill would vest even more power in the MPR which continuously impedes the 
independence of Nigeria’s downstream regulators. Until credible and unbiased 
legislation is ratified, the downstream sector will remain unchanged.  
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Table 7.3.1.1: Summary of the interview findings relating to the factors 
affecting independence of the Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies 
 
7.3.2 Concerns relating to the poor accountability practice among Nigeria’s 
downstream regulators 
Evidence derived from the literature review emphasises the importance of 
accountability practice in the regulatory governance regime. One of the most vital 
mechanisms in a successful regulatory governance regime is the accountability 
practice of the regulatory agencies involved (Gutiérrez and Berg, 2000). Indeed, 
Levine and Forrence (1990) opined that regulatory agencies should be accountable 
with regard to fulfilling their mission to protect the public and to provide an enabling 
environment for regulated companies. This accountability should not interfere with 
the autonomy of the regulatory body to be able to make specific decisions in a 
neutral and objective manner.  
Question: 
After analysing the responses from the questionnaire. It appears that experts believe 
there are certain issues that have affected the independence of the Nigeria’s 
downstream regulators. Do you share this view? If so, can you please comment on 
the factors that have affected, or might have affected the freedom of the regulators to 
act in an independent manner? 
 
Codes 
Factors affecting the 
independence of Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory agencies 
 
Codes 
Factors affecting the independence 
of Nigeria’s downstream 
regulatory agencies 
R01A i) Political factor: 
 Interference in managerial 
appointments  
 Interference in budget 
allocation  
 Interference in contract 
allocation 
ii) Legislation factors: 
 
 Excessive power of the 
petroleum Minister and the 
Presidency 
 Lack of DPR autonomy 
 Lack of government will to 
make reforms 
R06A iii) Influence of the regulated 
industries: 
 Companies have greater 
expertise than the regulators  
 The companies have financial 
capacity and links with 
government officials 
iv) Inadequate financial allocation 
 A lack of funds to build new 
refineries, depots and lay 
pipelines 
 A lack of power to determine 
expenditure 
 
R01B R06B 
R02A R07A 
R02B R07B 
R03A R08A 
R03B R08B 
R04A R09A 
R04B R09B 
R05A, R10A 
R05B R10B 
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Findings arising from the questionnaire survey revealed that the processes used in the 
accountability practices of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies were 
inappropriate (see Chapter 6). It is apparent that experts believe there are certain 
issues which have affected the accountability practice of Nigeria’s downstream 
regulators. This perception inspired further investigation, this time using the 
interview method. The interviewees were asked whether they shared the same view 
and to also comment on the factors that have affected, or might have affected the 
accountability practice of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies. The 
respondents unanimously agreed that the accountability practices among Nigeria’s 
downstream regulators were not in accordance with international best practice. 
Moreover, the interviewees highlighted many additional factors that they believe 
affects the accountability practice of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies.  
i) Lack of effective legal institution in the country: Many interviewees attributed the 
lack of accountability among Nigeria’s downstream regulators to the weak legal 
system.  
One respondent from the National Assembly said: ‘You know, in Nigeria it is very 
easy to commit certain crimes and get away with it. The laws that will punish issues 
relating to the lack of accountability are there, but it is very difficult to apply them in 
practice, simply because of either favouritism or corruption in the entire judicial 
system. Therefore, the downstream regulators are not different’ (R08A).  
 
In addition, another participant from a civil society said: ‘I agree with your initial 
findings that Nigeria’s downstream regulators are not accountable. Part of the 
reason has to do with the weak system of fighting fraud in the country. You can see 
that the regulators that were indicted during the subsidy investigation got off scot-
free’ (R03B). 
 
Respondents R01A, R04A, R07B and R06B also shared the same perspective as the 
above respondents, namely that the poor legal system and the absence of harsh 
penalties contribute to the issues relating to accountability practice of Nigeria’s 
downstream sector. 
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ii) Lack of clear goals among the regulators: This is another issue affecting the 
accountability practice of Nigeria’s downstream regulators.  
When questioned, one of the interviewees replied: ‘Most of the regulatory agencies 
in the downstream petroleum sector do not have established, or clear goals and 
expectations. They do not set standards to check their performance, and there are no 
credible policies or procedures in place that will enable accountability practice’ 
(R08B). 
Similarly, respondent (R03A) said: ‘Accountability practices depend on the heads of 
organisation. The heads of the regulatory agencies should challenge the drive and 
performance of other employees and measure the results. Unfortunately, the heads of 
the regulatory agencies in Nigeria’s downstream petroleum are not like that, their 
concern is to manage the agency to their advantage before their tenure expires.’  
Another participant from the regulatory agencies commented: ‘It would surprise you 
to see the way these regulatory agencies operate. They cannot even develop or 
implement a follow-up system of accountability that may allow them to check the 
activities of other department or measure the performance, productivity and results 
achieved by its employees. That is part of the reason why the majority of the 
regulators are not accountable’ (R06A).  
In addition, respondents R01B, R09A and R02B also agreed that the absence of any 
clear goals for the regulatory agencies hinder their accountability practice.  
iii) Poor motivation: Other interviewees thought poor motivation was a major factor 
impacting the accountability practice of regulators in the downstream sector.  
One of the advocates of this assertion stated that: ‘Because of the improper 
recognition and rewards within the regulatory agencies, people fail to disclose 
misappropriation. Remember, that rewards and recognition don’t have to be 
monetary in value. Verbal praise, both in the private and public setting, might 
encourage whistleblowing’ (R10A). 
Likewise, (R09B) pointed out that: ‘When the staff of the regulatory agencies know 
that they are protected by the law they may disclose certain malpractices. But, as it is 
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now, the fear is that when they do that, they may end up being victimised or losing 
their job.’  
Similarly, respondent (R02A) said that: ‘Most of these regulatory agencies have poor 
remuneration systems, that is why they short change the system. This contributes to 
their poor accountability practice.’ 
Moreover, a participant from a regulatory agency said: ‘Interference by the 
government in decision making, such as the issuance of waivers and sometimes 
relying on the operator’s mercy to use part of his data/information, is due to the 
inability to provide a good working environment, such as working tools and other 
logistics to enable you perform your job optimally’ (R04B). 
Further, an interviewee from a regulated company stated: ‘Regulators should be 
accountable to the nation, the executive and the legislative arms of government. 
Accountability needs the will to demand it from the nation, it also needs the desire to 
be held accountable by the regulators (in other words, the sense of duty on their 
part) in addition, accountability requires a system whereby agencies with oversight 
functions are voted into law to hold regulators accountable’ (R05B). 
In support of this perspective, participants R07A, R10B and R05A also unanimously 
agreed that the effective and appropriate motivation of regulators would undoubtedly 
encourage accountability by regulatory agencies. The table below summarises the 
findings relating to the factors affecting accountability practice. 
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Table 7.3.2.1: Summary of the interview findings relating to factors affecting 
the accountability practice of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies 
Question: 
From the questionnaire findings, it would appear that experts believe there are certain issues 
affecting the accountability of Nigeria’s downstream regulators. Do you share this view? If 
so, can you please comment on the factors that have affected, or might have affected the 
accountability practice of Nigeria’s Downstream regulatory agencies?  
 
Codes 
Factors affecting accountability 
practice of Nigeria’s downstream 
regulatory agencies 
 
Codes 
Factors affecting accountability 
practice of Nigeria’s downstream 
regulatory agencies 
R01A i) Poor legal institution  
 Very difficult to apply laws in 
practice  
 Favouritism and corruption in 
the judiciary 
 Lack of severe penalties for 
regulators who abuse 
accountability principles 
ii) Lack of clear goals  
 
 Regulators do not set standards 
to monitor staff performance  
 The head of the regulatory 
agencies; personal interest 
negatively affects the agencies’ 
accountability  
R06A  Failure to implement a follow-up 
system of accountability 
 Poor accounting system in the 
country 
iii) Poor motivation  
 Absence of performance 
recognition  
 Lack of legal protection for 
whistleblowers 
 Poor remuneration system 
 Interference by the government 
in decision making 
 Lack of will and desire by the 
authorities to hold the regulators 
accountable for their actions. 
R01B R06B 
R02A R07A 
R02B R07B 
R03A R08A 
R03B R08B 
R04A R09A 
R04B R09B 
R05A, R10A 
R05B R10B 
 
7.3.3 Concern relating to inadequate transparency practice in Nigeria’s 
downstream petroleum sector  
Literature on the subject of regulatory governance states that one of the regulatory 
body’s responsibilities is to provide information to the public. A regulatory body 
should have the authority to communicate its regulatory decisions and also the 
rationale behind such decisions to the public. Indeed, the public may only begin to 
have confidence in the regulators if the regulatory process and decisions are 
transparent (Goodhart and Charles, 2001; Fisher, 1985). Arguably, regulatory 
agencies should establish a consultation system enabling representatives from major 
stakeholders (for example, industry and the public) to express their views on 
regulatory decisions. Moreover, the results of such consultation should be published. 
However, the findings derived from the questionnaire survey in Chapter Six revealed 
that the practice of transparency in Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies is 
inadequate. This necessitated a further investigation into the factors impacting the 
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transparency practice of downstream regulators. When the interviewees were asked 
to suggest possible ways in which to overcome the general perception that there is a 
lack of transparency amongst downstream regulators, their suggestions included the 
following. 
i) Public sensitisation: A number of interviewees proposed using public awareness as 
a tool for overcoming the perception of a lack of transparency among regulators. One 
advocate of this method, from a regulatory agency stated: ‘Basically you have to be 
doing something to publicise whatever it is you are doing. However, because these 
regulatory agencies have a track record of compromising or short-changing the 
system to their advantage, they are always refraining from publishing certain 
information. In fact they end up disclosing issues that are irrelevant to the public’ 
(R09A). 
Another respondent, from NEITI, said: ‘It is a well-known fact that because of their 
lack of transparency they were indicted in all the audit investigations. The only way 
to overcome this is for the regulatory agencies to disclose all information and 
consult stakeholders in their regulatory decisions’ (R05B). 
Similarly, an interviewee from the regulatory agencies commented that: ‘They should 
allocate enough votes to the public affairs unit to enable them to sensitise the public 
through the use of televisions and radio programs, use telecommunication providers 
to educate their subscribers, attend trade fairs and use bill boards to enhance 
transparency practice’ (R03A).  
ii) Eradication of Nepotisms: A number of interviewees mentioned that there is 
rampant discrimination in most of the activities performed by Nigeria’s downstream 
sector. 
  
In addition, another interviewee stated: ‘Right from the recruitment of the regulators 
there is no transparency. As such, you will not expect them to be transparent. Unless 
the government does away with nepotism in the recruitment process, the 
transparency practice will remain as it is’ (R07A). 
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In a similar fashion, respondent (R10B) argued that: ‘Openness in downstream sector 
is very critical. The award of licences to companies is usually not disclosed to the 
public. I think the legislature should pass a law that will enable the general public to 
have access to certain information from downstream regulators.’ 
R04B claimed that: ‘Unless transparency mechanisms are in place Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory agencies will continue to be non- transparent in discharging 
their regulatory duties.’ 
iii) Effective monitoring: A number of participants suggested that effective 
monitoring by the legislative arm of government would reduce the general perception 
that there was no evidence of transparency by the downstream regulatory bodies. 
A participant from the civil society believes: ‘The only way to overcome the 
perception of lack of transparency among the downstream regulators is for the 
National Assembly to closely monitor the activities of the regulatory agencies on a 
regular basis’ (RA9B). 
The majority of the interviewees were of the view that the absence of regulatory 
transparency is a key and also recurrent obstacle affecting the downstream petroleum 
sector. In order to change this perception, the regulators should ensure transparency 
in all regulatory processes. This would not only guarantee the predictability of the 
business environment, but may also prove to be a valuable tool for identifying and 
addressing inadvertent difficulties in the downstream petroleum sector (R04A, 
R10A, R05A and R03B). 
Another group of interviewees opined that in order for Nigeria’s downstream 
regulatory agencies to appear transparent, the government should increase 
institutional capacity and empower agencies such as the NEITI to punish any non-
compliance of transparency practice (R01B, R02A, R06A and R07B).  
 iv) Reducing corruption and inefficiency: The participants also highlighted 
corruption and inefficiency as important factors impacting the transparency practice 
of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies.  
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One of the participants said: ‘The irregular supply of petroleum products, hoarding, 
acute product shortages, adulteration, smuggling, and long queues were the main 
features of Nigeria’s downstream, simply because of corruption and inefficiency 
among the regulators. In fact the situation deteriorated because of the low 
performance of the local refineries, which contributed to the excessive dependence 
on importation of petroleum products. No doubt these conditions have affected the 
transparency practice of the regulatory agencies. Until an effort is made by the 
government to deal with all these issues the perception will remain as it is’ (R01A). 
In a similar vein, respondent (R08B) said: ‘Even the limited inflow of investments 
into the downstream sector is due to the non-transparent nature of the regulatory 
agencies. Most investors avoid investing in the sector because of the uncompetitive 
pricing structure and the poor incentive mechanism that have accumulated due to a 
lack of consultation by the regulatory bodies. Proper consultation should be in 
place.’  
In the same fashion, respondents R06B and R08B agreed and suggested that reducing 
corruption in the downstream petroleum sector would undoubtedly reduce the 
perception of poor transparency practice amongst experts and the general public. The 
Head of NEITI stated during the global Conference of EITI in Australia that the 
absence of transparency in the acquisition and awarding of import licenses, financing 
mechanisms, inappropriate disclosures of petroleum products and revenues were 
characteristic of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies. Table 7.3.3.1 provides a 
summary of the findings relating to the perception that the transparency practices of 
Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies are inadequate. 
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Table 7.3.3.1: Summary of findings in relation to the perception of poor 
transparency practices of Nigeria’s downstream regulators 
Question: 
Given the responses from the questionnaire, the perceptions of the experts in relation to the 
transparency practice of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies were inadequate. Can 
you please suggest ways in which these perceptions could be overcome?  
 
Codes 
Steps to overcome the perception 
of poor transparency practice of 
Nigeria’s downstream regulatory 
agencies 
 
Codes 
Steps to overcome the perception of 
poor transparency practice of 
Nigeria’s downstream regulatory 
agencies 
R01A i) Public sensitisation  
 Publicising all relevant 
information, using all available 
means  
 Consulting all stakeholders on 
certain decisions  
 Allocating an adequate number 
of votes to the public affairs unit 
ii) Eradication of Nepotism 
  
 Sincerity in the recruitment 
process 
 Passing a law that will enable 
the general public to have 
access to certain information 
 The process which awards 
current licenses to companies 
should be reviewed and 
disclosed to the public 
R06A iii) Effective monitoring 
 National Assembly to closely 
monitor the activities of the 
regulators 
 Empowering agencies such as 
the NEITI to punish 
noncompliance  
iv) Lowering Corruption and 
inefficiency 
 The Government should strive to 
ensure that the refineries are 
working at full capacity 
 The Government should attempt 
to attract foreign investors 
 The Government should punish 
any oil marketers and regulators 
who have committed subsidy 
fraud. 
R01B R06B 
R02A R07A 
R02B R07B 
R03A R08A 
R03B R08B 
R04A R09A 
R04B R09B 
R05A, R10A 
R05B R10B 
 
7.3.4 Concerns relating to the inadequate utilisation of skills in the sector  
The regulatory agencies should have appropriate technical expertise in the areas 
relevant to regulatory governance. Moreover, management staff should have the 
ability to recruit staff with the necessary skills and technical expertise to be able to 
carry out regulatory functions. In addition, the regulatory body should remain up-to-
date with developments in relation to regulatory governance (Quintyn et al., 2003).  
The findings from the questionnaire survey reveal that although the regulators 
possess the required skills to regulate the sector, these skills were not being fully 
utilised. This resulted in further investigation and each of the interviewees was asked 
the following question: 
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Despite the perception amongst experts that Nigeria’s downstream regulatory 
agencies have the necessary skills to regulate the sector effectively, these same 
experts believe these skills are not being fully utilised. Why might this be the case 
and how can it be remedied?  
 
From the responses received, it would appear that the majority of the interviewees 
did not dispute the fact that the regulators had the required skills. They then listed the 
many reasons which may account for the poor utilisation of such talents.  
 
Respondent (R02A) pointed out that: ‘Whatever the skills Nigeria’s downstream 
regulators have, it will be very difficult to fully utilise them because of government 
intervention in the sector.’   
 
In support of this view, respondent (R07B) observed that: ‘Interference from the 
government, politicians, lack of autonomy and poor budget allocation are the major 
factors that hinder the expertise of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies.’ 
 
In similar fashion another respondent stated: ‘Anything concerning staff promotion 
or postings was usually not based on merit. There is no doubt preferential treatment 
among the regulators affects the utilisation of their skills.’ (R01A). This respondent 
added: ‘It is demoralising when you see that some junior officers were given certain 
tasks that were supposed to be handled by senior staff.’ 
 
Furthermore, a participant working in a regulated company (R09B) commented: 
‘Most of these regulators don’t have the willingness to regulate the sector, they 
prefer to be posted only where they will collude with company officials and make 
money.’  
 
Some interviewees asserted that the deterioration in infrastructure in the downstream 
sector has affected the regulators’ working conditions. For example, it has become 
very difficult to source petroleum products in the country because the refineries are 
operating at average capacity. The transportation of petroleum products is another 
challenge affecting the regulators’ skills, as the regulators are not in a position to 
prevent pipeline vandalism. In addition, even the bridging policy that was introduced 
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in order to allow the transportation of petroleum products by trucks is affected by the 
sub-standard condition of the road surfaces (R10A, R08B, R04A and R05B).   
 
In contrast, respondents R03A, R06B, R09A, R03B and R01B were of the view that 
it was the absence of planning and clear responsibilities that have affected the 
utilisation of the regulators’ skills in the sector. These respondents believe that the 
sheer number of regulatory bodies in the sector obstructs the expertise of the 
regulators. The general public is even confused over which body, the NNPC, DPR or 
PPPRA, is responsible for the regulation of the downstream sector.  
 
In summary, the majority of the respondents were of the opinion that the issue 
surrounding the poor utilisation of skills can only be remedied when the regulatory 
agencies are free from interference. On the other hand other interviewees argued that, 
until the government deals with the corrupt elements amongst the regulators, the 
attitude of those who conspired with other industry officials will not change. A few 
participants asserted that improvements in the infrastructure would result in the full 
utilisation of regulators’ skills. Table 7.3.4.1 summarises the findings relative to the 
above question. 
Table 7.3.4.1: Summary of the findings relating to the inadequate utilisation of 
Nigeria’s downstream regulators’ skills and the way forward 
Question: 
Despite the perception held by experts that Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies have 
the necessary skills to regulate the sector effectively, these same experts believe the skills are 
not being fully utilised. Why might this be the case and how can it be remedied? 
 
Codes 
Reasons for the poor utilisation of 
regulators’ skills and the way 
forward 
 
Codes 
Reasons for the poor utilisation of 
regulators’ skills and the way 
forward 
R01A i) Reasons for not fully 
utilising skills  
 Government elite’s interference 
 Lack of autonomy  
 Poor budget allocation  
 Preferential treatment among 
staff of the regulatory agencies 
 Staff prefer to be posted only 
where they can conspire with 
company officials and gain 
financially 
 Pipeline vandalism 
R06A Infrastructural decay in sector.  
ii) Way forward 
 There should only be one 
regulator  
 Regulators should be free from 
interference 
 The government must deal with 
corrupt elements among 
regulators 
 New infrastructure is required  
 
R01B R06B 
R02A R07A 
R02B R07B 
R03A R08A 
R03B R08B 
R04A R09A 
R04B R09B 
R05A R10A 
R05B R10B 
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7.3.5 Concerns relating to the reasons behind the material differences between 
the major respondent groups 
From the findings of the questionnaire survey in Chapter Six, it is evident that the 
perception held by the major stakeholders differs significantly regarding the 
accountability and transparency practices in Nigeria’s downstream regulatory 
agencies. This issue created the need to interview other experts in the sector so as to 
ascertain the reasons behind the disagreements. Therefore, all twenty interviewees 
were asked the following question: 
 
From the findings of the questionnaire, it would appear that the perception held by 
the respondents working in Nigeria’s Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
(NEITI), Civil Society (CS) and Trade Union (TU) were materially different from 
that of respondents connected to the Department of Petroleum Resource (DPR) and 
Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA) in relation to the 
accountability and transparency practices of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory 
agencies. Why would these experts have different viewpoints? 
Mixed responses were received from the interviewees. Twelve out of the twenty 
respondents asserted that the NEITI, CS and TU were in a better position to assess 
the accountability and transparency practices of the regulators (DPR and PPPRA). 
On this note, the regulators might repudiate any allegation of issues relating to poor 
accountability and transparency practices.  
A participant from Civil Society stated: ‘NEITI, as an agency that is mandated to 
ensure accountability and transparency practice, and PPPRA and DPR were 
indicted by various audit reports on issues concerned with accountability and 
transparency practices. Hence this will be part of the material differences of their 
perception’ (R06A).  
One interviewee from a regulatory agency (R03A) observed that: ‘I am very 
optimistic that the modes of operations of these important stakeholders are varied, 
both use different indices in arriving at their findings. Therefore, is not surprising to 
have a different perception between them.’ 
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Similarly, a respondent from a regulated entity stated: ‘The first group (NEITI, CS 
and TU) are the layer that holds the second group (DPR and PPPRA) accountable, 
hence, the different view’ (R08B). 
The above assertion is consistent with the assertion made by the NEITI’s Executive 
Secretary, who commented that: ‘the management of the Department of Petroleum 
Resources (DPR) should place all licenses and contracts in the public domain in 
conformity with global best practice and standards.’  
However, another respondent commented: ‘The major mandate of NEITI is to 
promote due process and ensure transparency and accountability in the use of oil 
revenues and PPPRA has been mismanaging the generated revenues. This might be 
the reason for the differences’ and added that: ‘Unfortunately, DPR and PPPRA are 
government agencies and these agencies tend to lean towards the side of the 
government while NEITI, CS and TU are non-governmental organisations who take 
a critical approach to government’s actions thereby creating a checkmate in 
government’s activities’ (R01A). 
 
In general, the majority of the interviewees agreed that the lack of accountability and 
the extent of corruption in the downstream sector were the main reasons behind the 
differences in perceptions held by the stakeholders. A summary of the findings is 
presented in the Table 7.3.5.1. 
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Table 7.3.5.1: Summary of the different perceptions held by major stakeholders 
in relation to the transparency and accountability practice of Nigeria’s 
downstream regulators 
Question: 
From the findings of the questionnaire, it would appear that the perceptions of the 
respondents from the Nigeria’s Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), Civil 
Society (CS) and Trade Union (TU) were materially different from those of the Department of 
Petroleum Resource (DPR) and Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA) in 
relation to the accountability and transparency practices of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory 
agencies. Why would these experts hold different views? 
 
Codes 
Reasons for the differences in 
perception between major 
stakeholders  
 
Codes 
Reasons for the differences in 
perception between major 
stakeholders 
R01A  NEITI, CS and TU are in a 
better position to assess the 
accountability and transparency 
practice of the regulators 
 DPR and PPPRA, as regulators, 
might repudiate any allegation 
of noncompliance to the 
accountability and transparency 
principles 
 Various audits, including that of 
the NEITI, reveal that the 
PPPRA and DPR were neither 
accountable nor transparent, 
although they always denied 
this fact. Hence, this is the 
reason for the different 
perceptions. 
R06A   Because the modes of 
operations of these important 
stakeholders varied. Both used 
different indices to arrive at 
their decision 
  The NEITI, CS and TU make up 
the layer that holds the second 
group, the DPR and PPPRA 
accountable, hence, the different 
viewpoint’ 
 
R01B R06B 
R02A R07A 
R02B R07B 
R03A R08A 
R03B R08B 
R04A R09A 
R04B R09B 
R05A, R10A 
R05B R10B 
 
7.3.6 Concerns relating to Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies’ ability to 
assist the government in meeting its societal aims and objectives 
According to the literature on regulatory governance, the main responsibility of 
regulatory agencies is to protect the interests of the general public and to assist the 
government in providing social welfare (OECD, 2009; Croley, 2000). However, it is 
evident from the questionnaire findings that the Nigeria’s downstream regulatory 
agencies do not discharge their regulatory responsibility in the interest of the general 
public. Indeed, the reason for seeking further clarification was to test the Public 
Interest Theory of regulation, with the aim of determining whether or not Nigeria’s 
downstream regulators take decisions in the interest of the general public. This 
resulted in the emergence of the question below.  
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Do you agree that the performance of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies 
assists the ability of the government to meet its societal aims and objectives? 
 
The responses recorded from the interviewees agreed with the initial findings of the 
questionnaire. Seventeen out of the twenty interview participants disagreed that the 
performance of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies assisted the government to 
meet its social objectives. The most significant assertions made by the interviewees 
who were in disagreement are given below. 
 
A participant from Civil Society said: ‘No, I totally disagree. The government is 
using these agencies to their own advantage’ (R05B). 
 
Similarly, a respondent from the National Assembly (R08A) stated: ‘As it is now, the 
aims of establishing these regulatory agencies are defeated because they are only 
serving the interest of regulated companies.’  
 
Concurring with this assertion, respondent (R03A) added: ‘You can see how the 
regulated companies avoided any punishment, despite indictment from many credible 
organisations, including the National Assembly.’  
 
Another interviewee from a regulatory agency commented: ‘The majority of the 
decisions taken by these regulatory agencies are either based on personal interest, or 
the interest of other powerful government officials including politicians and the elite. 
Therefore, their performance does not help the government in achieving its 
objectives’ (R07B). 
 
Similarly, respondent (R10A) argued that: ‘The underperformance of Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory agencies is very alarming. As such, they are unable to assist 
the government in providing social welfare.’  
Many interviewees believed that any evidence of malpractice in the downstream 
sector was sufficient to convince the public that the regulators were not assisting the 
government to safeguard the welfare of the citizens. This finding is consistent with 
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the argument of Oformiyon (2012, p. 22) that ‘the public grievance at the beginning 
of 2012 over the now periodic pump price increases is inter alia caused by lack of 
domestic refining capacity, faulty regulatory policy and lack of transparency as well 
as the excessive corruption in the sector; by marketers who make bogus claims to the 
regulatory authorities whose officials connive to inflate figures of imported products 
and share allocations meant for stabilising fuel pump prices within the pump price 
regulatory regime.’ 
In line with the above, respondent R04A observed that: ‘The regulated companies 
were able to perpetuate the fraud committed during the subsidy regime with the help 
of field officers from DPR and PPPRA at various stages of fuel importation and 
distribution. This kind of attitude will not benefit the public.’ 
However, a respondent from Civil Society (R09A) argued: ‘‘I disagree with the 
assertion that the performance of the regulator assists the Nigerian pubic. It is well 
known that kerosene was supposed to be N50 per litre, but the ordinary Nigerian’s 
are paying higher when the product becomes available and the regulators are 
actually not bothered about this irregularity.’ The respondent continued: ‘It is very 
unfortunate that kerosene, used by the citizenry for their everyday survival, costs 
more than other petroleum products. It is even more frustrating that the present 
suffering faced by the majority of the masses that depend on kerosene could be 
traced to sharp business practices from people in and around government and its 
regulatory agencies.’ 
Moreover, one of the interviewees from the National Assembly said: ‘I disagree, 
because for several years, Nigeria has experienced shortages of petroleum products 
that have crippled economic activities in the country, which have augmented the cost 
of doing business several times. Indeed, the scarcity unavoidably contributes to the 
problem of adulterated products in the market. This usually results in damage to 
vehicles and machines’ (R10B).  
Another participant from the Civil Society stated that: ‘There is this perception that 
the activities in the oil sector are gradually being considered a curse by some 
communities, because the sector is affecting the means of their livelihood by 
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destroying their environment. To be sincere, the performance of regulators does not 
help in this regards’ (R09B). 
In contrast, only three interviewees were of the opinion that the performance of the 
regulatory agencies facilitates the government in meeting its social objectives. 
 
One of the interviewees from a regulatory agency stated: ‘Yes I agree the 
performance of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies assists the government 
effort to provide welfare to the general public. Despite the problem that emerged 
regarding subsidies, the policy is assisting the public in so many ways, ranging from 
reducing the cost of transportation, power generation and cooking gas’ (R01A). 
 
Similarly, respondent R03B observed: ‘If the performance of these regulatory 
agencies does not help assist citizens, why did the public resist the removal of a fuel 
subsidy in January 2012?’  
 
In summary, the majority of the respondents disputed the ability of the regulatory 
agencies to assist the government in achieving its social objectives. Hence it could be 
said the perception held is in contrast to the Public Interest Theory of Regulation. 
Table 7.3.6.1 summarises the findings. 
Table 7.3.6.1: Summary of perceptions on whether the performance of the 
regulators facilitates the government to meet its social aims and objectives 
Question: 
Do you agree that the performance of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies facilitates 
the government to meet its societal aims and objectives? 
 
Codes 
Performance of the Nigeria’s 
downstream regulators in meeting 
societal aims and objectives 
 
Codes 
Performance of the Nigeria’s 
downstream regulators in meeting 
societal aims and objectives 
R01A  
The majority disagreed based 
on the following reasons: 
 The government is using these 
agencies to their own advantage 
 Regulators are serving the 
interest of regulated companies 
 The regulators’ performance 
does not help the government to 
achieve its objectives 
R06A  
The reason for the agreement of 
the two respondents 
 Despite the problem that 
emerged regarding subsidies, the 
policy is assisting the public in 
so many ways, ranging from 
reducing the cost of transport, 
power generation and cooking 
gas. 
 If the performance of these 
R01B R06B 
R02A R07A 
R02B R07B 
R03A R08A 
R03B R08B 
R04A R09A 
R04B R09B 
R05A R10A 
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R05B  Regulators are perpetuating 
fraud at the expense of the 
general public 
R10B regulatory agencies does not 
assist citizens, why did the 
public resist the removal of fuel 
subsidy in January? 
7.3.7 Concerns regarding the mitigation of challenges affecting the performance 
of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies. 
The findings from both the questionnaire and the interviews revealed that the 
adoption of good regulatory governance practice by Nigeria’s downstream regulatory 
agencies was bogged down by various challenges. Therefore it was imperative for 
this empirical investigation to identify the best means of mitigating these challenges. 
It is against this background that the thesis sought the opinion of experts on the most 
effective way to enhance the regulatory governance practice of Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory agencies. The twenty interviewees were asked the following 
question: 
 
What steps should be taken to enhance the performance of the Nigeria’s downstream 
regulatory agencies? 
 
The majority of the respondents were of the opinion that the government’s 
willingness to improve the infrastructure, and to open up the sector to more investors, 
would surely mitigate any challenges. The most relevant points made by the 
interviewees in relation to this assertion are detailed below.  
 
A participant from the regulatory agencies commented: ‘The regulators should be 
allowed to do their work without government and political interference, budget 
allocation should be improved and they should be made more autonomous’ (R03B). 
Similarly, another interviewee (R06A) argued that: ‘Nigeria’s downstream 
regulators can only practice good regulatory governance if the sector is fully 
deregulated. As long as the government controls certain activities the regulators will 
not be able to achieve their desired objectives.’  
In addition, a respondent from a regulated company stated: ‘It is only the 
deregulation of the downstream oil sector that will improve the efficiency of the 
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regulators. This will bring in the forces of demand and supply in determining the 
actual costs of petroleum products in the sector’ (R07A).  
The perceptions of the above interviewees are closely related to those of the Nigerian 
government. In recent years the government has advocated the deregulation of the 
downstream sector based on the perceived social burden. Indeed, the Ministry of 
Finance was quoted to have declared:  
Deregulation of the downstream oil sector promises to be the way forward in 
expanding opportunities for economic growth and a competitive downstream 
petroleum sector. If regulation in the downstream sector is limited to oversight and 
supervisory functions, aimed at guaranteeing quality of products and preventing 
consumer exploitation, then the process of deregulation could help achieve greater 
cost-effectiveness (Excerpts from Ministry of Finance). 
In support of this assertion, one respondent from a regulatory agency agreed that: 
‘Without deregulation of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector, it will be very 
difficult to attract investors’ (R02A). 
Another respondent proclaimed: ‘Until there is enough refining capacity within the 
country, which might stop the importation of petroleum products, the regulatory 
agencies will find it hard to perform their regulatory duties effectively’ (R01A)  
Also supporting the above assertion, another participant observed that: ‘It does not 
make sense for the country that is producing crude oil to be importing refined 
petroleum products. I think the government should put more effort into advancing the 
refineries and should also allow private investors to build new refineries. Indeed, by 
the time this is done the performance of the regulatory agencies must improve’ 
(R04B).  
On the other hand, a respondent from NEITI said: ‘All stakeholders have to come 
together and address the problems of corruption, crude theft, vandalisation, 
unemployment and insecurity. This is the only way to enhance the performance of 
Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies’ (R05A).  
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One of the interviewees from the National Assembly commented: ‘Until effective 
and unbiased legislation for downstream sector is passed, the regulators will 
continue to underperform’ This respondent continued by adding: ‘I think when the 
government comes up with environmental laws and other relevant laws, and 
adequately funds the regulatory agencies which will enable them to enforce such 
law, this will enhance the regulators capacity in relation to implementing their 
regulatory policies’ (R04A).  
A respondent from Civil Society claimed: ‘So many people begin to cast doubt on 
the proposed Petroleum Industry Bill PIB, currently before the National Assembly 
because of the powers vested to the minister and the president which the legislature 
said is the major reason for the delay in passing the bill. But it is our hope that the 
National Assembly will correct the ambiguous areas in order for the regulatory 
agencies to be free from interference’ (R06B).  
In addition, a participant from the regulatory agencies stated: ‘The government 
should be determined to maintain and develop a good railway system for the mass 
transportation of petroleum products across different regions’ (R07B).  
A trade union respondent observed that: If the regulatory agencies ensure the 
availability of petroleum products at affordable prices, I am optimistic this will 
stimulate demand and lead to higher production and productivity, which will lead to 
job creation and economic growth. Hence, their performance will be appreciated’ 
(R10A).  
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Table 7.3.7.1: Summary of proposed steps, aimed at enhancing the performance 
of the Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies 
Question: 
What steps should be taken to enhance the performance of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory 
agencies? 
 
Codes 
Steps required to enhance the 
performance of Nigeria’s 
downstream regulators  
 
Codes 
Steps required to enhance the 
performance of Nigeria’s 
downstream regulators 
R01A  The government should improve 
infrastructure 
 Limiting political interference 
 Financial autonomy 
 Full deregulation of the sector 
 Regulators should be sincere  
 Effective and unbiased new 
legislation  
 Ensuring availability of 
petroleum products at 
affordable prices 
 Power to reprimand companies 
 Nepotism in the sector should be 
eliminated 
R06A  Ensuring adequate refining 
capacity within the country 
 Encouraging private investors to 
build new refineries 
 Stakeholders must co-operate 
and address the problems of 
corruption, crude oil theft, 
vandalism, unemployment and 
insecurity 
 Passing of new environmental 
laws and other relevant 
mandates 
 Maintenance and development of 
new railway system for the mass 
transportation of petroleum 
products 
R01B R06B 
R02A R07A 
R02B R07B 
R03A R08A 
R03B R08B 
R04A R09A 
R04B R09B 
R05A, R10A 
R05B R10B 
7. 4 Conclusion of the interview chapter 
This chapter has presented and analysed the findings of interviews conducted with 
twenty research participants. The participants were asked seven questions which 
required further clarification, relating to the issues emerging from the findings of the 
questionnaire survey in Chapter Six.  
 
Firstly, all the interviewees reiterated that there were certain issues affecting the 
independence of Nigeria’s downstream regulators. The majority of the respondents 
named political interference, poor legislation, external influence on regulated 
companies and inadequate financial allocation as the major factors impeding the 
regulators’ autonomy. Secondly, in relation to accountability practice, the 
interviewees reaffirmed that the regulators of Nigeria’s downstream sector performed 
ineffectively in that regard. The research participants attributed the shortcomings of 
the legal institutions, a lack of clear goals and poor motivation as significant 
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contributing factors affecting the accountability practices of Nigeria’s downstream 
regulators. 
 
Thirdly, the majority of respondents were optimistic that effective public 
sensitisation, the eradication of nepotism and the reduction of corruption and 
inefficiency would help to overcome the perception that there is a lack of 
transparency in Nigeria’s downstream regulations. Furthermore, in response to the 
fourth question, the interviewees suggested that a single independent regulator, 
unrestricted by external interference, should deal with corrupt officials and that 
investment in new infrastructure might ensure that the regulators’ skills were 
optimally utilised. The findings relating to the fifth question were similar to those of 
the previous chapter; the majority of the interviewees were of the opinion that as the 
most important stakeholders were engaged in a variety of operations, they all used 
different indices to arrive at their decision, hence, the different perceptions.  
 
In response to the sixth question, seventeen out of the twenty respondents disagreed 
that the performance of the regulators assisted the government to meet its social 
objectives. The respondents believed that the government used these agencies to their 
own advantage and that the regulators only served the interests of regulated 
companies. Lastly, the interviewees opined that a number of factors, namely: limiting 
political interference; increasing financial autonomy; full deregulation of the sector; 
sincerity amongst regulators; effective and unbiased new legislation; ensuring the 
availability of petroleum products at affordable prices; granting regulators the 
necessary power to admonish companies; and the elimination of nepotism would all 
improve the performance of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Summary and conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
This study has investigated the regulatory governance practice and the applicability 
of the Public Interest Theory of regulation as a theoretical framework in Nigeria’s 
downstream petroleum sector. Furthermore, the study sought evidence that could 
potentially resolve the issues identified in the literature relating to Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory governance practice. Thus the empirical analysis centered 
only on issues relating to the good regulatory governance practices of Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory agencies. There were a number of reasons why Nigeria’s 
downstream sector was selected for this study.  
 
1) There have been many reported cases directly related to regulatory governance 
issues within Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies. For example, instability of 
the price of petroleum products, petroleum product shortages, petroleum subsidy 
issues, and the lack of disclosure regarding the actual quantity of petroleum products 
refined locally and imported (see Chapter 3 for details).  
 
2) The regulatory agencies were established to regulate the sector in the best interests 
of Nigeria’s citizens. However, from the findings it would appear that the regulators 
are failing in this regard. Therefore the Public Interest Theory of regulation is 
deemed suitable and beneficial as a theoretical framework underpinning the current 
study.  
 
3) The abovementioned problems suggested that it was essential to investigate why 
regulatory governance issues were emerging in Nigeria’s downstream petroleum 
sector and how these could be overcome. On this note, the Public Interest Theory 
that served as the guiding principle in the study justified the opinion that to ensure 
good regulatory governance practice, regulators should be autonomous, accountable, 
and transparent and above all possess regulatory expertise. Indeed, this would help 
mitigate future regulatory governance challenges. The findings could also prevent 
stagnation of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector.  
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The methodological technique employed in this thesis involves: (i) a critical 
literature review on regulatory governance around the world and regulatory 
governance issues in Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector (see Chapters 2 and 3); 
(ii) the theoretical framework and the research methodology that underpin this 
research were thoroughly discussed (see Chapters 4 and 5); and (iii) the 
questionnaire and the interview survey findings were obtained from stakeholder 
groups (see Chapters 6 and 7). From data collected from the experts and the 
application of the theoretical framework (Public Interest Theory), it was possible to 
make relevant recommendations that would benefit the stakeholders of Nigeria’s 
downstream petroleum sector. Moreover, following a critical analysis of the findings, 
it was possible to recommend areas of future research. 
The aim of this chapter is to summarise the discussions in the preceding chapters and 
to conclude this study. Accordingly, the remainder of the chapter is divided into the 
following sections. Section 8.2 presents the summary of the whole thesis. Section 8.3 
discusses and presents the contributions that arose from the theoretical and empirical 
investigations, while section 8.4 offers recommendations for future research. Finally, 
section 8.5 highlights the limitations that emerged during the course of the study.  
8.2 Summary of the research findings 
This study investigated Nigeria’s downstream regulatory governance practice with 
the aim of determining whether the regulatory agencies discharged their duties in the 
interest of the general public (fit for purpose). The previous chapters discussed and 
presented the main arguments of this thesis. Chapter one introduced the aim of the 
research and in Chapter two general literature relevant to regulatory governance was 
reviewed in order to accomplish the objectives of the study. As a result, a number of 
regulatory governance issues were exposed, including market failure, unbalanced 
market operations, and information asymmetry among others (see Chapter Two). 
Moreover, the review discovered that the welfare of the general public can only be 
guaranteed through good regulatory governance practice. The general review also 
identified a basic regulatory governance framework that regulatory agencies must 
adhere to in order to achieve good regulatory governance practice (see Chapter Two).  
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Furthermore, the literature reviewed in Chapter Three revealed that Nigeria’s 
downstream petroleum sector, like any other downstream sector, has it rules and 
regulations enshrined in the country’s petroleum Act (see Chapter Three), with the 
aim of implementing the policies in the interest of the general public. Thus, like other 
nations, Nigeria established regulatory agencies in its downstream petroleum sector 
to regulate the business activities for the welfare of its citizens, as well as to control 
any harmful business conduct by regulated companies. The review further discovered 
that the Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector faces many regulatory governance 
challenges (Chapter Three).  
Chapter Four reviewed the theories that could be adopted in a regulatory governance 
study. The adoption of the Public Interest Theory of regulation as a suitable 
theoretical framework for this study was further informed from the literature 
findings. Indeed, the most significant factor influencing the welfare of the general 
public is the effectiveness of the regulatory agencies in implementing a credible 
regulatory policy. Therefore one general reason behind the creation of Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory agencies was to ensure that the rules and regulation were 
effectively and efficiently designed and implemented for the benefit of all. 
Consequently, the adoption of the Public Interest Theory of regulation underpins this 
study. Chapter Four also reviewed other theories and stated the reasons why they 
were rejected.  
In Chapter Five, a thorough review of the research methodology and the 
philosophical assumptions informed the adoption of the pragmatic paradigm for this 
study, as advocated by many researchers such as Bryman (2004), Tashakkori and 
Teddlie (1998) and Creswell (2003). The pragmatic approach is widely used in many 
social science and mixed-method researches (Meeker, 1994; Morse, 1991). The 
underlying assumption of the pragmatic approach is that the best means of gathering 
knowledge is to adopt a combination of both positivist and interpretive approaches. 
Furthermore, the choice of the mixed-method research for this study was informed 
by the methodology review and it is deemed to be appropriate as the study employed 
both the questionnaire and interview. As guided by the pragmatic paradigm, the 
questionnaire and interview were used as data-gathering tools for this thesis. The 
decision to use a triangulating questionnaire and interview was due to the fact that 
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the weakness of one approach could be overcome by the other. The questionnaire 
was appropriately designed and piloted twice before it was administered to the 
respondents. After gathering the data, non-parametric statistics were used to analyse 
the data. First, descriptive statistics tests were run, which informed the use of the 
Mann-Whitney test to determine whether any differences existed between the 
respondent groups and then cross-tabulation tests were conducted to help ascertain 
the responses within the groups. In particular, the analysis focused on testing the 
opinion of the respondents in relation to the four main hypotheses developed for this 
study.  
8.2.1 Summary of the findings relating to the independence of Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory governance 
Evidence from the literature suggests that to ensure effective and efficient regulatory 
governance practices, regulatory agencies should be independent in discharging their 
regulatory duties (Cubbin and Stern, 2006). However, evidence from the empirical 
findings revealed that there are certain issues that can affect the independence of 
Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies. The overall findings from both the 
questionnaires and the interviews indicate that the three regulatory agencies (DPR, 
PPPRA and PEF) lack the required regulatory independence, as a result of political 
interference and regulatory capture which constrain the regulators’ autonomy. The 
entire set of variables used to measure the level of independence of Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory governance was found to be absent. Under this condition, it 
might prove difficult for the regulators to safeguard the welfare of the general public 
by advocating the Public Interest Theory of regulation. From the findings, it would 
appear that Nigeria’s downstream regulatory governance practices are not consistent 
with the principles of good regulatory governance (see Chapter Two). In this regard, 
the findings, as evident from the perceptions of the respondents, suggest that 
Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies require a significant level of independence 
in order for regulatory governance practice to be fit for purpose.  
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8.2.2 Summary of the findings relating to the accountability practice in 
Nigeria’s downstream regulatory governance 
An effective accountability practice is a vital mechanism in any regulatory 
governance regime. On a general note, the main findings relating to the 
accountability practice of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies discovered 
inadequacies in the way in which the regulators control accountability. The findings 
revealed that there are no acceptable mechanisms that could ensure efficient 
accountability practice within the agencies. Moreover, the empirical test revealed 
that out of the three regulatory agencies mandated to regulate the sector, only one 
(PEF) has an element of accountability. The findings further highlight the fact that 
there is evidence of deficiencies in accountability practice in Nigeria’s downstream 
regulatory governance. The perceptions of the respondents indicate that much needs 
to be done to improve disclosure practices and audit mechanisms in order for 
regulatory governance practice to be fit for purpose.  
8.2.3 Summary of the findings relating to transparency practice in Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory governance 
The findings of the analysis disclosed that the respondents disagreed with the 
statement that legitimate stakeholders received accurate and timely information. 
Respondents were of the view that when regulatory authorities refrained from 
disclosing confidential information, the rationale for such non-disclosure should be 
clearly justified. In this regard, the findings suggest the need for the enhancement of 
transparency practice among regulatory agencies. Moreover, the respondents opined 
that all the activities in Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector lack transparency, 
openness and fairness. 
On this note, the findings further indicate that the current regulatory governance 
practices, in relation to the transparency practice of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory 
agencies, are not consistent with international best practices. Therefore the 
government and regulatory agencies should strive to guarantee transparency in order 
to meet international best practice.  
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8.2.4 Summary of the findings relating to the level of expertise in Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory governance 
In general, the findings of this investigation revealed that the three regulatory 
agencies (DPR, PPPRA and PEF) had a reasonable level of expertise in regulatory 
governance; however, their skills were not being fully utilised. This was a result of 
many factors, including political interference, poor motivation and weak 
infrastructure. However, respondent opinions indicated the need for improvement in 
terms of the manner in which personnel discharged their regulatory duties. Moreover, 
it was felt that appointments to head regulatory agencies should be strictly based on 
merit and proven integrity.  
Lastly, the overall findings suggest that the Public Interest Theory is applicable in the 
study of regulatory governance of downstream petroleum sector. However, Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory agencies have failed to act in the interest of the general 
public. The results of the findings indicated that the general public are dissatisfied by 
the way in which Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies are governing the sector. 
Hence, the regulatory governance practice in the sector is not fit for purpose. 
8.3 Contributions of the study  
This study has explored good regulatory governance practices within Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory agencies. Its major points of significance are set out below.  
Firstly, this study is the first research that empirically investigates the regulatory 
governance practices of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector. Secondly, this thesis 
is the first to adopt the Public Interest Theory of regulation as a vehicle to 
scientifically explore whether Nigeria’s downstream regulators protect the interests 
of Nigeria’s citizens. This is significant as the results have revealed that the agencies’ 
decisions do not reflect the interests of Nigeria’s citizens. Therefore this will assist 
policy makers to ensure that a holistic approach is taken to guarantee adherence to 
this important responsibility. Thirdly, the application of the Public Interest Theory of 
regulation in this study will enable other researchers to apply it to other countries, or 
to different sectors, to ascertain whether regulators are serving interests other than 
those of the general public.  
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Fourthly, another significant contribution made by this thesis is that it has 
empirically measured and presented the actual status of the regulatory governance 
practices of Nigeria’s downstream agencies. In this regards, the study was able to 
identify the factors that prevent Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies from 
adhering to good regulatory governance practice. This may motivate regulators to 
introduce ways of eliminating these factors.  
Fifthly, the differences in the perceptions discovered between the major stakeholders 
is evidence that the regulatory governance practice of Nigeria’s downstream 
regulators is deficient. The findings of this thesis will assist the government, 
regulators and other countries with similar issues to mitigate deficiencies, such as 
unfairness in the recruitment process, corruption and interference in the regulatory 
process. Furthermore, the results will enable regulators, the government and policy 
makers to implement efficient legislation which will ensure that the necessary 
mechanisms for regulatory independence, accountability and transparency are in 
place.  
In general, it is the conclusion of this thesis that good regulatory governance practice 
is deficient in Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector and in fact is not fit for 
purpose. Although the proposed Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) was sent to Nigeria’s 
parliament for consideration many years ago, the inability of the lawmakers to pass it 
has continued to jeopardise the regulatory governance regime, particularly the 
downstream petroleum sector. If the bill were to be passed into law, this might 
improve regulatory governance practices in the downstream petroleum sector as the 
bill supports the harmonisation of the three regulatory agencies into one regulatory 
authority, which could address the issue of overlapping responsibilities. On the other 
hand, a number of interviewees criticised the PIB for proposing that ministers and 
the president are granted more power. 
 8.4 Recommendations 
1. Recommendations for regulatory agencies 
(a) Economic development: It is a recommendation of this thesis that regulatory 
agencies should be free from political interference for the purpose of 
economic development, since the significance of the downstream petroleum 
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sector cannot be over-emphasised. Indeed, most Nigerians depend on 
petroleum products for their everyday survival, including for transportation 
and cooking which rely on petroleum products in the absence of alternative 
fuel. Consequently, this research could have significant economic 
consequences for Nigeria if political interference was to be eliminated.  
(b) Equality in recruitment and appointment of agencies head: the study 
findings indicate that the research participants are displeased with the 
appointment and recruitment process of regulatory agencies personnel, which 
they believe is biased. Therefore, it is a recommendation of this thesis that all 
appointment and recruitment processes should be based solely on merit. This 
will enable regulatory agencies to employ competent staff who will discharge 
their duties in a professional manner. 
 
(c) Implementation of internationally accounting procedure: The study 
results, as described in Chapters 6 and 7, highlight many deficiencies in the 
accountability and transparency practices of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory 
agencies. These include the lack of disclosure, poor consultation and poor 
auditing processes. In this regard, it is recommended that Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory agencies adopt internationally recognised and 
accepted accounting principles. This would assist in mitigating corruption and 
fraud and ensure good accountability and transparency practice. In addition, it 
would strengthen investor and other stakeholder confidence to invest in 
Nigeria’s downstream sector.  
 
(d) Strengthening the legal institution: The research findings identified that the 
regulatory agencies usually conspire with companies to commit fraud. It is 
therefore suggested by this research that Nigeria’s legal system should have 
adequate capacity to monitor and severely reprimand those regulators and 
companies that are seeking their own financial gains. This would serve to 
deter other regulators from following suit.  
 
(e) Designing a comprehensive regulatory framework: From the research 
findings, it is evident that the Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies have 
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no clear aims or objectives. On this note, it is recommended that Nigeria’s 
downstream regulators second a number of regulatory experts to assist them 
in the design of a comprehensive regulatory framework to ensure all 
loopholes in the sector are closed. This would enable the regulators to 
implement good regulatory governance objectives. 
 
(f) Establishment and development of a viable power and energy policy: The 
research findings highlighted the fact that refineries are not working at full 
capacity due to a lack of power. In order for Nigeria’s downstream regulatory 
agencies to guarantee credible regulatory governance, investment should be 
made into improving the almost moribund power sector. Due to the inter-
relationship between the energy and the power sectors, one cannot manage 
without the other. Establishing a viable power and energy policy should be a 
critical objective. Moreover, it signifies a very powerful and important 
approach to regulatory governance by the Nigeria’s downstream petroleum 
sector. Having a clear, comprehensive and articulated power and energy 
policy would undoubtedly enhance the quality of power supply that the 
refineries and depots require for refining, transportation and the distribution 
of petroleum products around the country. Thus this thesis strongly 
recommends that a comprehensive power and energy policy is carefully 
designed and included in the proposed Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) that is 
currently before the legislature for passing into law.  
2. Recommendations for further research  
It is believed that the results recorded during the investigation have appropriately 
addressed the scope of the research questions. Nevertheless, it is the recommendation 
of this thesis that further studies should be undertaken, in particular to investigate the 
level of regulatory compliance between regulated companies. In the same way that 
regulatory agencies are responsible for the design and implementation of regulations 
in an appropriate manner, regulated companies are expected to adhere to the 
regulations to ensure effective governance in the sector. It is evident from the 
findings of this study that there is a need for improvements in regulatory governance 
practice.  
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Secondly, the Public Interest Theory, which was adopted as the framework for this 
study, places much emphasis on the welfare of the general public. Therefore it is 
suggested that a further investigation should be undertaken to ascertain the extent to 
which the regulatory governance practice of Nigeria’s downstream regulatory 
agencies is affected by regulatory capture. The findings derived from respondents in 
this study reveal that the regulators in the sector are failing in their responsibility to 
protect the public’s interest. However, this could possibly be due to the fact that the 
agencies are subjected to great external interference, which results in regulatory 
capture.  
Thirdly, this thesis recommends that additional research focuses on ascertaining the 
ability of Nigeria’s downstream companies to provide effective services to the 
country. This should include investigating the corporate governance practices of the 
companies, their financial capability and the capacity of their infrastructure.  
Lastly, this thesis recommends that a comparative study should to be undertaken 
between Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies and other countries, in relation to 
their respective regulatory governance practices. This will further assist Nigeria’s 
downstream regulatory agencies to develop their regulatory governance practice.  
8.5 Limitations of the study 
It is generally believed that the information required in order to enable regulators to 
govern the system effectively includes financial and other valuable data provided by 
regulated companies. In this regard, the questionnaire and the interview used in this 
research did not request any information concerning regulated companies directly. 
This limited the sources of data available to this study. However, if the research had 
requested information regarding the level of regulatory compliance by regulated 
companies; it is likely that other regulatory governance issues would have been 
discovered.  
In addition, the data obtained by this thesis was mainly derived from the input of 
respondents across various stakeholder groups. This would suggest that the data 
gathered from the participants limited the results of the study. Indeed, as is a 
common issue in social science research, the participants may have decided not to 
provide an objective view, for many reasons. For instance, some respondents may 
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not have been willing to supply information which contradicted their organisation’s 
official standpoint. Thus this study strived to ensure that such problems were 
eliminated by carefully selecting participants with a high level of integrity and 
expertise (Chapter 5).  
Another possible limitation is the adoption of a single theoretical framework. As 
mentioned earlier, although this research adopted the Public Interest Theory as its 
theoretical framework, there are other theories which could have also been applied 
here. The literature reviewed in Chapters Two and Three revealed that regulatory 
governance issues are extensive; therefore the adoption of just one particular 
framework could not have addressed all the challenges present. Although the 
adoption of a single framework may have some shortcomings, it is also believed that 
the implementation of multiple frameworks might further compound the problem and 
possibly produce negative results. Moreover, in order to mitigate methodological 
challenges, the research adopted a pragmatic approach, which combined all the 
qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection and analysis.  
The time it took some respondents to complete the questionnaire also proved to be a 
limitation of this study. A number of respondents took three to four weeks to respond 
and in some cases some questions were not answered. In order to resolve this 
problem new dates and times for collection were set and the missing values were 
mitigated by a MCAR test (see Chapter 6).  
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Appendix 1 
 
 
 
 
August, 2012 
.........................................................................................................................................
......................... 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
Introduction to Ghali Mustapha 
 
My name is Professor Alex Russell. I am Head of the Department of Management at 
Robert Gordon University and a professor of petroleum accounting. I very much 
hope that you can assist with a research project that my excellent research student, 
Ghali Mustapha, is undertaking. We are aware of your expertise in the research areas 
under investigation and your input will be invaluable to us.  
 
Please find attached a letter to you from Mr Mustapha. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Alex Russell 
Professor of Petroleum Accounting 
Head of Department of Management 
Aberdeen Business School 
Chair of the Oil Industry Finance Association 
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August, 2012 
.........................................................................................................................................
......................... 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am a research scholar based in Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen, United 
Kingdom. My research interest and speciality is governance practices in the 
downstream petroleum sector. I am particularly interested in regulatory governance 
issues related to Nigerian Downstream Petroleum Sector. I attach a questionnaire 
relating to the Nigerian Downstream Regulatory Governance Practice.  
I would be very grateful if you can complete the questionnaire so that we can have 
the benefit of your expertise. Please, be assured that your responses will be treated in 
strict confidence and that your identity will not be revealed at any time. I am happy 
to let you have a summary of my findings in due course, should you request one. 
Information on completing the questionnaire can be found at the beginning of each 
section.  
 
I would be glad to be contacted any time about the survey or procedures on:              
+44(0) 7424425057. Alternatively by email at: g.t.mustapha@rgu.ac.uk   
 
Many thanks for your time and cooperation 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Ghali M. Tijjani 
 
Ghali Mustapha 
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SECTION ONE 
 
Survey on Certain Aspects of Regulatory Governance Practices in 
the Nigerian Downstream Petroleum Sector. 
 
  Please tick the box that best represents your organisation. 
 
1 Department of Petroleum Resources   
2 Petroleum Equalisation Fund   
3 Petroleum Product Pricing Regulatory Agency   
4 Pipeline and Product Marketing Company   
5 Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative   
6 National Assembly  
7 Major Oil Marketing Companies  
8 Independent Oil Marketing Companies  
9 Civil Society   
10 Trade Union  
 
 
SECTION TWO 
This section relates to the regulatory governance practices of the Department of 
Petroleum Resources (DPR) 
 
1. Please indicate your opinion by ticking the appropriate box for each of the following 
statements relating to DPR’s independence in the conduct of its regulatory functions with 
respect to the downstream petroleum sector. 
 
(1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a)  The Department of Petroleum Resources has financial 
autonomy to determine its own budgets. 
     
b)  The Department of Petroleum Resources is free to make 
independent decisions relating to regulation of the 
downstream petroleum sector. 
     
c)  The Department of Petroleum Resources effectively 
reprimands regulated companies that do not adhere to 
regulations. 
     
d)  The Department of Petroleum Resource’s regulatory 
decisions are only overruled by a court of jurisdiction or pre-
established appellate panel. 
     
e) The Department of Petroleum Resources independently 
recruits, deploys, promotes and disciplines its own personnel. 
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2. Please indicate your opinion by ticking the appropriate box for each of the following 
statements relating to DPR’s accountability in the conduct of its regulatory functions with 
respect to the downstream petroleum sector. 
 
(1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree) 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Guidelines to obtain import permits are clearly stated and publicised 
by the Department of Petroleum Resources. 
     
b) The Department of Petroleum Resources follows due process in the 
issuance of import licenses to regulated companies. 
     
c) The Department of Petroleum Resources discloses to the general 
public information relating to the issuance of import licenses.  
     
d) The Department of Petroleum Resources discloses to the National 
Assembly information relating to the issuance of import licenses. 
     
e) The Department of Petroleum Resources discloses to the general 
public the actual quantity of imported petroleum products.  
     
f) The Department of Petroleum Resources discloses all discovered 
malpractices relating to importation of petroleum products. 
     
g) The Department of Petroleum Resources publically discloses actual 
petroleum products refined locally.  
     
h) The Department of Petroleum Resources discloses in total all 
revenue it generates annually. 
     
 
 
3. Please indicate your opinion by ticking the appropriate box for each of the following 
statements relating to DPR’s transparency in the conduct of its regulatory functions with 
respect to the downstream petroleum sector. 
 
(1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree) 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) The Department of Petroleum Resources consults all legitimate 
stakeholders in major regulatory decisions.  
     
b) The methods used for measurement of petroleum products by the 
Department of Petroleum Resources are transparent. 
     
c) The methods used for issuance of import licenses to regulated 
companies by the Department of Petroleum Resources are 
transparent. 
     
d) The methods used in monitoring the actual quantity of imported 
petroleum products by the Department of Petroleum Resources are 
transparent 
     
e) When the Department of Petroleum Resources refrains from 
disclosing information because it is confidential the rationale for that 
confidentiality is explained and justified. 
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4. Please indicate your opinion by ticking the appropriate box for each of the following 
statements relating to DPR’s expertise in the conduct of its regulatory functions with respect 
to the downstream petroleum sector. 
     
(1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree) 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) The Department of Petroleum Resources has the capacity to 
regulate the downstream petroleum sector. 
     
b) The Department of Petroleum Resources deploys skilled 
personnel to conduct its downstream regulatory functions.  
     
c) Staff from the Department of Petroleum Resources receive 
necessary training to ensure setting of quality regulations in the 
downstream sector.  
     
d) The Department of Petroleum Resources is effective in setting 
in place a framework for regulatory governance.  
     
e) The appointment of executive management of the Department 
of Petroleum Resources is primarily based on merit. 
     
f) The personnel of the department of petroleum resources 
discharge their regulatory duties in a professional manner. 
     
 
 
If you have any additional comment, please write it in the space provided below: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………… 
 
SECTION THREE 
This section relates to the regulatory governance practices of the Petroleum 
Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA) 
 
1. Please indicate your opinion by ticking the appropriate box for each of the following 
statements relating to PPPRA’s independence in the conduct of its regulatory functions with 
respect to the downstream petroleum sector. 
      
(1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree) 
 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency has financial 
autonomy to determine its own budgets. 
     
b) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency is free to make 
independent decisions relating to pricing of petroleum products in 
the downstream sector. 
     
c) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency effectively 
reprimands regulated companies that do not adhere to pricing 
regulations. 
     
d) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency regulatory 
decisions are only overruled by a court of jurisdiction or pre-
established appellate panel.  
     
e) The Department of Petroleum Resources independently recruits, 
deploys, promotes and disciplines its own personnel. 
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2. Please indicate your opinion by ticking the appropriate box for each of the following 
statements relating to PPPRA’s accountability in the conduct of its regulatory functions with 
respect to the downstream petroleum sector. 
  
(1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree) 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Guidelines to determine the price of petroleum products are 
clearly stated and publicised by the Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency. 
i)  j)  k)  l)  m)  
b) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency follows due 
process to determine the actual price of petroleum products. 
n)  o)  p)  q)  r)  
c) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency discloses to 
the general public all important information relating to pricing 
of petroleum products.  
s)  t)  u)  v)  w)  
d) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency discloses to 
the National Assembly all important information relating to 
pricing of petroleum products. 
x)  y)  z)  aa)  bb)  
e) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency audits all 
claims for subsidies relating to petroleum products.  
cc)  dd)  ee)  ff)  gg)  
f) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency follows due 
process relating to payment of subsidies. 
hh)  ii)  jj)  kk)  ll)  
g) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency discloses 
all discovered malpractices relating to pricing of petroleum 
products. 
mm)  nn)  oo)  pp)  qq)  
h) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency discloses 
all discovered malpractices relating to subsidy claims of 
petroleum products. 
rr)  ss)  tt)  uu)  vv)  
i) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency 
periodically discloses all generated revenue to legitimate 
stakeholders. 
ww)  xx)  yy)  zz)  aaa)  
 
3. Please indicate your opinion by ticking the appropriate box for each of the following 
statements relating to PPPRA’s transparency in the conduct of its regulatory functions with 
respect to the downstream petroleum sector. 
    
(1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree) 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency consults all 
legitimate stakeholders in major regulatory decisions.  
     
b) The methods used in reviewing the price of petroleum products 
by the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency are 
transparent. 
     
c) The methods used in determining the actual price of petroleum 
products by the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency 
are transparent. 
     
d) When the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency 
refrains from disclosing information because it is confidential 
the rationale for that confidentiality is explained and justified. 
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4. Please indicate your opinion by ticking the appropriate box for each of the following 
statements relating to PPPRA’s expertise in the conduct of its regulatory functions with 
respect to the downstream petroleum sector. 
 
(1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree) 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency has the 
capacity to regulate the price of petroleum products. 
     
b) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency deploys 
skilled personnel to conduct its regulatory functions relating to 
pricing of petroleum products.  
     
c) Staff from the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency 
receive the necessary training to ensure the setting of high 
quality regulations relating to pricing of petroleum products. 
     
d) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency is effective 
in setting in place a framework for regulatory governance. 
     
e) The appointment of executive management of the Petroleum 
Products Pricing Regulatory Agency is primarily based on 
merit.  
     
f) The personnel of the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory 
Agency discharge their regulatory duties in a professional 
manner.  
     
 
If you have any additional comment, please write it in the space provided below: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………. 
 
 
SECTION FOUR 
This section relates to the regulatory governance practices of the Petroleum 
Equalisation Fund (PEF) 
 
1. Please indicate your opinion by ticking the appropriate box for each of the following 
statements relating to PEF’s independence in the conduct of its regulatory functions with 
respect to the downstream petroleum sector. 
 
(1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree) 
 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a)  The Petroleum Equalisation Fund has financial autonomy to 
determine its own budgets. 
     
b)  The Petroleum Equalisation Fund is free to make independent 
decisions relating to price equalisation in the downstream 
petroleum sector. 
     
c)  The Petroleum Equalisation Fund effectively reprimands regulated 
companies that do not adhere to price equalisation policy. 
     
d)  The Petroleum Equalisation Fund regulatory decisions are only 
overruled by a court of jurisdiction or pre-established appellate 
panel. 
     
e) The Department of Petroleum Resources independently recruits, 
deploys, promotes and disciplines its own personnel. 
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2. Please indicate your opinion by ticking the appropriate box for each of the following 
statements relating to PEF’s accountability in the conduct of its regulatory functions with 
respect to the downstream petroleum sector. 
  
(1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree) 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Guidelines to equalize the price of petroleum products are clearly 
stated and publicised by Petroleum Equalisation fund. 
     
b) The Petroleum Equalisation fund follows due process in 
equalizing the price of petroleum products in the country. 
     
c) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund follows due process in 
determining actual bridging costs. 
     
d) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund discloses to the general public 
important information relating to price equalisation.  
     
e) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund discloses to the National 
Assembly information relating to price equalisation.  
     
f) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund audits all bridging claims 
relating to the transportation of petroleum products.  
     
g) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund follows due process relating to 
payment of bridging. 
     
h) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund discloses all significant 
discovered malpractices relating to bridging. 
     
i) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund discloses in total all revenue it 
generates relating to the registration of transporters. 
     
 
 
3. Please indicate your opinion by ticking the appropriate box for each of the following 
statements relating to PEF’s transparency in the conduct of its regulatory factions of the 
downstream petroleum sector. 
 
(1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree) 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
a) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund consults all legitimate 
stakeholders in major decisions relating to price equalisation.  
     
b) The methods used in determining the actual cost of bridging the 
petroleum products by the Petroleum Equalisation Fund are 
transparent. 
     
c) When the Petroleum Equalisation Fund refrains from disclosing 
information because it is confidential the rationale for that 
confidentiality is explained and justified. 
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4. Please indicate your opinion by ticking the appropriate box for each of the following 
statements relating to PEF’s expertise in the conduct of its regulatory functions with respect 
to the downstream petroleum sector. 
    
(1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree) 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund has the capacity to determine 
the actual bridging costs in the country. 
     
b) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund deploys skilled personnel to 
conduct its regulatory functions relating to price equalisation of 
petroleum products.  
     
c) Staff from the Petroleum Equalisation Fund receive the 
necessary training to ensure setting of high quality regulations 
relating to price equalisation of petroleum products. 
     
d) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund is effective in setting in place a 
framework for regulatory governance.  
     
e) The appointment of executive management of the Petroleum 
Equalisation Fund is primarily based on merit. 
     
f) The personnel of the Petroleum Equalisation Fund discharge 
their regulatory duties in a professional manner. 
     
 
 
If you have any additional comment, please write it in the space provided below: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………… 
 
Thank you very much for your time and interest. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Follow up Interview questions 
 
(1) From the analysis of the responses to the questionnaire it appears that 
experts believe that there are issues that have affected the 
independence of the Nigerian downstream regulators. Do you share 
this view? If so, can you please comment on the factors that have 
affected, or might have affected the freedom of the regulators to act in 
an independent manner? 
 
(2) From the questionnaire findings, it appears that experts believe that 
there are issues that have affected the accountability of the Nigerian 
downstream regulators. Do you share this view? If so, can you please 
comment on the factors that have affected, or might have affected the 
accountability practice of the Nigerian Downstream regulatory 
agencies?  
 
(3) Given the responses from the questionnaire the perceptions of the 
experts in relation to the transparency practice of the Nigerian 
downstream regulatory agencies is not as expected. Can you please 
suggest the ways in which those perceptions can be overcome?  
 
(4) Despite a perception amongst the experts that the Nigerian 
downstream regulatory agencies have skills to regulate the sector 
effectively. These same experts believe the skills are not being fully 
utilised. Why might this be the case and how can it be remedied?  
 
(5) From the findings of the questionnaire, it appears that the perception 
of respondents from Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative (NEITI), Civil Society (CS) and Trade Union (TU) were 
materially different from that of Department of Petroleum Resource 
(DPR) and Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA) 
in relation to accountability and transparency practices of the 
Nigerian downstream regulatory agencies? Why would these experts 
have this different view?  
 
(6) Do you agree that the performance of the Nigerian downstream 
regulatory agencies assist the ability of the government to meet its 
societal aims and objectives?  
 
(7) What steps should be taken to enhance the performance of the 
Nigerian  downstream regulatory agencies? 
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Appendix 3A, 3B and 3C below presented the Mann-Whitney results in relation 
to the first hypothesis. 
Appendix 3A 
f) The Department of Petroleum Resources has financial autonomy to determine its own budgets. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * * * * * * * 
P1 * n/a * * * * * * * * 
P2 * * n/a * .023 .028 * * .001 .001 
P3 * * * n/a .030 .021 * * .019  .022 
 N1  * * .023 .030 n/a *** * .015 * * 
N2 * * .028 .021 * n/a * .025 * * 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * .025 .041 
I1 * * * * .015 .025 * n/a .002 .001 
C1 * * .001 .019 * * .025 .002 n/a * 
T1 * * .001 .022 * * .041 .001 * n/a 
g) The Department of Petroleum Resources is free to make independent decisions relating to the 
regulations of the downstream petroleum sector. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
 D1 n/a * * * * * * * * * 
P1 * n/a .011 .007 * * * .030 * * 
 P2 * .011 n/a * * .020 * * .024 .011 
P3 * .007 * n/a * .014 * * .027 .008 
N1 * * * * n/a * * * * * 
N2 * * .020 .014 * n/a * .046 * * 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * * * 
I1 * .030 * * * .046 * n/a .048 .028 
C1 * * .024 .027 * * * .048 n/a * 
T1 * * .011 .008 * * * .028 * n/a 
h) Department of Petroleum Resources effectively reprimands regulated companies that do not adhere to 
regulations. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a .003 * * .003 .008 * * .005 .008 
P1 .003 n/a .000 .038 * * .032 .035 * * 
 P2 * .000 n/a * .000 .001 * * .000 .000 
 P3 * .038 * n/a .030 * * * .023 .042 
N1 .003 * .000 .030 n/a * .034 * * * 
N2 .008 * .001 * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * .032 * * .034 * n/a * .035 * 
I1 * .035 * * * * * n/a .038 * 
C1 .005 * .000 .023 * * .035 .038 n/a * 
T1 .008 * .000 .042 * * * * * n/a 
i) The Department of Petroleum Resources’ regulatory decisions are only overruled by a court of 
jurisdiction or a pre-established appellate panel. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * .018 .033 .022 .008 .045 .007 
 P1 * n/a * * * * * * * * 
P2 * * n/a * .005 .014 .008 .001 .021 .000 
P3 * * * n/a * * * * * * 
N1 .018 * .005 * n/a * * * * * 
N2 .033 * .014 * * n/a * * * * 
M1 .022 * .008 * * * n/a * * * 
I1 .008 * .001 * * * * n/a * * 
C1 .045 * .021 * * * * * n/a * 
T1 .007 * .000 * * * * * * n/a 
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a) D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency 
(PPPRA), P2= Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company 
(PPMC), N1 = Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), 
M1= Major Oil Marketing Companies (MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= 
Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade Union (TU) 
b) Only Mann-Whitney tests with p=values of equal to, or less than 0.05 (i.e. p<.05) are shown in the table 
c) *: No Significance difference 
d) N/A: Not Applicable 
 
  Appendix 3B 
j) The Department of Petroleum Resources independently recruits, deploys, promotes and disciplines its 
own personnel. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * .009 * * * * * * * 
 P1 * n/a .002 * * * * * * .000 
P2 .009 .002 n/a * .000 .014 .001 .034 .000 * 
P3 * * * n/a * * .037 * .010 .008 
N1 * * .000 * n/a * * * * * 
N2 * * .014 * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * .001 .037 * * n/a * * * 
I1 * * .034 * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * * .000 .010 * * * * n/a * 
T1 * .000 * .008 * * * * * n/a 
f) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency has financial autonomy to determine its own 
budgets. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
 D1 n/a * .000 * .001 .000 * * * * 
 P1 * n/a * * * .049 * * * * 
P2 .000 * n/a * .000 * * * * * 
P3 * * * n/a * .009 * * * * 
N1 .001 * .000 * n/a * .006 * * .003 
N2 .000 .049 * .009 * n/a .004 .014 * .001 
M1 * * * * .006 .004 n/a * * * 
I1 * * * * * .014 * n/a * * 
C1 * * * * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * * * * .003 .001 * * * n/a 
g) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency is free to make independent decisions relating 
to the pricing of petroleum products in the downstream sector. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
 D1 n/a * * * .000 * * * * * 
P1 * n/a * * .009 * * * * * 
P2 * * n/a * .001 * * * * * 
P3 * * *** n/a .000 * * * * * 
N1 .000 .009 .001 .000 n/a .003 * .005 .001 .000 
N2 * * * * .003 n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * * * 
I1 * * * * .005 * * n/a * * 
C1 * * * * .001 * * * n/a * 
T1 * * * * .000 * * * * n/a 
h) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency effectively reprimands regulated companies 
that do not adhere to the pricing regulations. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * .002 * * * .015 * 
P1 * n/a * * .007 * * * .031 * 
P2 * * n/a * * * * * * * 
P3 * * * n/a * * * * * * 
N1 .002 .007 * * n/a .020 .003 * * .018 
N2 * * * * .020 n/a * * * * 
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a) D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency 
(PPPRA), P2= Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company 
(PPMC), N1 = Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), 
M1= Major Oil Marketing Companies (MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= 
Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade Union (TU) 
b) Only Mann-Whitney tests with p=values of equal to, or less than 0.05 (i.e. p<.05) are shown in the table 
c) *: No Significance Difference 
d) N/A: Not Applicable 
 
Appendix 3C 
M1 * * * * .003 * n/a * .017 * 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 .015 .031 * * * * .017 * n/a * 
T1 * * * * .018 * * * * n/a 
i) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency regulatory decisions are only overruled by a 
court of jurisdiction or a pre-established appellate panel. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
 D1 n/a * * * .020 * .007 * * * 
 P1 * n/a * * * * * * * * 
P2 * * n/a * .045 * .013 * * * 
P3 * * * n/a * * * * * * 
N1 .020 * .045 * n/a * * * * * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 .007 * .013 * * * n/a * * * 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * * * * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * * * * * * * * * n/a 
j) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency independently recruits, deploys, promotes and 
disciplines its own personnel. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * .000 * * .033 .003 .002 
 P1 * n/a * * .027 * * * * * 
 P2 * * n/a * .000 * * * .003 .003 
P3 * * * n/a .034 * * * * * 
N1 .000 .027 .000 .034 n/a * * * * * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * .001 .006 * 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * * * 
I1 .033 * * * * .001 * n/a * * 
C1 .003 * .003 * * .006 * * n/a * 
T1 .002 * .003 * * * * * * n/a 
j) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund has the financial autonomy to determine its own budgets. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * .008 .003 * * * .007 
P1 * n/a * * .018 .002 * * * .028 
P2 * * n/a * .013 * * * * * 
P3 * * * n/a * * .045 * * * 
N1 .008 .018 .013 * n/a * * * .032 * 
N2 .003 .002 * * * n/a .048 * .007 * 
M1 * * * .045 * .048 n/a * * * 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * * * * .032 .007 * * n/a .044 
T1 .007 .028 * * * * * * .044 n/a 
k) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund is free to make independent decisions relating to price 
equalisation in the downstream petroleum sector. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * .036 .026 .008 .003 * * * * 
 P1 * n/a * * * * * * * * 
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a) D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency 
(PPPRA), P2= Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company 
(PPMC), N1 = Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), 
M1= Major Oil Marketing Companies (MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= 
Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade Union (TU) 
b) Only Mann-Whitney tests with p=values of equal to, or less than 0.05 (i.e. p<.05) are shown in the table 
c) *: No Significance Difference  
d) N/A: Not Applicable  
 
 
 
P2 .036 * n/a * * * * * .025 .025 
 P3 .026 * * n/a * * .004 * * * 
N1 .008 * * * n/a * * * * * 
N2 .003 * * * * n/a * .035 * * 
M1 * * * .004 * * n/a * * * 
I1 * * * * * .035 * n/a * * 
C1 * * .025 * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * * .025 * * * * * * n/a 
l) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund effectively reprimands regulated companies that do not adhere 
to price equalisation policy. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a .008 .000 .003 .001 * * * * .005 
 P1 .008 n/a .026 * * * * * * * 
 P2 .000 .026 n/a * * .009 .003 * * * 
P3 .003 * * n/a * * .044 * * * 
N1 .001 * * * n/a * .015 * * * 
N2 * * .009 * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * .003 .044 .015 * n/a * * * 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * * * * * * * * n/a * 
T1 .005 * * * * * * * * n/a 
m) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund’s regulatory decisions are only overruled by a court of 
jurisdiction or a pre-established appellate panel. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a .005 * .029 .000 .025 .000 .003 * .012 
P1 .005 n/a * * * * * * * * 
P2 * * n/a * * * * * * * 
P3 .029 * * n/a * * * * * * 
N1 .000 * * * n/a * * * * * 
N2 .025 * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 .000 * * * * * n/a * * * 
I1 .003 * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * * * * * * * * n/a * 
T1 .012 * * * * * * * * n/a 
n) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund independently recruits, deploys, promotes and disciplines its 
own personnel. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a .010 * * .003 * * .011 .004 .003 
P1 .010 n/a * * * * * * .012 * 
 P2 * * n/a * * * * * * * 
P3 * * * n/a * * * * * * 
N1 .003 * * * n/a * * * .015 * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * * * 
I1 .011 * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 .004 .012 * * * .015 * * n/a * 
T1 .003 * * * * * * * * n/a 
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Appendix 4A, 4B and 4C below presented the Mann-Whitney results in relation 
to the second hypothesis. 
Appendix 4A  
i) Guidelines for obtaining import permits are clearly stated and publicised by the Department of 
Petroleum Resources. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
 D1 n/a .001 * .026 .002 .000 * * .000 .000 
 P1 .001 n/a .044 * * * * * * * 
P2 * .044 n/a * .040 .007 * * .019 .001 
P3 .026 * * n/a * * * * * * 
N1 .002 * .040 * n/a * * * * * 
N2 .000 * .007 * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * * * 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 .000 * .019 * * * * * n/a * 
T1 .000 * .001 * * * * * * n/a 
j) The Department of Petroleum Resources follows due process in the issue of import licenses to 
regulated companies. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1  n/a .000 .027 .024 .009 * .019 * .000 .000 
P1 .000 n/a * * * * * * * * 
P2 .027 * n/a * * * .005 * .001 .010 
P3 .024 * * n/a * * * * * * 
N1 .009 * * * n/a * * * * * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 .019 * .005 * * * n/a * * * 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 .000 * .001 * * * * * n/a * 
T1 .000 * .010 * * * * * * n/a 
k) The Department of Petroleum Resources discloses information to the general public relating to the 
issue of import licenses. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * * * * * * * 
P1 * n/a * * * * * * * * 
P2 * * n/a .041 * * * * * * 
P3 * * .041 n/a .031 * .033 * * * 
N1 * * * .031 n/a * * * * * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * .033 * * n/a * * * 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * * * * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * * * * * * * * * n/a 
l) The Department of Petroleum Resources discloses information to the National Assembly relating 
to the issue of import licenses. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * * * * * .040 * 
P1 * n/a .007 * * * * * * * 
P2 * .007 n/a * * * * * .001 .004 
P3 * * * n/a * * * * .012 * 
N1 * * * * n/a * * * * * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * .023 * 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * .005 * 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 .040 * .001 .012 * .023 .005 * n/a * 
T1 * * .004 * * *  * * n/a 
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a) D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency 
(PPPRA), P2= Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company 
(PPMC), N1 = Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), 
M1= Major Oil Marketing Companies (MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= 
Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade Union (TU) 
b) Only Mann-Whitney tests with p=values of equal to, or less than 0.05 (i.e. p<.05) are shown in the table 
c) *: No Significance Difference  
d) N/A: Not Applicable  
 
 
Appendix 4B 
m)  The Department of Petroleum Resources discloses the amount of imported petroleum products to 
the general public  
* 
n) The Department of Petroleum Resources discloses all discovered malpractices relating to 
importation of petroleum products. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * .033 * * * .050 .018 
P1 * n/a * * * * * * * * 
P2 * * n/a * * * * * * * 
P3 * * * n/a * * * * * * 
N1 .033 * * * n/a * * * * * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * * * 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 .050 * * * * * * * n/a * 
T1 .018 * * * * * * * * n/a 
o) The Department of Petroleum Resources discloses information relating to petroleum products 
refined locally. 
* 
p) The Department of Petroleum Resources discloses all the revenue it generates annually. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a .026 * * * * * * * * 
P1 .026 n/a * * * * * * * * 
P2 * * n/a * * * * * * * 
P3 * * * n/a * * * * * * 
N1 * * * * n/a * * * * * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * * * 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * * * * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * * * * * * * * * n/a 
f) Guidelines to determine the price of petroleum products are clearly stated and publicised by the 
Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * * * * * * * 
P1 * n/a * * * .010 * * .001 * 
P2 * * n/a * * * * * * * 
P3 * * * n/a * * * * * * 
N1 * * * * n/a * * * * * 
N2 * .010 * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * * * 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * .001 * * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * * * * * * * * * n/a 
g) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency follows due process in the pricing of petroleum 
products. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
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D1 n/a * * * * * * * * * 
P1 * n/a * * .017 * * * .038 * 
P2 * * n/a * * * * * * * 
P3 * * * n/a * * * * * * 
N1 * .017 * * n/a * .003 * * * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * * .003 * n/a * .007 * 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * .038 * * * * .007 * n/a * 
T1 * * * * * * * * * n/a 
h) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency discloses to the general public all important 
information relating to the pricing of petroleum products. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * * * * * .036 * 
P1 * n/a * .010 .003 * * .030 .001 * 
P2 * * n/a * .017 * * * .004 * 
P3 * .010 * n/a * .009 * * * * 
N1 * .003 .017 * n/a .001 .040 * * * 
N2 * * * .009 .001 n/a * .006 .000 .004 
M1 * * * * .040 * n/a .016 * * 
I1 * .030 * * * .006 * n/a * * 
C1 .036 .001 .004 * * .000 .016 * n/a * 
T1 * * * * * .004 * * * n/a 
i) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency discloses to the National Assembly all 
important information relating to the pricing of petroleum products. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * * * * * * * 
P1 * n/a * .017 .033 * * * * .011 
P2 * * n/a .005 .011 .033 * .015 .029 .004 
P3 * .017 .005 n/a * * * * * * 
N1 * .033 .011 * n/a * * * * * 
N2 * * .033 * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * * .041 
I1 * * .015 * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * * .029 * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * .011 .004 * * * .041 * * n/a 
j) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency audits all subsidy claims relating to the 
importation of petroleum products. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * .006 .002 * * * .002 .028 
P1 * n/a * .008 .003 * * * .003 .029 
P2 * * n/a * * * * * * * 
P3 .006 .008 * n/a * * * * * * 
N1 .002 .003 * * n/a * * * * * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * * * 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 .002 .003 * * * * * * n/a * 
T1 .028 .029 * * * * * * * n/a 
k) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency follows due process relating to all subsidy 
payments. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * * * * * * * 
P1 * n/a * .000 .000 .020 .049 .008 .001 .000 
P2 * * n/a * * * * * * * 
P3 * .000 * n/a * * * * * * 
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a) D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency 
(PPPRA), P2= Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company 
(PPMC), N1 = Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), 
M1= Major Oil Marketing Companies (MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= 
Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade Union (TU) 
b) Only Mann-Whitney tests with p=values of equal to, or less than 0.05 (i.e. p<.05) are shown in the table 
c) *: No Significance difference 
d) N/A: Not Applicable 
 
 
N1 * .000 * * n/a * * * * * 
N2 * .020 * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * .049 * * * * n/a * * * 
I1 * .008 * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * .001 * * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * .000 * * * * * * * n/a 
l) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency discloses all discovered malpractices relating 
to the pricing of petroleum products. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
 D1 n/a * * * * * * * .003 * 
P1 * n/a .001 .002 .004 * * * .021 * 
P2 * .001 n/a * * * * * .047 * 
P3 * .002 * n/a * * * * .013 * 
N1 * .004 * * n/a * * * .018 * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * * * 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 .003 .021 .047 .013 .018 * * * n/a * 
T1 * * * * * * * * * n/a 
m) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency discloses all discovered malpractices relating 
to subsidy claims for petroleum products. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * .004 .010 * * * * * 
P1 * n/a * .001 .003 * * * * .005 
P2 * * n/a * * * * * * * 
P3 .004 .001 * n/a * .005 * * * * 
N1 .010 .003 * * n/a .013 * * * * 
N2 * * * .005 .013 n/a * * * .049 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * * * 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * * * * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * .005 * * * .049 * * * n/a 
n) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency periodically discloses all generated revenue to 
legitimate stakeholders. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * .001 .011 .002 * * .006 * * 
P1 * n/a .037 .032 .012 * * .045 * * 
P2 .001 .037 n/a * * * * * * * 
P3 .011 .032 * n/a * * * * * * 
N1 .002 .012 * * n/a * * * * * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * * * 
I1 .006 .045 * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * * * * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * * * * * * * * * n/a 
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Appendix 4C 
j) Guidelines to equalize the price of petroleum products are clearly stated and publicised by the 
Petroleum Equalisation fund. 
* 
k) The Petroleum Equalisation fund follows due process in equalizing the price of petroleum 
products in the country. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * * * * * * * 
P1 * n/a .003 * * * * * * * 
P2 * .003 n/a .015 .002 .001 * .012 .009 .004 
P3 * * .015 n/a * * * * * * 
N1 * * .002 * n/a * * * * * 
N2 * * .001 * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * * * 
I1 * * .012 * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * * .009 * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * * .004 * * * * * * n/a 
l) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund follows due process in determining bridging costs. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * .013 * .004 * * * .009 * 
P1 * n/a .005 * .011 * .006 * .025 * 
P2 .013 .005 n/a .007 * * * * * * 
P3 *  .007 n/a * * 039 * * * 
N1 .004 .011 * * n/a * * * * * 
N2 *  * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * .006 * 039 * * n/a * * * 
I1 *  * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 .009 .025 * * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * * * * * * * * * n/a 
m) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund discloses to the general public, important information relating to 
price equalisation of petroleum products. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * .025 * * * * * * * 
P1 * n/a .001 * * * * * * * 
P2 .025 .001 n/a .001 .000 .011 .002 .028 .003 .003 
P3 * * .001 n/a * * * * * * 
N1 * * .000 * n/a * * * * * 
N2 * * .011 * * n/a  * * * 
M1 * * .002 * * * n/a * * * 
I1 * * .028 * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * * .003 * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * * .003 * * * * * * n/a 
n) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund discloses to the National Assembly, information relating to price 
equalisation of petroleum products. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * .003 * * * * * * * 
P1 * n/a .001 * * * * * * * 
P2 .003 .001 n/a .001 .001 .002 .003 .003 .001 .000 
P3 * * .001 n/a * * * * * * 
N1 * * .001 * n/a * * * * * 
N2 * * .002 * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * .003 * * * n/a * * * 
I1 * * .003 * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * * .001 * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * * .000 * * * * * * n/a 
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a) D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency 
(PPPRA), P2= Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company 
(PPMC), N1 = Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), 
M1= Major Oil Marketing Companies (MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= 
Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade Union (TU) 
b) Only Mann-Whitney tests with p=values of equal to, or less than 0.05 (i.e. p<.05) are shown in the table 
c) *: No Significance difference 
d) N/A: Not Applicable 
 
 
 
 
o) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund audits all bridging claims relating to the transportation of 
petroleum products. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * .007 * * * * * * 
P1 * n/a * * * * * * * * 
P2 * * n/a .000 * * * * .012 .021 
P3 .007  .000 n/a * * * * * * 
N1 * * * * n/a * * * * * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * * * 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * * .012 * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * * .021 * * * * * * n/a 
p) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund follows due process relating to the payment of bridging claims. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a .011 * .003 .006 * * * .003 .001 
P1 .011 n/a .000 * * * .026 * * * 
P2 * .000 n/a .000 .000 * * * .000 .000 
P3 .003 * .000 n/a * * .009 * * * 
N1 .006 * .000 * n/a * .016 * * * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * .026 * .009 .016 * n/a * .007 .003 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 .003 * .000 * * * .007 * n/a * 
T1 .001 * .000 * * * .003 * * n/a 
q) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund discloses all significant discovered malpractices relating to 
bridging claims. 
* 
r) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund discloses all revenue it generates relating to the registration of 
transporters. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * .012 * * * * * * * 
P1 * n/a .000 * * * * * * * 
P2 .012 .000 n/a .000 .001 * .000 .001 .002 * 
P3 * * .000 n/a * * * * * * 
N1 * * .001 * n/a * * * * * 
N2 * *  * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * .000 * * * n/a * * * 
I1 * * .001 * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * * .002 * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * * * * * * * * * n/a 
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Appendix 5A, 5B and 5C below presented the Mann-Whitney results in relation 
to the first hypothesis. 
Appendix 5A 
f) The Department of Petroleum Resources consults all legitimate stakeholders in major regulatory 
decisions. 
* 
g) The methods used by the Department of Petroleum Resources for the measurement of petroleum 
products are transparent. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 
P1 .000 n/a * * * * * * * * 
P2 .000 * n/a * * * * * * * 
P3 .000 * * n/a * * * * * * 
N1 .000 * * * n/a * * * * * 
N2 .000 * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 .001 * * * * * n/a * * * 
I1 .000 * * * * * * n/a * * 
C .000 * * * * * * * n/a * 
T1 .000 * * * * * * * * n/a 
h) The methods used by the Department of Petroleum Resources for the issue of import licenses to 
regulated companies are transparent. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1  n/a * * .004 .024 * * * * * 
P1 * n/a * * * * * * * * 
P2 * * n/a * * * * * * * 
P3 .004 * * n/a * * * * * * 
N1 .024 * * * n/a * * * * * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * * * 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * * * * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * * * * * * * * * n/a 
i) The methods used by the Department of Petroleum Resources in monitoring the amount of 
imported petroleum products are transparent. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a .006 .004 .005 .024 .024 * * .004 .003 
P1 .006 n/a * * * * * * * * 
P2 .004 * n/a * * * .030 * * * 
P3 .005 * * n/a * * * * * * 
N1 .024 * * * n/a * * * * * 
N2 .024 * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * .030 * * * n/a  .030 .019 
I1 * * * * * *  n/a * * 
C1 .004 * * * * * .030 * n/a * 
T1 .003 * * * * * .019 * * n/a 
j) When the Department of Petroleum Resources refrains from disclosing confidential information 
relating to its activities, the rationale for such non-disclosure is explained and justified. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1  n/a * * .037 .020 * * * .017 .000 
P1  * n/a * * * * * * * .009 
P2 * * n/a * * * * * * * 
P3 .037 * * n/a * * * * * * 
N1 .020 * * * n/a * * * * * 
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a) D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency 
(PPPRA), P2= Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company 
(PPMC), N1 = Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), 
M1= Major Oil Marketing Companies (MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= 
Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade Union (TU) 
b) Only Mann-Whitney tests with p=values of equal to, or less than 0.05 (i.e. p<.05) are shown in the table 
c) *: No Significance difference 
d) N/A: Not Applicable 
 
 
 
Appendix 5B 
 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * * * 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 .017 * * * * * * * n/a * 
T1 .000 .009 * * * * * * * n/a 
e) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency consults all legitimate stakeholders in major 
regulatory decisions. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * * * * * * * 
P1 * n/a * * * * * * * * 
P2 * * n/a * * * * * * * 
P3 * * * n/a * * * * * * 
N1 * * * * n/a * * .011 * * 
N2 * * * * * n/a .029 .003 * * 
M1 * * * * * .029 n/a * * * 
I1 * * * * .011 .003 * n/a .050 .009 
C1 * * * * * * * .050 n/a * 
T1 * * * * * * * .009 * n/a 
f) The methods used by the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency in reviewing the price of 
petroleum products are transparent. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * * * * * * * 
P1 * n/a * .015 .005 .001 * * * .014 
P2 * * n/a * .019 .003 * * * * 
P3 * .015 * n/a * * .032 * * * 
N1 * .005 019 * n/a * .008 * * * 
N2 * .001 .003 * * n/a .001 * .007 .006 
M1 * * * .032 .008 .001 n/a * * .025 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * * * * * .007 * * n/a * 
T1 * .014 * * * .006 .025 * * n/a 
g) The methods used by the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency in determining the actual 
price of petroleum products are transparent. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * * * * * * * 
P1 * n/a * * .015 * * * .035 * 
P2 * * n/a * .005 .031 * * .011 * 
P3 * * * n/a * * * * * * 
N1 * .015 005 * n/a * .020 * * * 
N2 * * .031 * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * .020 * * n/a * .043 * 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * .035 .011 * * * .043 * n/a * 
T1 * * * * * * * * * n/a 
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a) D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency 
(PPPRA), P2= Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company 
(PPMC), N1 = Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), 
M1= Major Oil Marketing Companies (MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= 
Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade Union (TU) 
b) Only Mann-Whitney tests with p=values of equal to, or less than 0.05 (i.e. p<.05) are shown in the table 
c) *: No Significance difference 
d) N/A: Not Applicable 
 
Appendix 5C 
 
h) When the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency refrains from disclosing confidential 
information relating to its activities, the rationale for such non-disclosure is explained and 
justified. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * .005 * * * * * 
P1 * n/a * * .001 * * * * * 
P2 * * n/a * .002 * * * * * 
P3 * * * n/a .029 * * * * * 
N1 .005 .001 .002 .029 n/a * * .008 * * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * * * 
I1 * * * * .008 * * n/a * * 
C1 * * * * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * * * * * * * * * n/a 
b) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund consults all legitimate stakeholders on major decisions relating 
to price equalisation. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * .001 * .047 .011 * * * * 
P1 * n/a .001 * * .027 * * * * 
P2 .001 .001 n/a .001 *  .001 .007 .001 .001 
P3 * * .001 n/a .033 .005 * * * * 
N1 .047 * * .033 n/a  .013 * * * 
N2 .011 .027 * .005 * n/a .004 .047 .028 * 
M1 * * .001 * .013 .004 n/a * * * 
I1 * * .007 * * .047 * n/a * * 
C1 * * .001 * * .028 * * n/a * 
T1 * * .001 * * * * * * n/a 
b) The methods used in determining the actual cost of bridging the petroleum products by the 
Petroleum Equalisation Fund are transparent. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * * * * * * * 
P1 * n/a * * * * * * * * 
P2 * * n/a * * * * * * * 
P3 * * * n/a * * * * * * 
N1 * * * * n/a * .009 .015 * * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * * .009 * n/a * * * 
I1 * * * * .015 * * n/a * * 
C1 * * * * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * * * * * * * * * n/a 
c) When the Petroleum Equalisation Fund refrains from disclosing confidential information relating to 
its activities, the rationale for such non-disclosure is explained and justified. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * .007 * * * * * 
P1 * n/a * * * * * * * * 
P2 * * n/a * * * * * * * 
277 
 
a) D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency 
(PPPRA), P2= Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company 
(PPMC), N1 = Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), 
M1= Major Oil Marketing Companies (MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= 
Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade Union (TU) 
b) Only Mann-Whitney tests with p=values of equal to, or less than 0.05 (i.e. p<.05) are shown in the table 
c) *: No Significance difference 
d) N/A: Not Applicable 
 
Appendix 6A, 6B and 6C below presented the Mann-Whitney results in relation 
to the first hypothesis. 
Appendix 6A 
P3 * * * n/a * * * * * .030 
N1 .007 * * * n/a * * * * .002 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * .038 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * * * 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * * * * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * * * .030 .002 .038 * * * n/a 
c) The Department of Petroleum Resources has the capacity to regulate the downstream petroleum 
sector. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * * * * * * * 
P1 * n/a * .008 * * .004 .016 * * 
P2 * * n/a * * * * * * * 
P3 * .008 * n/a * .037 * * * .012 
N1 * * * * n/a * .037 * * * 
N2 * * * .037 * n/a .022 .040 * * 
M1 * .004 * * .037 .022 n/a * * .005 
I1 * .016 * * * .040 * n/a * .020 
C1 * * * * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * * * .012 * * .005 .020 * n/a 
d) The Department of Petroleum Resources deploys skilled personnel to conduct its downstream 
regulatory functions. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a .000 .005 * .000 * * * .015 * 
P1 .000 n/a * .024 * * .008 .033 * * 
P2 .005 * n/a * * * * * * * 
P3 * .024 * n/a .027 * * * * * 
N1 .000 * * .027 n/a * .010 .032 * * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * .008 * * .010 * n/a * * * 
I1 * .033 * * .032 * * n/a * * 
C1 .015 * * * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * * * * * * * * * n/a 
c) Staff from the Department of Petroleum Resources receive the necessary training to ensure the 
implementation of quality regulations in the downstream sector. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * * * * * * .002 
P1 * n/a * * * * * * * * 
P2 * * n/a * * * * * * .001 
P3 * * * n/a * * * * * .012 
N1 * * * * n/a * * * * * 
N2 * * * *  n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * * .005 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
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a) D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency 
(PPPRA), P2= Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company 
(PPMC), N1 = Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), 
M1= Major Oil Marketing Companies (MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= 
Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade Union (TU) 
b) Only Mann-Whitney tests with p=values of equal to, or less than 0.05 (i.e. p<.05) are shown in the table 
c) *: No Significance difference 
d) N/A: Not Applicable 
 
Appendix 6B 
C1 * * * * * * * * n/a * 
T1 .002 * .001 .012 * * .005 * * n/a 
d) The Department of Petroleum Resources is effective in establishing a framework for good regulatory 
governance. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * * * * * * * 
P1 * n/a * * * * * * * * 
P2 * * n/a * * * * * * * 
P3 * * * n/a * * * * * * 
N1 * * * * n/a * .024 * * * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * * .024 * n/a * * .031 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * .001 
C1 * * * * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * * * * * * .031 .001 * n/a 
e) The appointment of the executive management of the Department of Petroleum Resources is 
primarily based on merit. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * * * * * * * 
P1 * n/a .025 * * * .034 * * * 
P2 * .025 n/a * .027 * * * .009 .006 
P3 * * * n/a * * * * * * 
N1 * * .027 * n/a * * * * * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * .034 * * * * n/a * .046 .028 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * * .009 * * * .046 * n/a * 
T1 * * .006 * * * .028 * * n/a 
f) The personnel of the Department of Petroleum Resources discharge their regulatory duties in a 
professional manner. 
* 
b) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency has the capacity to regulate the pricing of 
petroleum products. 
* 
b) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency deploys skilled personnel to conduct its 
regulatory functions relating to the pricing of petroleum products. 
* 
c) Staff from the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency receive the necessary training to 
ensure the implementation of high quality regulations relating to the pricing of petroleum products. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * .003 .002 * * * .009 * 
P1 * n/a * .005 .004 * * * .014 * 
P2 * * n/a .001 * * * * .005 * 
P3 .003 .005 .001 n/a * * .013 * * * 
N1 .002 .004 * * n/a * .007 .001 * * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * .013 .007 * n/a * .024 * 
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a) D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency 
(PPPRA), P2= Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company 
(PPMC), N1 = Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), 
M1= Major Oil Marketing Companies (MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= 
Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade Union (TU) 
b) Only Mann-Whitney tests with p=values of equal to, or less than 0.05 (i.e. p<.05) are shown in the table 
c) *: No Significance difference 
d) N/A: Not Applicable 
 
Appendix 6C 
 
I1 * * * * .001 * * n/a * * 
C1 .009 .014 .005 * * * .024 * n/a * 
T1 * * * * * * * * * n/a 
d) The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency is effective in establishing a framework for 
good regulatory governance. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * .026 .001 * * * * * 
P1 * n/a * .037 .004 * * * * * 
P2 * * n/a .018 .011 * * * * * 
P3 .026 .037 .018 n/a * .026 * * * * 
N1 .001 .004 .011 * n/a .018 * .017 * .006 
N2 * * * .026 .018 n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * * * 
I1 * * * * .017 * * n/a * * 
C1 * * * * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * * * * .006 * * * * n/a 
e) The appointment of the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency’s executive management is 
based primarily on merit. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * .019 .005 .027 * * * * 
P1 * n/a * * .023 * * * * * 
P2 * * n/a .000 .000 .000 * * * * 
P3 .019 * .000 n/a * * * * .029 * 
N1 .005 .023 .000 * n/a * .046 * .002 * 
N2 .027 * .000 * * n/a * * .021 * 
M1 * * * * .046 * n/a * * * 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * * * .029 .002 .021 * * n/a * 
T1 * * * * * * * * * n/a 
f) The personnel of the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency discharge their regulatory 
duties in a professional manner. 
* 
b) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund has the capacity to regulate bridging activities in accordance 
with its mandate. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * .033 * * * * * * * 
P1 * n/a .020 * * * * .048 * * 
P2 .033 .020 n/a .040 .011 .004 * * .006 .001 
P3 * * .040 n/a * * * * * * 
N1 * * .011 * n/a * .032 .032 * * 
N2 * * .004 * * n/a .008 .018 * * 
M1 * * * * .032 .008 n/a * * * 
I1 * .048 * * .032 .018 * n/a .030 .009 
C1 * * .006 * * * * .030 n/a * 
T1 * * .001 * * * * .009 * n/a 
b) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund deploys the necessary personnel to conduct its regulatory 
functions relating to the downstream petroleum sector. 
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Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * .007 * * * * * * * 
P1 * n/a .001 * * * .048 * * * 
P2 .007 .001 n/a .001 .000 .002 * .005 002 .001 
P3 * * .001 n/a * * * * * * 
N1 * * .000 * n/a * .021 * * * 
N2 * * .002 * * n/a  * * * 
M1 * .048 * * .021 * n/a * * * 
I1 * * .005 * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * * 002 * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * * .001 * * * * * * n/a 
c) Staff from the Petroleum Equalisation Fund receive the necessary training to ensure the 
implementation of high quality regulations relating to its mandate. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * * * * * * * 
P1 * n/a * * * * * * * * 
P2 * * n/a .009 * * * .027 .003 .010 
P3 * * .009 n/a * * * * * * 
N1 * * * * n/a * * * * * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * .014 * 
I1 * * .027 * * * * n/a  * 
C1 * * .003 * * .014 * * n/a * 
T1 * * .010 * * * * * * n/a 
d) The Petroleum Equalisation Fund is effective in putting in place a framework for good regulatory 
governance in accordance with its mandate. C1 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * * * * * * * 
P1 * n/a * * * * * * * * 
P2 * * n/a * * * * * * * 
P3 * *  n/a * * * * * * 
N1 * * * * n/a * * * * * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * .003 .001 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a .006 .012 
C1 * * * * * * .003 .006 n/a * 
T1 * * * * * * .001 .012 * n/a 
e) The appointment of executive management of the Petroleum Equalisation Fund is based primarily 
on merit. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * * * * * * * * * 
P1 * n/a * * * * * * * * 
P2 * * n/a .001 .023 * * .002 .003 .003 
P3 * * .001 n/a * * * * * * 
N1 * * .023 * n/a * * * * * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * * * * * n/a * * * 
I1 * * .002 * * * * n/a * * 
C1 * * .003 * * * * * n/a * 
T1 * * .003 * * * * * * n/a 
f) The personnel of the Petroleum Equalisation Fund discharge their regulatory duties in a 
professional manner. 
Groups D1 P1 P2 P3 N1 N2 M1 I1 C1 T1 
D1 n/a * .009 .017 .022 * * * .045 .005 
P1 * n/a .004 * * * * * * .008 
P2 .009 .004 n/a * * * .020 * * * 
P3 .017 * * n/a * * .022 * * * 
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a) D1=Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), P1= Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency 
(PPPRA), P2= Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), P3 = Pipeline and Product Marketing Company 
(PPMC), N1 = Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N2 = National Assembly (NA), 
M1= Major Oil Marketing Companies (MOMC), I1= Independent Oil Marketing Companies (IOMC), C1= 
Civil Society (CS), T1= Trade Union (TU) 
b) Only Mann-Whitney tests with p=values of equal to, or less than 0.05 (i.e. p<.05) are shown in the table 
c) *: No Significance difference 
d) N/A: Not Applicable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N1 .022 * * * n/a * .036 * * * 
N2 * * * * * n/a * * * * 
M1 * * .020 .022 .036 * n/a * .049 .005 
I1 * * * * * * * n/a * * 
C1 .045 * * * * * .049 * n/a * 
T1 .005 .008 * * * * .005 * * n/a 
